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WILL THE INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT
PROGRAM ENABLE LAw SCHOOLS TO
CONTINUE TO PROVIDE "HARVARDSTYLE" LEGAL EDUCATION?
Gregory Crespi*
ABSTRACT
Legal education provided in the prevailing "Harvard-style" now costs
students on average between $160,000 and $250,000 for their three years of
study, the precise amount depending on the law school attended, the alternative employment opportunitiesforegone, and the amount of scholarship
assistance provided. However, the median starting salaryfor full-time, entry-level legal positions has declined in recent years to only $60,000/year,
and upwards of 45% of recent law graduatesare now unable to obtain fulltime legal employment within nine months of their graduation.This dismal
employment situation is unlikely to significantly improve over the next few
years. While the attractive job opportunities still available to graduates of
the elite law schools justify the large majority of those graduatesincurring
the high costs of legal education, even under unsubsidized federal student
loan terms, the more limited job prospects facing most graduates of nonelite law schools do not justify their incurring those costs. However, the
Income-Based Repayment ("IBR") program as now implemented by the
Obama Administration's Pay As You Earn ("PAYE") rules may significantly change this situation for some of those latter students.
In this Article I conduct several different detailed analyses of the IBR
program under the PA YE rules and of the related and even more generous
Public Service Loan Forgiveness ("PSLF") program. My conclusion is
that the IBR loan repayment and debt- forgiveness provisions are sufficiently attractive so that Harvard-style legal education is once again a financially viable proposition for many law students, not only for those
students attending the most elite law schools but also for many students
attendingnon-elite law schools, specifically those students who will graduate in the upper half of their class or better at the 40 or so upper- or midtier non-elite law schools, and also for those students who will graduate in
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the upper quarter of their class or better from one of the more than 150
lower-tier law schools. For most other law students, however, who in the
current employment market have only a slim chance of obtaining a fulltime entry-level legalposition paying even $60,000/year, and who have very
slim chances of obtaining a qualifying public service position as an attorney under the PSLFprogram, attending law school is no longer economically justified even with the generous IBR and PSLF loan repayment and
debt forgiveness options.
The continuation of Harvard-style legal education at the non-elite law
schools will depend to a large extent upon the willingness of their students
to continue to borrow the large sums needed to pay for this expensive education. My analysis leads me to somewhat optimistically conclude that
many, perhaps most prospective law students consideringattending upperor mid-tier non-elite law schools should go ahead and matriculate, taking
out the needed student loans and then enrolling after graduation in either
the IBR or PSLFprograms to contractually lock in these favorable repayment and debtforgiveness terms. If they choose to do so then these schools
should be able to continue to offer Harvard-style education, albeit probably with significantly smaller enrollments and in a moderately more financially stringent manner. Whether these prospective students will in fact be
willing to attend and later enroll in the IBR or PSLF programs on a large
scale in the coming years, however, is uncertain. On the other hand, I conclude more pessimistically that attending lower-tier law schools can no
longer be financially justified even under the IBR or PSLF programsfor
any but the best of their students, and consequently the longer-term prospects for the survival of those many law schools is not very promising.
Finally, one should not assume that the IBR and PSLFprograms will
necessarily continue to be availableto law students indefinitely in their current configurations. The regressive taxpayer subsidies of uncertainbut possibly substantialsize that these programsprovide to law students-a group
of people that are drawn disproportionatelyfrom upper-income socioeconomic groups-andindirectly to law schools-generallyrelatively affluent
institutions-and to relatively very affluent law faculty makes these programs an attractive targetfor political leaders who are looking for opportunities to reduce federal deficits, particularly at a time when there is
recognized to be a pronounced oversupply of new lawyers relative to the
employment opportunities.
The elite law schools will surely survive in any case, but law school
deans and other legal education leaders may only have a relatively short
period of time to take proactive steps that will significantly reduce law
school costs and tuitions for the upper- and mid-tier non-elite schools so
that those schools can survive should the IBR and PSLFprograms be substantially curtailedor even eliminatedfor law students. The substantialcurtailment of these programsfor law students would, however, probably lead
to the closing of many if not most of the lower-tier law schools no matter
what efforts they may undertake to try to avoid this fate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
unfavorable job market that new law graduates now face,

coming after decades of steady increases in the real costs of attending law school, has resulted in a serious financial crisis for legal education.' The basic problem is easy to understand but very difficult
1. For a comprehensive discussion of the difficult financial situation facing legal education, see generally PAUL CAMPOs, DON'T Go To LAw SCHOOL (UNLESS) (2012) [hereineafter CAMPOS (2012)]; BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012) [hereinafter
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS); Richard W. Bourne, The Coming Crash in Legal

Education:How We Got Here, and Where We Go Now, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 651 (2012);
Steven R. Smith, Financingthe Future of Legal Education:Not What It Used To Be, 2012
MICH. ST. L. REV. 579 (2012). For a briefer summary of the problem, see also Steven J.
Harper, Pop Goes the Law, CHRON. REV., Mar. 11, 2013, at 1-3.
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to solve. A typical law student who graduated in 2011 with an average
amount of undergraduate and law school student loan debt, and who then
obtained a full-time legal position paying the median $60,000/year entrylevel salary for such positions, 2 cannot afford to service that debt even
under an extended twenty-five-year repayment schedule. 3 This debt service problem is even more severe for those numerous law graduates with
2. NALP Employment Report and Salary Survey for the Class of2011, NALP, available at http://www.nalp.org/starting-salaries class-of 2011 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) [hereinafter NALP (2011)]. Throughout this Article I will utilize the $60,000/year class of 2011
median starting salary for my calculations.
The "adjusted mean" salary for class of 2011 law graduates who took full-time legal
positions, calculated on the basis of the 65% of graduates who obtained such positions and
then reported their salary to the National Association for Law Placement ("NALP"), was
adjusted downwards by the NALP from the reported mean salary of about $78,600 to
about $74,000 to take into account the disproportionate non-response bias for graduates
taking lower-salaried positions. Id. This adjusted mean figure is substantially higher than
the calculated $60,000/year median salary, primarily due to the approximately $160,000/
year starting salaries that were obtained by 14% of the members of that group of graduates
who reported obtaining full-time legal positions. Id. The true median salary for all class of
2011 graduates who obtained full-time legal positions may well also be several thousand
dollars lower than the calculated $60,000/year median salary because of the same disproportionate non-response bias of lower-salaried graduates. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The
Law School in the New Legal Environment: Legal Educators Defending the Status Quo, 41
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 131, 137 (2013) [hereinafter Tamanaha (2013)]. The comparable
median starting salary for class of 2012 graduates was recently determined to be a slightly
higher $61,245/year. NALP Employment Report and Salary Survey for the Class of 2012,
NALP, available at http://www.nalp.org/starting-salaries-class-of-2012 (last visited Nov. 8,
2013) [hereinafter NALP (2012)].
It should be emphasized that these median and adjusted mean figures reflect only the
approximately 55% of the class of 2011 who had obtained full-time legal positions as of
nine months after their graduation. See infra note 4. For that reason alone the $60,000/year
figure surely overstates the overall median income of all graduating class members, perhaps by a substantial amount. While some graduates decline full-time legal positions to
pursue other attractive opportunities or for personal reasons, most graduates who do not
take full-time legal positions have tried and failed to do so and must then accept part-time
or contract lawyer legal positions at substantially lower salaries, accept generally lowerpaying non-legal positions, or remain unemployed. In addition, that 55% full-time legal
employment figure may itself be somewhat misleading because it includes one-year judicial
clerkships, temporary positions paid for by the law schools, some unpaid public sector positions, and some unsustainable solo or small firm positions. Id. The true proportion of class
of 2011 graduates who obtained full-time, long-term legal positions may be as small as onethird. See Paul Campos, The Crisisof the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
177, 197-202 (2012) [hereinafter Campos, The Crisis]. Therefore, perhaps no more than
about 20% of the class of 2011 graduates obtained full-time legal positions with starting
salaries of at least $60,000/year within nine months of graduation.
On the other hand, the choice of nine months after graduation as the date at which the
placement success of a law school cohort is measured, while long enough after graduation
to allow for employers to consider bar examination results, is nevertheless rather arbitrary
and may significantly understate the proportion of graduates who later in their careers
move to a salary career track comparable to that of those graduates who are able to obtain
at least $60,000/year salary within nine months of graduation. Research carried out by Ben
Barros, while limited to the graduates of one lower-tier law school, suggests that this may
be the case and that things are not quite as bad as the rather low full-time employment
rates measured nine months after graduation would indicate. See Ben Barros, Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom on the Legal Job Market-PartI, FACULTY LOUNGE (Apr.
30, 2013), available at http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/04/reconsidering-the-conven
tional-wisdom-on-the-legal-job-market-part-i.html.
3. See infra Part III.
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larger-than-average student debt loads, and for those many law graduates
who are only able to obtain full-time legal positions that offer starting
salaries of less than $60,000/year, and even worse for those graduates with
both large student loan debts and low starting salaries. Moreover, the
situation is absolutely dire for most of the approximately 45% of recent
law graduates who are unable to obtain a full-time legal position.4
The prevailing model of legal education in the United States that has
contributed to this financial crisis is what I label "Harvard-style" education. By this phrase, I am referring generically to the instructional approach that originated at Harvard Law School in the late-19th century
and since then has been very widely replicated. This approach requires
three years of full-time legal study or the part-time equivalent thereof
over a longer period, where the instruction is provided by research-oriented faculties comprised primarily of well-paid, mostly tenured scholars
with relatively light teaching loads. It makes only relatively modest use of
inexpensive adjunct instructors and online courses. It also includes large
and expensive clinical programs, library facilities, and extensive student
services. This expensive educational approach is designed primarily to
prepare students for prestigious public sector positions, highly remunerative associate positions with prominent private law firms, or academic positions, often after a short-term judicial clerkship after graduation.
As I will discuss below, the high cost of Harvard-style legal education
can still be financially justified by its benefits for the large majority of
students who attend one of the ten or so most elite law schools and who,
even in the current depressed job market, still have excellent employment
prospects upon graduation.5 For students paying full tuition, however,
4. Only 54.9 % of the class of 2011 graduates had obtained full-time legal positions
requiring passage of a bar examination by nine months after their graduation. Mark Hansen, Employment Picturefor Law Grads Looks Pretty Much the Same as a Year Ago-For
Better and Worse, A.B.A. J., June 1, 2013, at 1. See also 2012 LAw GRADUATE EMPLOYMENT DATA, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUc. (giving a 54.9% placement rate for the class of
2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal-edu
cation-and-admissionstothebar/reports/lawgrad employmentdata.authcheckdam
.pdf. The corresponding NALP calculation of this figure was 56.7%. Press Release, National Association for Law Placement, Median Private Practice Starting Salaries for the
Class of 2011 Plunge as Private Practice Jobs Continue to Erode (July 12, 2012), available
at http://www.nalp.org/classof2011 salpressrel. The comparable ABA figure for the class of
2012 is 56.2%, Hansen, supra, at 2, but that figure includes 1.1% of graduates employed in
temporary law school-funded positions. Id. (citing Kyle McEntee of the Law School Transparency blog website. But see Barros, supra note 2, arguing that this percentage may increase significantly over a longer period of time after graduation.
5. Let me make clear exactly which law schools I am referring to with each of my
various law school categorizations. The phrase "elite law schools" is an inherently imprecise one that is used to mean different things by different persons and in different contexts.
People sometimes use this phrase to refer to the top fourteen schools as listed in the annual
U.S. News & World Report law-school rankings. The phrase, however, is sometimes used
much more narrowly to refer to only the top five or six schools in that ranking, particularly
when it is used in the affordability and graduate placement context that this article addresses. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLs, supra note 1, at 158 ("A $150,000
debt is unwise for anyone not at a top-five school."). When I use the phrase "elite law
schools" in this Article, I am taking a compromise position and referring specifically to
those law schools regularly ranked among the top ten law schools in the annual U.S. News
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this education is now overpriced relative to its benefits for a large proportion of the students attending one of the forty or so upper- or mid-tier
non-elite law schools, 6 students who will probably not be able to obtain
such positions upon graduation. At full tuition this form of legal education is significantly overpriced for all but the best students at one or another of the more than 150 lower-tier law schools7 since most of these
students now have only a rather slim chance of obtaining such attractive
positions.8 Absent a major increase in the demand for new lawyers for
sophisticated legal work which would sharply increase the number of
large-firm, entry-level associate positions paying six-figure starting salaries ranging up to $160,000/year, something no serious observer expects
to occur anytime in the foreseeable future, 9 the recent sharp decline in
the number of law school applicantso is likely to persist and may even
& World Report law school rankings, specifically Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, the
University of Chicago, New York University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Virginia, the University of California-Berkeley, and the University of Michigan.
When I refer to "upper-tier, non-elite" law schools, in contrast, I am referring broadly to
those non-elite law schools that are at least occasionally ranked among the top twenty-five
law schools in the annual U.S. News & World Report rankings. When I refer to "upper- or
mid-tier, non-elite" law schools I am referring broadly to those non-elite law schools that
are at least occasionally ranked among the top fifty schools in the annual U.S. News &
World Report rankings. I include my own law school, Southern Methodist University, in
that latter group. I recognize that there is a tendency on the part of law professors who are
analyzing the prospects for the future of legal education to somewhat self-servingly conclude that their own school and those ranked above it will survive the coming travails,
although most of the schools ranked just below their own school will perhaps not thrive,
and I admit that I have reached this same conclusion. However, as I argue in this Article, I
believe that I do have legitimate grounds for concluding that the fifty or so upper- or midtier law schools, including Southern Methodist University, do in fact have far better prospects for long-term survival than do most of the lower-tier law schools.
The remaining approximately 150 or so accredited law schools and couple of dozen or so
unaccredited law schools I will refer to collectively as "lower-tier" law schools. I therefore
am using that phrase "lower-tier" very broadly to refer to approximately three-quarters of
all U.S. law schools, which is broader than the more common use of that phrase as a
description of only the very lowest-ranked law schools that are not included among the top
100 or 150 schools. However, I have found it useful for the purposes of this Article to
group these 150-plus schools that consistently fall outside the U.S. News & World Report
top-50 ranking together into one broad category, given the similarly unfavorable employment prospects now faced by the large majority of the graduates of virtually all of these
schools. However, Deborah Merritt has noted, see infra note 17, that given the local or
regional rather than national character of much mid-size law firm hiring there are some
lower-tier law schools that for one reason or another may have significantly better graduate placement rates than one might expect from their relatively unfavorable overall U.S.
News & World Report ranking status.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8.

TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW

SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 112 ("[Most lower-tier law

schools], particularly those not located in major legal markets . . . place fewer than 5 percent, and in some cases none of their graduates in these coveted [NLJ 250] jobs.").
9. See, e.g., id. at 168-71.
10. The Law School Admissions Council notes that the overall number of applicants
to law school declined from a high of 100,600 for the 2004-2005 academic year to 78,500
for the 2011-2012 academic year, and the number further declined another 13.5% to
68,000 for the 2012-2013 academic year. LSAC Volume Summary, LSAC, available at
http://www.1sac.org/docs/default-source/data-(1sac-resources)-docs/1sac-volume-summary
.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). As of August 8, 2013 only 54,839 persons had applied to law

2014]

Income-Based Repayment Program

57

worsen over the next few years as the current employment market realities for young lawyers become ever more widely appreciated.
The simple fact is that US law schools collectively have substantial
overcapacity relative to student demand for law degrees at current tuition
levels and given the currently limited employment opportunities." Even
if the number of law school applicants stabilizes at the current level
rather than continues to decline a number of informed observers are of
the view that the situation is unsustainable and will necessitate a rather
drastic restructuring of legal education to substantially reduce costs and
tuitions.12 A number of controversial suggestions have been offered as to
what form this restructuring should take.13
The discussion that is now taking place regarding the merits of the various proposals that have been suggested for restructuring legal education
to significantly reduce its costs and tuition charges is certainly important.
However, I will not attempt to directly contribute to that discussion in
this Article. I will instead focus on one aspect of the related threshold
question of whether a fundamental restructuring of any type is really
needed. In particular, what is often lacking in these discussions of which
schools for the 2013-2014 academic year, another 17.9% decline from the prior academic
year. LSAC Current Volume-Three Year Summary, LSAC, available at http://www.1sac
.org/docs/default-source/data-(1sac-resources)-docs/1sac-volume-summary.pdf (last visited
Nov. 8, 2013).
11. See infra note 30.
12. See generally, e.g., CAMPos (2012), supra note 1; TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW
SCHOOLs, supra note 2; Ray Worthy Campbell, Law School Disruption,26 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 341 (2013); Campos, The Crisis, supra note 2; Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2; William Henderson, A Blueprintfor Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461 (2013); Paul Horwitz, What
Ails the Law Schools?, 111 MICH. L. REV. 955 (2013); Stephen F. Diamond, The Futureof
the American Law School or, How the 'Crits' Led Brian Tamanaha Astray and his Failing
Law Schools Fails, Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3-13 (Jan. 27,
2013) available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=2207749; Bryant Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric,
and Competition in Legal Education:A Sociological Perspectiveon the (Latest) Crisis of the
Legal Profession and Legal Education, 24 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 503 (2013); Samuel
Estreicher, The Roosevelt-Cardozo Way: The Case for Bar Eligibility After Two Years of
Law School, 15 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 599 (2012); Kyle P. McEntee et al., The Crisis
in Legal Education: Dabbling in Disaster Planning,46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 225 (2012);
Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century, 96
IOWA L. REV. 1649 (2012); Lucille A. Jewell, You're Doing it Wrong: How the Anti-Law
School Scam Blogging Movement Can Shape the Legal Profession, 12 MINN. J.L. Sci. &
TECH. 239 (2011); Lloyd Cohen, Comments on the Legal Education Cartel, 17 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 25 (2008); Maimon Schwarzchild, The Ethics and Economics of American
Legal Education Today, 17 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2008).
13. Some examples of fundamental changes in legal education that have been recently
suggested by various commentators include significantly reducing law school enrollments,
allowing law students to take the state bar examinations and qualify for legal practice after
only two years of law school instruction, eliminating mandatory tenure requirements,
sharply increasing faculty teaching loads, making much greater use of adjunct professors,
reducing or eliminating ABA library or other facility requirements, imposing more stringent federal loan eligibility requirements, and making greater use of online instruction. See
generally TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 167-85; see also supra note
12. A discussion of the merits of these various proposals for restructuring legal education is
outside of the scope of this Article, which considers only the question of the affordability
of the current expensive Harvard-style of legal education, offered at current tuition levels,
under standard government loan repayment terms and then under the more generous IBR
and PSLF programs.

58

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

radical changes of one sort or another are called for is a comprehensive
assessment of how significantly the financial problems of Harvard-style
legal education that are motivating such proposals have been alleviated
by the federal government's Income-Based Repayment ("IBR") program. 14 Under IBR student borrowers are offered generous loan repayment and debt forgiveness terms, particularly under the Obama
Administration's new Pay As You Earn rules (the "PAYE rules") that
have made those terms substantially more advantageous to qualifying
borrowers.15 This Article is an attempt to provide such an assessment of
the IBR program.
As I will demonstrate below in (perhaps excruciating) mathematical
detail, the IBR program as implemented by the PAYE rules has a rather
dramatic effect on the affordability of Harvard-style legal education, but
that effect will likely vary greatly in impact across the different reputational tiers of law schools. The impact of the IBR program upon students
attending the handful of elite law schoolsl 6 will probably be relatively
minor, since attending one or another of those schools still generally
leads to very attractive employment opportunities for the large majority
of graduates. Probably between about 80% and 90% of those graduates
obtain full-time legal employment,' 7 and the large majority of those posi14. In 2007 Congress created both the IBR program and the PSLF program. College
Cost Reduction and Access Act Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007). In 2010 Congress
passed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010), which made the IBR program more generous, but with a delayed
July 1, 2014 implementation date for the changes made. This implementation date was then
accelerated to November 1, 2012 by the Obama Administration's announcement of the
PAYE rules and the subsequent issuance of the final PAYE regulations. 34 C.F.R. §§ 674,
682, 685 (2012).
15. 34 C.F.R. §§ 674, 682, 685 (2012). The PAYE rules apply for loans taken out beginning in January 2013, but those provisions are only applicable to borrowers who did not
take out any federal student loans prior to October 2007. The PAYE rules will thus apply
to the large majority of law students enrolling in 2013 or later. For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution and features of the IBR program and of the Obama Administration's
PAYE rules that have made that program far more generous to law students, see generally
Phillip G. Schrag, Failing Law Schools-Brian Tamanaha'sMisguided Missile, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETmIcs 387 (2013) [hereinafter Schrag (2013)]; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Problems
with Income Based Repayment, and the Charge of Elitism: Responses to Schrag and Chambliss, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL. ETHICs 521 (2013) [hereinafter Tamanaha, Problems With Income
Based Repayment]; Jason Delisle & Alex Holt, Safety Net or Windfall: Examining Changes
to Income-Based Repayment for Federal Student Loans, NEw AMERICA FOUNDATION (Oct.
16, 2012), available at http://edmoney.newamerica.net/publications/policy/safety-netor
windfall [hereinafter Delisle & Holt]; Phillip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment
Assistancefor Public Interest Lawyers and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit
Organizations,36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 27 (2007) [hereinafter Schrag (2007)].
16. See supra note 5.

17. A recent paper by Deborah Merritt sheds light on the different placement results
for the different tiers of law schools. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Job Gap, The Money
Gap, and the Responsibility of Legal Educators, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1 (2013) [hereinafter Merritt (2013)]. Merritt breaks down the approximately 55% overall rate at which
class of 2011 graduates obtained full time legal positions by different reputational tiers of
schools and determined that the thirty-five schools ranked between sixteen and fifty in the
latest U.S. News and World Report rankings had an average placement rate in such positions of 59.1%, while a stratified sample of fifteen lower-tier law schools had an average
placement rate in such positions of 46.1%, each figure calculated after school-funded posi-
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tions will pay at or above the $60,000/year median salary,18 with a significant percentage of those positions being with large law firms and paying
six-figure starting salaries ranging upwards of $160,000/year.1 9 The costs
of elite law school attendance, not surprisingly, can still be financially jus-

tions were excluded from the calculations, id. at 7-11, which may lower placement rates by
approximately 1.1%. Hansen, supra note 4, at 1-3. My definition of "upper- and mid-tier"
law schools is broader than Merritt's and includes also those prominent schools ranked
eleven to fifteen in those rankings, with each of these five schools likely having somewhat
higher placement rates than 59.1%, suggesting an average placement rate for the entire
group of forty upper- or mid-tier non-elite law schools of about 60%.
The difference that Merritt found in placement rates in full-time legal positions between
the different reputational tiers of schools does not differ as much as one might expect,
which she explains is a consequence of the generally local and regional rather than national
character of law firm hiring practices. Merritt (2013), supra, at 11. This seems a plausible
explanation; one would think, for example, that a relatively rural state's flagship university
public law school would have long-established and strong placement connections with the
larger local law firms that would belie a perhaps relatively unfavorable national reputational ranking.
Merritt did not determine the comparable placement rates for the group of ten elite law
schools, but her calculation of 78.9% for the 10th ranked school would suggest a placement
rate in such full-time legal positions for the elite law schools of between 80% and 90%, say
about 85%, probably with a significant fraction of those graduates that do not take such
positions doing so out of choice.
Research done by William Henderson also suggests that law school placement rates are
significantly impacted by local and regional factors as well as by the law school's national
reputation. See William Henderson, The Competition is for Full-Time, Professional LawRelated Jobs, Part I, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (June 28, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad
.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/06/the-competition-is-full-time-professional-law-related-jobs
.html; William Henderson, The Competition is for Full-Time, Professional Law-Related
Jobs, Part 2, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (June 30, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
legalwhiteboard/2013/06/the-competition-is-for-full-time-law-related-professional-jobspart-ii.html (finding that a number of lower-tier law schools with strong positions in local
legal employment markets had class of 2011 graduate placement rates well above the national average).
On June 9, 2014 President Obama issued an Executive Order that will go into effect in
December, 2015 and that will allow those persons who first took out federal student loans
prior to October, 2007 to now also avail themselves of the PAYE program. This Executive
Order will significantly expand the number of persons eligible for this preferential program
by up to 5 million people. Memorandum for the Sec'y of the Treasury and Sec'y of Educ.,
79 Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 12, 2014).
18. Merritt (2013), supra note 17, at 16-17. Merritt did not attempt to determine how
the distribution of salaries for these positions might vary between the different tiers of law
schools. Surely a far higher proportion of elite school graduates taking full-time legal positions would obtain salaries at or above the $60,000/year median starting salary than would
be the case for the upper- or mid-tier non-elite law schools, and those latter schools are
surely in the same advantageous position with regard to the graduates of the lower-tier
schools. I have not seen a detailed study of this question, but my admittedly somewhat
impressionistic estimate here is that probably about 90% or more of those elite school
graduates who take full-time legal positions will earn starting salaries at or above the
$60,000/year median starting salary. This is also the case for about 70% of the graduates of
the upper- or mid-tier non-elite law schools, but only about at most 40% or so of the
graduates of lower-tier schools who obtain full-time positions will receive starting salaries
at or above this median salary.
19. See Press Release, National Association for Law Placement, Median First-year
Big-law Associate Salary Slumps to $145,000 in 2012, a Median Last Seen in 2007 (Sept. 20,
2012), available at http://nalp.org/2012_associatesalaries.
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tified for almost all students even absent the generous IBR provisions. 20
The IBR program will, however, further encourage elite law school attendance at least to a modest extent because it will reduce the now nonnegligible financial risk of having relatively unattractive employment
prospects after graduation as a result of doing poorly in one's studies.
The impact of the IBR program for students attending any of the more
than 150 lower-tier law schools 21 will probably also be relatively minor,
but for a very different and more depressing reason. Even under the generous IBR program terms, attending one or another of these schools is
still not financially justified for the large majority of their students, given
the relatively poor employment prospects that those students will later
face upon graduation. 22 At most of these lower-tier schools a student who
does not graduate in the top 10% of their class, or at the very least in
upper quarter of the class, has relatively poor prospects for obtaining fulltime legal employment at a $60,000/year or better starting salary. I hope
that prospective students considering attending one of these lower-tier
law schools come to better appreciate the difficult odds that they would
face.
The IBR program is therefore likely to have its most dramatic impact
on the students attending and the financial viability of the forty or so
upper- and mid-tier, non-elite law schools. 23 As I will demonstrate below,
under the IBR loan repayment provisions Harvard-style legal education
remains at least a borderline financially viable proposition for the many
prospective law students who will be average or better-than-average students at one of those schools. Those students will have reasonably good
prospects for obtaining full-time legal positions upon graduation that will
pay at or above the current $60,000/year median starting salary, even in
the current depressed job market.24 I will show in Part III of this Article
20. "[S]tudents [at elite law schools] on a whole obtain a positive economic return at
current tuition levels . . . elite schools are not yet producing large streams of economic
casualties." Tamanaha, Problems with Income Based Repayment, supra note 15, at 13.
21. See supra note 5.
22. Deborah Merritt estimates that only 46.1% of the graduates of those lower-tier
schools are able to obtain full-time legal employment within nine months of graduation.
Merritt (2013), supra note 17, at 14. My estimate is that only about 40% of those positions
will pay at or above the $60,000/year median starting salary. See supra note 18. I therefore
estimate that only about 46.1% x 40% = 18.4% of the graduates of those lower-tier schools
will be able to obtain full-time legal positions paying $60,000/year or more within that ninemonth period. Therefore students attending a lower-tier school need to graduate at least in
the upper-quarter of their class, if not somewhat higher, to have reasonably good prospects
for obtaining such positions. But see Barros,supra note 2 (suggesting that the longer term
prospects for such graduates may be significantly better than this).
23. See supra note 5.
24. Deborah Merritt estimates that 59.1% of the graduates of those thirty-five schools
ranked between sixteen and fifty in the most recent U.S. News & World Report rankings
are able to obtain full-time legal employment. Merritt (2013), supra note 17, at 10. For the
entire group of forty upper- and mid-tier non-elite schools I estimate the comparable percentage at a slightly higher 60%. See supra note 17. My further estimate is that about 70%
of those positions will pay at or above the $60,000/year median starting salary. See supra
note 18. I therefore also estimate that about 60% x 70% = 42% of the graduates of those
upper- or mid-tier non-elite law schools will be able to obtain full-time legal positions pay-
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that this seemingly modest starting salary is clearly insufficient to repay
the costs of law school if a student finances all of those costs with unsubsidized federal student loans at current high interest rates, even under an
extended 25-year repayment schedule. But as I will also demonstrate in
some detail in Parts IV and V, this salary is arguably sufficient to justify
these students who reasonably expect to obtain a median or better salary
incurring even relatively large student loan debts when they can be repaid
under the terms of the IBR program or under the even more generous
terms of the closely-related Public Service Loan Forgiveness ("PSLC")
program. Hopefully, prospective applicants to these upper- and mid-tier,
non-elite law schools will be able to realistically and accurately assess
their prospects for doing well enough academically-to be able to graduate at least in the upper half of their class, if not a little better than
that 25 -to justify incurring the costs of law school under IBR or PSLF
program repayment terms.26
If law students in the coming years prove willing to increase their usage
of the IBR program, which as I will discuss below in Part VI is a matter of
some uncertainty, then legal education may be sustainable indefinitely in
its current Harvard-style format. This is surely the case at the elite law
schools whose students have such good employment prospects that their
schools are not dependent on IBR program largesse, and probably also in
a moderately downsized and more financially stringent manner at the
forty or so upper- and mid-tier non-elite schools that still offer their better graduates a realistic prospect of obtaining full-time legal employment
ing $60,000/year or more. Therefore students graduating in the upper half of their classes
or better at upper- or mid-tier non-elite law schools will have relatively good prospects for
obtaining such positions.
My estimates of 90%, 70%, and 40% respectively for the proportions of those graduates
from each of the three tiers of law schools who are able to obtain full-time legal positions
that pay salaries at or above the overall median salary, see supra note 18, is roughly consistent with the overall numbers of law school graduates and overall starting salary distribution. There were 44,495 law graduates in 2011, Merritt (2013), supra note 17, at 3, an
average of approximately 222 graduates for each of the about 200 law schools (although
the schools vary considerably in size). About 55% of those 44,495 graduates were able to
obtain full-time legal positions, see supra note 4, a total of about 24,472 positions. About
half of those positions-12,236 jobs-paid at or above the median $60,000/year starting
salary.
If 90% of 85% of the approximately 2,220 graduates at the ten elite law schools took
full-time legal positions paying at or above the median starting salary, that is a total of
1,698 positions filled. If 70% of 60% of the approximately 8,880 graduates of the forty
upper- or mid-tier law schools took such positions, then that is another 3,730 positions
filled. If 40% of the 46.1% of the approximately 33,300 graduates of the 150 lower-tier law
schools took such positions, then that is another 6,141 positions filled. 1,698 + 3,730 + 6,141
= 11,569 positions. I attribute the discrepancy between this 11,569 figure and the 12,236
such positions estimated to exist from ABA figures, supra note 24, to pay at or above the
median starting salary at least partially to the fact that Merritt's and my estimated percentages exclude school-financed full-time legal employment, while the ABA figures include
such employment. Id. at 2.

25. Id.
26. But see CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 15-21 (discussing the "Special Snowflake
Syndrome" whereby law students and other high-achievers tend to regard themselves as
much less likely to suffer adverse events than the relevant statistical evidence would
indicate).
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paying the median or better starting salary. The prospects for members of
this latter group of schools are of course more promising for those law
schools that are fortunate enough to have large endowments to help them
remain solvent while they make the necessary longer-term cost structure
adjustments to balance their budgets with significantly smaller enrollments and somewhat lower tuition levels, or that are state-university law
schools that will probably have access to at least temporary emergencyfunding support during this extended adjustment period.
However, the longer term financial situation for the over 150 lower-tier
law schools that most law students now attend is far more problematic
even with the availability of the IBR and PSLF programs for their students. Even under the generous IBR and PSLF program terms the poor
employment prospects that the large majority of graduates of those
schools now face do not justify the substantial costs of attendance. Most
of these lower-tier law schools are likely to sharply contract or even close
altogether in the coming years, particularly those schools that are not exceptionally well-endowed nor part of state university systems that are
willing to continue the law school's operations at much lower tuition
levels and absorb significant losses on a regular basis.27
The elite law schools and their students will probably do just fine, even
in this difficult environment, and, as a result of the IBR and PSLF programs, the wolf may not yet be at the door for most of the upper- and
mid-tier non-elite schools. With some fairly significant reductions in their
class sizes, and with some moderate adjustments in their operations so as
to reduce their costs and limit their future tuition increases, those latter
schools will probably be able to continue to offer Harvard-style education
indefinitely if their students prove willing to utilize these generous loan
repayment programs. However, it should be of serious concern to the
deans of those more fortunate schools and others with an interest in the
long-term viability of legal education that the Harvard-style instructional
approach is now no longer financially viable for the large majority of law
students at upper- and mid-tier non-elite law schools unless they enroll in
the IBR or PSLF programs. Once one leaves the rarified world of the
elite law schools, legal education, even at the well-regarded upper- and
mid-tier non-elite law schools, is now unfortunately in roughly the same
position as the ethanol, wind power, and maritime shipping industries,
industries now essentially dependent on federal largesse to survive. And
even with those generous subsidy programs in place, legal education is
still not financially viable for the large majority of students at the lowertier schools, which calls into question the ability of those many schools to
survive over the longer term.
Moreover, even if law students at non-elite schools prove to be willing
on a large scale over the coming years to take on large loan debts in the
expectation of later IBR or PSLF program enrollment, which for several
27. See infra Part V.
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reasons that I will later discuss in Part VI is far from certain, the perpetual continuation of these federal programs for law students cannot be
taken for granted. There are strong and persistent political pressures to
reduce federal budget deficits.2 8 There is a widespread perception that
through the IBR and PSLF programs large and regressive federal subsidies are being provided to law students and indirectly to law professors, 2 9
persons that are disproportionately drawn from upper-income socioeconomic groups, during a period of time when there is clearly a significant
surplus of new law graduates relative to their employment opportunities.3 0 As I will discuss in Part VII the IBR and PSLF programs could
well become political targets for deficit hawks and be cut back substantially or even eliminated altogether for law students in coming years.3 1
If the IBR and PSLF programs are significantly curtailed in some fashion with regard to their availability or generosity for law students, this
would surely force an immediate and drastic response by all law schools
except for the handful of elite schools. Those upper- and mid-tier nonelite law schools that are fortunate enough to have access to the substantial financial resources necessary to allow for them to make an orderly
though painful transition over several years to a significantly smaller student body and to a more sustainable cost and tuition structure would
likely survive the loss of IBR program support. However, those upperand mid-tier non-elite law schools that lack the resources to run significant deficits during an extended transitional period would face major
problems that might even threaten their survival. In addition, any substantial curtailment of the IBR program for law students would probably
lead to the relatively rapid closing of many or even most of the lower-tier

28. See infra Part VII.
29. Precisely how large the subsidies provided by the IBR and PSLF programs will be
over the coming years is uncertain, for several reasons. This question is discussed infra Part
VII.
30. Even under relatively optimistic assumptions of 3% annual real Gross Domestic
Product growth from 2010 through 2020, with the economy assumed to reach full employment by 2020, the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") still predicts that only 73,600 new
lawyer jobs will be created between 2010 and 2020. C. Brett Lockard & Michael Wolf,
OccupationalEmployment Projectionsto 2020, MoNTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2012, at 94. The
BLS also projects that only an additional 138,400 lawyer jobs will be made available by
lawyers leaving practice through 2020. Matt Leichter, BLS Updates its 2020 Employment
Projections: For Law Students, It's Very Bad, L. SCH. TuTHON BUBBLE (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/2012/03/12/bls-updates. Even the BLS itself
admits that these economic assumptions may be overoptimistic. See Merritt (2013), supra
note 17, at 4. Even under these optimistic assumptions, these projections total to only
73,600 + 138,400 = 212,000 lawyer job openings over the 2010-2020 period for new law
graduates and others, about 21,200/year, which is only about half as many openings as the
40,000 to 45,000 or so law students that are expected to graduate each year over that time
period, suggesting that the current 55% rate at which graduates are able to obtain full-time
legal employment within 9 months of graduation may further decline. But see also Rene
Reich-Graefe, Keep Calm and Carry On, 27 GEO J. LEG. ETH. 55 (2014), which takes a
much more optimistic position regarding the evolving supply and demand balance for lawyers over the coming decade,
31. See infra Part VII.
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law schools, many of which, as I have noted, are unlikely to survive over
the longer term even with the IBR program in place.
Given this hanging Sword of Damocles presented by the potential loss
of IBR program support, legal education leaders would be well advised to
be proactive while there is still time available to make significant cost
reductions and tuition-level adjustments in a measured and thoughtful
fashion. Law school deans and other interested faculty members should
work together with the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, the American Association of Law
Schools, and the various state supreme courts to try to implement some
of the suggested fundamental reforms that might significantly reduce the
costs of legal education. Doing so may enable a significant number of
non-elite law schools to survive if the IBR program is significantly curtailed with regard to law students.
The main focus of the remainder of this Article will be on the question
of the financial viability of legal education for those prospective law students who are considering attending a non-elite law school, and who, because of the relatively high prestige of the school which they have been
invited to attend, or their relatively strong academic capabilities, or both,
are fortunate enough to have reasonably good prospects for obtaining a
full-time legal position paying at or above the median $60,000/year starting salary after graduation.32 I am here referring specifically to those students who will likely graduate at least in the upper half of their class at an
upper-or mid-tier non-elite law school,33 or at least in the top quarter of
their class at a lower-tier law school. 34 I will focus only limited attention
on the situation facing those prospective law school applicants who will
not do this well academically, and who consequently will not have nearly
as good employment prospects upon their graduation. The conclusion in
that instance is unfortunately simple and straightforward: the costs of law
school cannot be financially justified for those students even under the
generous IBR and PSLF programs.
To render my analysis comparable with earlier efforts to assess law
school affordability along the lines of important work done by Paul Cam38
37
pos, 3 5 Phillip Schrag, 36 Herwig Schlunk and Brian Tamanaha I have
chosen to focus primarily on the situation facing a typical law student
seeking to obtain a full-time, entry-level legal position paying at or above
32. Let me again note that only about 55% of class of 2011 graduates were able to
obtain full-time legal positions within nine months after graduation, see supra note 4, so
that only about 1/2 x 55% = 27.5% of that class was able to obtain full-time legal positions
paying $60,000/year or better starting salaries. So my main analytical focus group excludes
over 70% of law students.
33. See supra note 17.
34. Id.
35. See Campos, The Crisis, supra note 2.
36. See Schrag (2013), supra note 15.
37. See Herwig Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree a Good Investment Today?, 36
J. Legal Prof. 310 (2012).
38. See Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2.
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the median starting salary. I have taken this tact, rather than starting with
the well-known bimodal distribution of full-time starting salaries that has
emerged in recent years3 9 and then analyzing the prospects for a graduate
obtaining a position with a six-figure starting salary that is located in the
right "hump" of this bimodal distribution, and not in the $40,000/year$65,000/year left hump. 40 However, given that only approximately 15% of
the class of 2011 law graduates were able to obtain starting salaries in
excess of $100,000/year 41 the results that I would have reached following
the bimodal distribution-based analytical approach would very likely be
much the same as the conclusions that I have here reached.
Let me provide a brief road map to the remainder of this Article. Part
II presents some illustrative calculations regarding the current costs of
Harvard-style legal education. These calculations are necessarily based on
a number of simplifying assumptions and should be regarded as establishing only the general contours of the range of costs borne by typical law
students at various public and private law schools, and with different undergraduate degrees and different levels of scholarship assistance, rather
than as an attempt to precisely estimate any particular student's burden.
However, my calculations are nevertheless robust enough to allow me to
demonstrate in Part III that given the current depressed state of the market for full-time entry-level legal positions, expensive Harvard-style legal
education is no longer financially viable for the large majority of law students at non-elite law schools under unsubsidized loan repayment terms,
even under extended twenty-five-year debt repayment plans.
Part IV of this Article describes the main features of the IBR program
under the PAYE rules and demonstrates how this program significantly
alters the calculations regarding the balance of the costs and benefits of
law school for many, but not all, prospective law school applicants. Part
IV also demonstrates how this program preserves financial viability for
not only the elite law schools but perhaps also for the upper- or mid-tier
non-elite law schools, but unfortunately not for most lower-tier law
schools. I will also briefly discuss the related PSLF program and demonstrate its financial advantages and disadvantages for law graduates. Part
V considers in some mathematical detail the affordability of legal education given the IBR and PSLF programs and given the current $60,000/
year median salary for full-time entry-level legal positions, with the analysis conducted using several different complementary approaches to assess
affordability and making various assumptions about salary and price inflation trends. There I will also consider the magnitude of the governmental subsidies provided by those programs to law students and indirectly to
law schools and law faculties.
Part VI of the Article will address some concerns regarding whether
prospective law students may be reluctant in the coming years to rely
39. See Henderson, supra note 17.
40. Id.
41. Tamanaha, Problems With Income Based Repayment, supra note 15, at 4 n.11.
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upon either the IBR or PSLF programs as a basis for borrowing heavily
to finance their legal education, despite those programs' generous terms.
Part VII will discuss whether the IBR and PSLF programs' generous
terms are likely to continue in force for law student borrowers in the
coming years, given the strong political pressures to reduce federal government deficits and given the various legitimate criticisms that can be
made of these programs. Lastly, Part VIII will present a brief conclusion
to the Article.
II.

THE COSTS OF LAW SCHOOL

One major shortcoming of the recent literature addressing the financial
problems of legal education is that the various attempts to determine the
cost of legal education for law students, which is obviously needed as a
baseline for determining the size of their debt obligations upon graduation, and their consequent starting salary requirements, are often fundamentally flawed from an economic perspective. Many of the writers in
this field measure the cost of legal education by simply adding up the
required tuition and fees, the costs of books and other law school supplies, and the estimated living costs of a law student over their period of
legal education, and ignoring those costs that are of the nature of foregone income. 42 A cost estimate calculated in this rather simplistic manner
is seriously flawed in that it is both over- and under-inclusive.
Such an estimate is significantly over-inclusive in that the living costs of
a law student are not a marginal cost attributable to law school attendance. These living costs would have to be incurred whether or not the
person attended law school and therefore should not be included as a cost
of law school. In addition, a cost estimate calculated in this way is also
significantly under-inclusive in that it does not reflect the three years of
lost after-tax income that a typical full-time law student, who has alternative employment opportunities based on his undergraduate degree, would
forego to attend law school.
A properly calculated estimate of the costs of attending law school
should include what remains of that foregone income after adjusting for
federal and state income taxes, Social Security taxes, Medicare taxes, and
state and local sales taxes that would be paid from that income, but
42. For example, even as knowledgeable an analyst as Brian Tamanaha is guilty of the
error of counting living expenses that a person would have to incur whether or not they
attended law school as a relevant cost of law school, and of omitting the after-tax income
that was foregone as a result of attending law school: "Considering the full cost of attendance, Columbia Law School is the most expensive law school in the country in 2012, with
an estimated out-of-pocket cost totaling $81,950, including tuition ($53,636), living expenses ($19,894), health insurance ($2,981), books, computer and supplies ($3,520), and
miscellaneous fees ($1,133)." Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2, at 134. As another example,
in an illustrative calculation done for a hypothetical student at Fordham Law School, Paul
Campos correctly includes as a cost, at least conceptually if not quantitatively, the foregone
after-tax income that a law student sacrifices, but then errs by also including the unavoidable living expenses that are borne by the student as another cost of law school, thus overestimating the costs of law school. CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 54-55.
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should not include living costs during the period of attendance. The combined effect of these two offsetting errors is generally to underestimate
the costs of law school because the foregone after-tax income that typical
law students could have earned over three years based on their undergraduate degree is generally larger, sometimes substantially so, than their
living expenses during law school. 4 3
My estimate of the full costs of a three-year private school legal education for a law student commencing their legal education in the fall of 2013
and graduating in the spring of 2016 is approximately $250,000. Let me
explain in some detail how I have calculated this number, which may initially strike some readers as far too high, but is actually a relatively conservative estimate.
I first calculated three years of private law school tuition at an estimated $45,000/year for the 2013-2016 period 4 4 for a total tuition cost of
$135,000. I then added an estimated total expenditure of $8,000 for
books, computers, and other supplies over the three years of study, and
for the post-graduate bar examination course almost all graduates take.
Next, I added the estimated forgone after-tax income of $30,000/year for
three years-the approximately $45,000/year average income now earned
by college graduates in their initial year of full-time employment, 45 minUS
43. For example, even the high annual living costs (including health insurance) for
Columbia Law School students living in New York that is estimated by Tamanaha (2013),
supra note 2, at 134, at roughly $23,000 is substantially lower than those students' estimated average annual foregone after-tax income of $30,000. See infra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
One scholar who has taken what I regard as the correct approach to calculating the cost
of law school is Herwig Schlunk. See Schlunk, supra note 37, at 312. Schlunk excludes
living costs and includes after-tax foregone income as a cost. He estimates the cost of law
school as $209,714, $227,865, and $252,441 respectively for three different hypothetical students attending different law schools in different reputational tiers who forego different
amounts of income while attending law school. Id. These figures, although calculated without regard to possible scholarship assistance, are reasonably close to my law school cost
estimates of $160,000 to $250,000 that I will later explain in some detail.
44. The average private law school tuition in 2011-2012 has been estimated by the
American Bar Association's Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar Section at
$39,184, and this private school tuition has been increasing by between 5% and 8% per
year for the last seven years. A.B.A. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR SECTION,
LEGAL EDUCATION STATISTIcs: LAw SCHOOL TUITION 1985-2011 2 (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/administrativelleIf one
gal-education-andadmissions-tothe_bar/statistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf.
projects that private law school tuition will continue to increase at 5% per year through
2015-2016, then the average private law school tuition for the three-year 2013-2016 period
will be $45,396/year. For ease of exposition I have used an estimate for $45,000/year for
private law school tuition and fees charges for my subsequent affordability calculations.
45. The National Association of Colleges and Employers estimates the average starting salary for college graduates in the class of 2013 at $44,928/year. NAT'L Ass'N OF COLLS.
& EMP'RS, NACE SALARY SURvEY: APRIL 2013 3 (2013). This figure is an overall average
of the various starting salaries for graduates in several different disciplines, which range
from a high of $62,535 for engineering graduates and $54,234 for business majors down to a
low of $37,058 for humanities and social science majors. Id. There is also, of course, great
variation in average starting salaries for graduates of different colleges, for example Herwig Schlunk notes that median 2011 starting salaries ranged from $58,900/year for
Princeton graduates to $28,900/year for Coker College graduates. Schlunk, supra note 43,
at 305. For ease of exposition I have used an overall estimate of $45,000/year for the typical
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estimated combined federal and state income taxes, federal Social Security and Medicare taxes, and state and local sales taxes of 33% of this
sum4 6-for a total foregone after-tax income of $90,000. This foregone
after-tax income is just as much a cost of law school, when viewed in
economic terms, as are the out-of-pocket tuition and books and supplies
expenses.
The various costs considered so far total $233,000. I then added the
estimated $26,213 of interest obligations that will typically accrue on a
$233,000 federal student loan debt during law school and for six months
after graduation before repayment of the loan commences under the federal student loan rules, assuming for now that both these law school expenses and the foregone after-tax income that would have been used for
living costs are financed by student loans, and that this borrowing is done
in regular installments throughout law school under the available federal
loan programs at an average blended annual interest rate of 7.5%.47 I also
undergraduate degree-based starting salary for my subsequent affordability calculations,
but one should recognize that actual amount of lost income for a particular law student is
relatively degree-specific, and that law students obviously tend to be better-than-average
undergraduate students who may consequently have the alternative of earning better-thanaverage alternative starting salaries.
46. This 33% estimated marginal tax rate is convenient for these illustrative calculations and fairly accurately reflects the combination of an estimated 7.65% federal Social
Security/Medicare tax rate on income and an estimated 25.35% combined marginal federal
and state income tax rate and marginal state and local sales taxes on those earnings when
spent. This combined 33% marginal tax rate is significantly higher than the tax rate used by
Schlunk in his opportunity cost calculations, Schlunk, supra note 43, at 508, but Schlunk
did not allow for sales taxes in his calculations.
47. ($233,000) x (7.5%) x (the 1.5 years on average of interest accruing on law school
loans prior to the commencement of repayment 6 months after graduation)) = $26,213. Let
me further explain my choice of this 7.5% blended annual interest rate.
Until August 9, 2013 a typical law student needing to borrow a total of $233,000 to finance their legal education would first borrow each year the maximum allowed $20,500/
year from the federal Stafford Loan program at an annual interest rate of 6.8%, for a total
loan amount of $61,500. The student would then borrow the remaining $171,500 of the
needed $233,000 from the federal Grad PLUS program at a 7.9% annual interest rate, plus
a one-time 4% charge at the time of disbursement of those Grad PLUS funds. If a student
borrows this $233,000 in regular installments during law school in this fashion, then their
blended interest rate on these loans will be ($61,500 x 0.068 + 171,500 x 0.079)/$233,000 =
7.61%. If they instead borrow only $188,000 during law school, then their corresponding
blended interest rate will be 7.55%, and if they instead borrow only $158,000 during law
school, then their corresponding blended interest rate will be 7.16%. Throughout this article for ease of exposition I will consistently use a blended interest rate of 7.5% for my loan
repayment calculations. This 7.5% blended annual interest rate is a little higher than the
7.25% or 7.3% blended annual interest rate often used for such illustrative calculations of
law school borrowing costs, but in my opinion this 7.5% figure better reflects the true costs
of the increasingly large and increasingly Grad PLUS loan-financed debts that law students
will have to bear for the 2013-2016 period.
On August 9, 2013 President Obama signed into law the Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-28, 127 Stat. 506. Under that Act, the interest rate on
unsubsidized Stafford Loans made to graduate and professional students, including law
students, starting with the 2013-2014 academic year was changed to be the annual interest
rate yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds as of June 1, 2013, plus 3.6%. The interest rate
on the Direct Plus loans was also changed to be the interest rate yield on 10-year U.S.
Treasury bonds as of June 1, 2013, plus 4.6%. The interest rate charged on those loans
would then be recalculated for each succeeding academic year with regard to the annual
interest rate yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds as of the June 1 preceding that academic
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added $6,860 to reflect the 4% surcharge that is imposed by the federal
government on the $171,500 portion of this loan financing that would be
made through the Grad PLUS loan program, once the total $61,500 overall three-year limit on lower cost federal Stafford loans has been
reached. 48 I then subtracted a total of $10,000 of after-tax income that
could be earned by a law student from summer employment during one
or more of the summer terms. 49 The total of all of these costs therefore
comes to $233,000 + $26,213 + $6,860 - $10,000 = $256,073. Given my
somewhat general and imprecise cost projections, and for simplicity of
exposition, I will instead use a slightly lower round number of $250,000
for the full costs of a private legal education in all of my subsequent affordability calculations.5 0
year. Those graduate student loan interest rates would be subject to a maximum cap of
9.5% on the Stafford Loans and 10.5% on the Direct Plus Loans, regardless of the interest
rate yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds.
The interest yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds as of June 1, 2013 was 1.80%, resulting
in an annual interest rate for the upcoming 2013-2014 academic year for law student Stafford Loans of 5.4% and 6.4% for law student Direct Plus loans, interest rates somewhat
lower than the prior 6.8% and 7.9% levels. As of August 23, 2013 the annual interest rate
yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds had risen to 2.83%. If it remained at that level on
June 1, 2014 this would result in an annual interest rate for 2014-2015 academic year law
student Stafford loans of 6.43% and 7.43% for law student Direct Plus loans, levels slightly
below the prior 6.8% and 7.9% levels. If the annual interest rate yield on 10-year U.S.
Treasury bonds were to rise above about 3.3% on a June 1 date then the corresponding
interest rates on these law student loans for the following academic year would subsequently exceed their earlier 6.8% and 7.9% levels. If the annual interest rate yield on 10year U.S. Treasury bonds were to reach or exceed 5.9% on a June 1 then both the Stafford
Loan and Direct Plus loan rates would reach their respective 9.5% and 10.5% annual caps
for the subsequent academic year.
Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the level of interest rates on the 10-year
U.S. Treasury bond over the coming years, I will conduct all of the law school affordability
calculations in this Article using the prior 6.8% and 7.9% interest rates that were in force
until August 9, 2013. Depending on how the interest rates on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds
moves over the coming years one would then have to adjust my calculations slightly with
regard to repaying unsubsidized federal student loans to reflect the different applicable
interest rates. However, this change in student loan interest rates would have no bearing
on my calculations relating to loan repayment under either the IBR program or the PAYE
program.
Whether the federal government should be charging such high loan interest rates, along
with a significant 4% Grad PLUS loan disbursement fee, for law student loans that are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy when the U.S. Treasury can sell 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds
in virtually unlimited amounts at annual interest rates of less than 3%, and shorter-term
bonds at even lower rates, interest rates that are significantly higher than charged for undergraduate federal student loans, is a separate and troubling question that is beyond the
scope of this Article. Some knowledgeable observers have called for sharp reductions in
both graduate and undergraduate student loan interest rates. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Student Debt and the Crushing of the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2013, http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/student-debt-and-the-crushing-of-the-americandream/.
48. Stiglitz, supra note 47.
49. Assuming approximately $12,000 in summer earnings, with a combined total income, Social Security, Medicare and state income and sales tax of 17% on this sum reflecting the student's low annual income.
50. The $90,000 foregone after-tax income component of this estimated $256,073 overall cost is based upon an assumed $45,000/year average starting salary for a typical person
with an undergraduate college degree. As noted above in supra note 45, this average starting salary masks a broad range of starting salaries that are available to college graduates in
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This $250,000 cost estimate is admittedly a broad2 generalization, given
the substantial variation in private law school tuition, the employment
opportunities available to different prospective law students graduating
from different undergraduate schools and with different degrees, and the
summer employment opportunities available to law students, but it is
nevertheless accurate enough to support the conclusions that I will later
reach. If a student instead attends a somewhat lower cost but still relatively expensive public law school without scholarship assistance, or attends a private law school but with a 33% scholarship discount on their
tuition, this will reduce the overall cost of law school to approximately
$200,000.51 Attending an unusually low-cost public law school with a
modest 10% scholarship, attending a relatively high-cost public law
school with a 33% scholarship, or attending a private law school with a
substantially more generous 55% scholarship would each further reduce
the overall net cost of law school to as low as $160,000 or so. 5 2 Law school
different disciplines and from different colleges. A typical law student with an engineering
degree, for example, would instead incur larger foregone after-tax income costs of approximately $62,535 x .67 x 3 = $125,695. At the other extreme, a typical humanities graduate
would only incur smaller foregone after-tax income costs of $37,058 x .67 x 3 = $74,487.
Therefore the costs for a typical law student pursuing this private school option, given this
disparity in foregone income across different undergraduate degrees and different colleges,
would range between approximately $240,560 and $291,768, depending on their undergraduate major, rather than being a precise $256,073.
51. This lower $200,000 figure assumes that the tuition cost of the relatively more expensive public law schools would be approximately $30,000/year, rather than the $45,000
tuition assumed for the private law schools, or that a private school charging $45,000/year
annual tuition would provide the student with approximately a 33% tuition discount down
to $30,000/year. This estimate of $30,000 for the 2013-2016 period tuition cost of these
relatively more expensive public law schools appears to be reasonable since the ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar has estimated that the average resident
tuition cost in 2011-2012 for public law schools was $22,116, and for non-residents was
$34,865, and that public law school tuitions have also been rising appreciably more rapidly
in recent years than private law school tuitions. A.B.A. SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION STATISTICS: LAw SCHOOL TUITION

1985-2012 (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal-education andadmissionstothebar/statistics/Is_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf. The
accrued interest during law school and for the following six months after graduation on the
now smaller required ($30,000 x 3) + $8,000 + ($30,000 x 3) = $188,000 in student loans
would be correspondingly reduced from the $26,213 that would accrue on $233,000 of loans
down to approximately $21,150, and the Direct PLUS 4% loan disbursement fee on the
loan amounts over $61,500 would be reduced from $6,860 down to $5,060. I have again
assumed after-tax summer earnings of $10,000. The total cost would therefore now be
$90,000 + $90,000 + $8,000 + $21,150 + $5,060 - $10,000= $204,210.

When one also takes into account the range of possible starting salaries available to
undergraduates in different disciplines, and the corresponding variation in foregone aftertax income, see supra note 50, this leads to a range of total costs between $188,697 and
$239,905, depending on their undergraduate major, rather than a precise figure of
$204,210. To again be conservative here, given my somewhat imprecise cost projections,
and for simplicity of exposition, I have instead used a lower $200,000 figure for my subsequent affordability calculations.
52. This lower $160,000 figure assumes that the annual net tuition cost for the lowercost public law schools, after a 10% scholarship discount, would be approximately $20,000/
year for the 2013-2016 period, rather than the $30,000/year charged by the relatively expensive public schools or the $45,000/year assumed for the private law schools. This figure
is based on a $22,000 estimated annual tuition charge over the 2013-2016 period. This is a
relatively conservative figure for these lower-cost public schools, given the data provided
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is now an expensive proposition.53
Most law students have exhausted their financial resources prior to attending law school and have already incurred a fairly significant amount
of undergraduate loan debt. 54 Thus, they generally have to finance all of
their law school tuition expenses, books and supplies, and living costs
through a combination of additional student loans and reductions in their
financial standard of living from what it would have been had they been
by the ABA that the average tuition charged in-state residents for all public law schools in
2011-2012 was $22,116, and that public school tuitions have been rapidly rising in recent
years, see supra note 51. If one assumes that the lower-cost public schools provided the
student with a 10% scholarship this would reduce the net tuition cost to about $20,000/
year. That would be approximately the same $20,000/year net tuition cost charged by a
higher-cost public law school charging $30,000/year tuition and offering a 33% scholarship,
or by a private law school charging $45,000/year tuition but providing the student with an
approximately 55% tuition scholarship.
This $160,000 estimate cost figure also again assumes that the student is able to obtain a
total of $10,000 of after-tax summer earnings over the several summer terms during their
period of enrollment and that the accrued interest during law school on the now smaller
required ($20,000 x 3) + $8,000 + ($30,000 x 3) = $158,000 in student loans would be correspondingly reduced from the $26,213 that would accrue on a $233,000 loan amount down
to approximately $17,776, and that the Direct PLUS 4% disbursement fee on the portion
of the loans exceeding $61,500 would be similarly reduced from $6,860 down to $3,901. The
total cost would therefore now be $60,000 + $90,000 + $8,000 + $17,776 + 3,901 - $10,000 =

$169,677.
When one also takes into account the range of possible starting salaries available to
undergraduates in different disciplines, and the corresponding variation in foregone aftertax income, see supra note 50, this leads to a range of total costs between $154,162 and
$205,372, depending upon their undergraduate major, rather than a precise figure of
$169,677. To again be relatively conservative here, given my somewhat imprecise cost projections, and for simplicity of exposition I have instead used a lower $160,000 figure for my
subsequent affordability calculations.
53. Some readers may be concerned at this point whether my projected 2013-2016 law
school costs of $160,000 to $250,000 are consistent with well-known ABA statistics showing
that the average debt for private law school graduates in 2011 was a much more modest
$124,950, and the average debt for public law school graduates was only $75,728.
Tamanaha, Problems With Income Based Repayment, supra note 15, at 3. There are several
reasons for this seeming discrepancy. First, average student debt loads have been rising
rapidly in recent years, and the average debt of graduates will surely be much higher by
2016 than it was in 2011. Second, some of the costs of law school are, as I have noted,
financed by student or family funds or curtailed consumption during law school, rather
than by borrowing, and are therefore not reflected in average debt statistics. Third, the
reported ABA average debt figures only relate to the originally incurred debt and not the
significant amount of accrued interest on that debt by the time repayment commences. Id.
The foregone after-tax income component of law school costs ranges from $90,000/
$250,000 = 36% of those costs up to $90,000/$160,000 = 56.3% of those costs. For a prospective law student who for some reason does not have the opportunity to accept alternative employment, rather than attend law school, the costs of law school will therefore be
substantially reduced. In the current relatively high unemployment economic environment
there are a significant number of college graduates who have some difficulty finding employment. However, given that typical prospective law students generally have better-thanaverage academic credentials, it is unlikely that they would be unable to find alternative
employment, and if they did have some difficulties, they would likely be unemployed only
for some months of job searching rather than for all three years that they would be attending law school. I have therefore not made any downward adjustments in my estimate of
foregone after-tax income to reflect the unemployment of some college graduates.
54. A high proportion of law graduates also have undergraduate student loan debts,
and for those students the average amount undergraduate loan debt is about $25,000 and
growing. Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2, at 135.
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employed rather than attending law school. Other, more fortunate students are able to finance some or all of these costs of law school through
use of their own funds or family funds, and do not have to incur this much
debt or suffer such significant reductions in their financial standard of
living during law school. From an economic point of view, however, the
use of one's own funds to pay for law school is economically equivalent to
borrowing the money, since it is done at the opportunity cost of not having those same funds available for investment, resulting in a stream of
foregone investment returns that are economically equivalent to debt repayments.5 5 Similarly, financing the costs of law school partially through
reducing one's standard of living imposes an immediate opportunity cost
on one that is economically equivalent to borrowing funds to maintain
consumption levels and then making the necessary sacrifices later to fund
repayment of that debt. 56

55. It is true that the foregone investment income when a student spends his own
funds on law school expenses are economically equivalent to making loan repayments on
borrowed funds. However, government law school loans carry a high interest rate relative
to the structure of expected returns now available on reasonably conservative investments.
Moreover, student loan repayments are not tax-deductible while the investment income
that one foregoes when spending their own funds on law school is taxable income when
realized. These two factors complicate the comparison of debt repayments to foregone
income. For example, a $1,000 government student loan taken out at a 7.5% annual interest rate would require annual repayments of $145.56 on a standard ten-year amortization
schedule and annual repayments of $89.29 on an extended 25-year repayment schedule
(this calculation does not include the Grad PLUS loan initial 4% disbursement fee). If,
however, a student instead spent $1,000 of his own funds for law school expenses, thereby
foregoing the purchase of a $1,000 investment in a common stock portfolio yielding a more
realistic 4.1% after-tax annual rate of return over that same time period, see infra note 59,
that student would then have foregone the equivalent annuitized stream of payments of
only $123.92/year on a 10-year annuity, or only $64.72/year on a twenty-five-year annuity.
For a student utilizing the extended twenty-five-year repayment option on federal student loans, therefore, the economic burden of borrowing funds for law school expenses
and then making loan repayments is $89.29/year per $1,000 borrowed, compared to only
$64.72/year of foregone after-tax income per $1,000 spent by the student using his own or
family funds for those expenses. The economic burden imposed by the use of twenty-fiveyear term loan financing at the current blended 7.5% student loan interest rate, given the
much lower after-tax returns that are currently available on reasonably conservative investments, is therefore roughly about 38% greater than the economic burden of using one's
own money. The calculations I present in this Article therefore will slightly overstate the
economic burden of law school for students who utilize to some extent their own funds or
family funds to pay for law school expenses, thus to that extent sacrificing 4.1% average
annual after-tax returns, rather than borrowing at a 7.5% annual interest rate to cover
those costs.
That all being said, as will be later discussed in some detail these complications in determining the economic burden of law school that are introduced by students' use of different
financing methods are to a very large extent mooted by the IBR program, which severs the
linkage between the amount borrowed and the amount of monthly repayments, although
the fact that the tax obligation on the final debt forgiveness after twenty years under that
program will be larger for larger initial loan amounts, due to larger amounts of unpaid
interest accruing at 7.5%/year, still enables students who are able to finance on their own
some of the expenses of law school to save some money.
56. The same complications noted above, supra note 55, will impact the comparisons
between borrowing money and reducing living expenses as alternative means for financing
some of the costs of law school.
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For ease of exposition, I will therefore assume for all of my following
detailed affordability calculations that all of the expenses of law school
will be financed by law students solely through federal Stafford loans and
Grad PLUS loans, loans that accrue interest during law school and thereafter but which do not require repayment to start until six months after
graduation.57 This simplifying assumption will obviously result in some
overstatement of the actual out-of-pocket loan repayment costs for some
graduates to the extent that those graduates have used their own or family funds and/or have curtailed their living expenses rather than use student loans to pay for law school expenses.58 Those students will, to that
extent, bear future costs of a foregone income nature, rather than of a
debt repayment character.
This assumption will also result in an (much more modest) overstatement of the overall economic burden of law school for those students that
have financed part or all of their costs of legal education with their own
or family funds, or through reductions in their standard of living while in
law school. This is because I estimate that those students will bear approximately a 4.1% annual after-tax rate of return opportunity cost as a
result of expenditures of their own funds or consumption curtailments, 5 9
57. Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/
types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized (last visited Nov. 23, 2013); Plus Loans, FED. STUDENT
AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/plus (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
58. See supra note 56. This is the case for repayment of unsubsidized student loans.
Under the IBR program, as will be extensively discussed below, the amount of debt undertaken will not affect the size of the monthly loan repayment obligations. See Schrag (2007),
supra note 15. However, the amount of debt will affect the size of the final debt forgiveness
and the consequent size of the tax liability for this debt forgiveness. See id. at 9 n.39.
As a brief example of this point, consider a typical student for whom the total cost of law
school, including $30,000/year of foregone after-tax income, is $200,000. If that student
incurs living costs of only $20,000/year, thereby foregoing $10,000/year of consumption expenditures or investments that they could have made had they been employed, the student
would thereby be able to avoid taking out 3 x $10,000 = $30,000 of student loans, thereby
reducing their overall loan debt by 15% to about $170,000. As a result, their total unpaid
debt at the time of forgiveness would also be about 15% smaller, meaning that they could
reduce the size of their monthly escrow deposits needed to build up a fund sufficient to
cover this eventual substantial tax liability by 15%. See infra notes 189-207 and the accompanying text for a further discussion of the escrow deposits necessitated by the IBR
program.
59. Let me explain my calculation of this 4.1% annual expected after-tax rate of return. I have conservatively, but realistically, assumed that a law student who pays for law
school expenses out of their own or family funds would alternatively be able to earn only a
modest 5%/year average annual before-tax return on a conventional diversified portfolio
of common stocks or stock mutual funds, with 2%/year of this return assumed to be dividends, and the remaining 3%/year assumed to be capital appreciation. There will be a 20%
annual income tax imposed on those dividends, Margaret Collins & Richard Rubin, Higher
Tax Rates Give Top U.S. Earners Year-End Headaches, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2013, 7:13
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-07/higher-tax-rates-give-top-u-s-earnersyear-end-headaches.html, reducing the average annual appreciation, assuming dividend reinvestment, to 4.6%. When the portfolio is liquidated a number of years later, long-term
capital gains taxes at the 20% rate will now have to be paid on the portion of the portfolio
that reflects stock appreciation, resulting over time in about a lower 4.1% average annual
after-all-taxes rate of return over that time period. I will consequently use this 4.1% aftertax rate of return figure throughout this Article when needed to calculate rates of return
on invested funds or to calculate present values.
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a cost that is significantly lower than the rather high 7.5% blended annual
interest rates now charged law students on government student loans of
this magnitude. 60 But these calculations will still be accurate enough with
regard to the full economic costs of attending law school that this minor
overstatement of the costs for those students who utilize their own or
family funds or curtail consumption to some extent to pay for their law
school expenses will not affect the conclusions that I will reach regarding
whether the benefits of Harvard-style legal education for law students
justify its costs for different students with differing academic capabilities
and attending law schools of varying prestige.
III.

PAYING FOR LAW SCHOOL UNDER UNSUBSIDIZED
FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN TERMS

The federal government is currently the main provider of law student
loans, although students sometimes also borrow from private lenders. 61
Until August 9, 2013, some of those federal loans, the (unsubsidized)
Stafford loans, were made available to law students and other graduate
students at a 6.8% annual interest rate up to an annual loan cap now set
at $20,500.62 The remainder of those loans, the Grad PLUS loans, were
similarly made available at a higher 7.9 % annual interest rate, plus a
one-time 4% disbursement fee. 63 Many law students therefore have a
blended annual interest rate obligation on their federal government student loans from these two sources in the neighborhood of 7.5%.64 A law
school graduate with a $250,000 debt on these terms who attempted to
repay this obligation over the standard ten-year repayment period would
have to make monthly principal and interest payments of over $3,000/
month, over $36,000/year, 65 payments that for the most part are not taxdeductible. 66 This would obviously be far too large a debt repayment burAs noted above, this overstatement of costs with regard to students who utilize their own
funds or sacrifice consumption to help pay for law school rather than borrow is much less
when borrowing takes place under the IBR program than for unsubsidized loans.
60. See supra note 47.
61. See Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2, at 142.
62. William D. Henderson & Rachael M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble, ABA J.,
Jan. 2012, at 34.
63. Id. The Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, signed into law by President Obama on August 9, 2013, changed the interest rates charged law students on Stafford
and Direct Plus loans. See Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act, supra note 47, at § 2.
For the reasons that I have discussed above, I will continue to use the prior 6.8% and 7.9%
annual interest rates for my financial calculations in this Article. See supra note 47.
64. See supra note 47.
65. See Repayment Comparison Calculator, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed

.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/standard/comparison-calculator (last visited Nov. 23,
2013). As noted above, some students are able to utilize their own funds or family funds for
some or all of the costs of law school and thus would to that extent not have to make loan
repayments of that size. They would, however, still bear the opportunity costs of the lost
investment income on the funds so used, and therefore still bear relatively comparable
(though somewhat smaller) overall economic costs of their legal education. See supra notes
55-56.
66. A person with a "modified adjusted gross income" of $75,000/year or less if filing
single, or $150,000/year if filing a joint return, is allowed to deduct up to $2,500 of student-
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den for the large majority of new law school graduates to bear, certainly
for the many graduates who now take jobs that pay only in the $40,000$65,000 annual salary range, 67 even if they are fortunate enough to be
among the only approximately 55% of graduates that the most recent
American Bar Association and National Association on Law Placement
reports indicate find full-time legal work within nine months of graduation,68 or among the relatively few law graduates who are able to obtain
part-time legal positions or non-legal positions paying $60,000/year or
more.6 9
Even those fortunate graduates who are able to obtain those fabled
associate positions at leading law firms that pay a starting salary of
upwards of $160,000/year 7 o would still have to pay a full 22.5% of their
income in debt service,71 a perhaps tolerable burden given the high salary, but still probably uncomfortably large given that many of those highpaying associate positions are located in large cities with relatively high
costs of living. 72 Even under an extended twenty-five-year repayment
schedule, the required monthly principal and interest payments on such a
$250,000 loan debt would be over $1,860/month, over $22,000/year.7 3 This
may be fairly easily affordable for the lucky few with $160,000/year salarieS7 4 but well beyond the capability of most new law graduates to
loan interest each year, even if they do not otherwise itemize their deductions. See IRS
Publication 970 (2013). This deduction can be modestly useful for persons with smaller
levels of undergraduate subsidized Stafford loan debt at relatively low interest rates, but is
relatively insignificant for law graduates that usually have much more substantial debts at
much higher interest rates. Furthermore, these law graduates will often have salaries that
are too high for them to qualify for use of this deduction. Even for those law graduates
who would qualify for this deduction for some early years of their law practice because
their income is low enough, their annual tax benefits from a maximum $2,500 annual deduction would only be in the neighborhood of $625/year. See Rev. Proc. 2011-52, 2011-45
I.R.B. 701, at § 3. This small deduction is will not significantly impact my calculations regarding law school affordability, so I will not take these tax benefits into account in my
subsequent analyses.
67. See Salary Distribution Curve, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/salarydistrib (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). The strikingly bimodal distribution of entry level salaries that is revealed by the NALP data for the class of 2011 and also for several earlier graduating
classes is by now very well known, thanks in large part to the efforts of William Henderson.
See, e.g., Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, supra note 12.
68. See supra note 4.
69. NALP, Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 1994, NALP
BULLETIN (July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/0712research.
70. See NALP (2011), supra note 2. No more than 14%, and perhaps as few as 10%, of
those graduates who obtained full-time legal positions received these high salaries. See id.
Given that only about 55% of class of 2011 graduates were able to obtain full-time legal
positions, see supra note 4, no more than 7.7% and perhaps as few as 5.5% of those graduates received these $160,000 starting salaries.
71. $36,000/$160,000 = 22.5%.
72. See Will You Make a Secure, Affluent Living in Law?, SHOULD You BE A LAWYER, http://www.shouldyoubealawyer.com/WillYouMakeASecureSalary.htm (last visited
Nov. 23, 2013).
73. See Repayment Calculator,supra note 65.
74. A graduate who obtains a $160,000/year starting salary would have a debt burden
of only about $22,000/$160,000 = 13.75% of their income, a relatively affordable burden
given that large salary.
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The financial situation posed by standard federal loan repayment terms
is also untenable for most graduates even with somewhat smaller loan
obligations. A student with a $200,000 loan debt, at a 7.5% annual interest rate on a ten-year repayment schedule, would have to pay nearly
$2,400 /month, over $28,000/year, and even on a twenty-five-year repayment schedule would have to pay approximately $1,488/month, over
$17,000 year, more than 28.3% of the $60,000/year median starting salary. 76 For a student with a $160,000 loan debt, the corresponding amounts
would be $1,920/month (over $23,000/year) and $1,190/month (over
$14,000/year), the latter being more than 23.3% of the median starting
salary.7 7 Such large loan repayment obligations obviously could not be
met on a $60,000/year salary without unreasonable sacrifices. 7 8
The discussion above has thus far ignored any debt burdens that law
graduates may bear from their earlier undergraduate education. However, a substantial proportion of law graduates do also have additional
undergraduate student loans to repay, which would further increase their
overall debt burden, 79 making it even less feasible to repay those debts
out of a $60,000/year salary.
IV. THE IBR PROGRAM, THE PAYE RULES,
AND THE PSLF PROGRAM
The rather depressing conclusions reached above regarding the inability of a law school graduate that has taken a full-time legal position paying the median $60,000/year starting salary to service the debt incurred to
75. Graduates who obtain the median starting salary would have a debt burden of
about $22,000/$60,000 = 36.67% of their income.
76. For a calculation of monthly payments, see Repayment Calculator,supra note 65.
$17,000/$60,000 = 28.3%.
77. Id. $14,000/$60,000 = 23.3%.
78. Although on a $160,000/year starting salary the debt repayment burden for a graduate with $200,000 of loans with a twenty-five-year repayment term and a 7.5% blended
annual interest rate would be only $17,000/$160,000 = 10.6% of their income. For a student
with $160,000 of comparable loans the burden would be only $14,000/$160,000 = 8.75% of
their income. These are entirely manageable debt burdens. Harvard-style legal education
remains financially viable at least for those law graduates who are able to obtain these high
paying entry-level positions (and are able to keep them indefinitely, or are able to later
move to other, comparable positions, obviously not a sure thing).
The debt payments under standard federal loan repayment terms are fixed in size and
will therefore decline as a proportion of the graduate's income as their income increases.
Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/
plans (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). Even assuming a steady 5%/year increase in the nominal
income of a law graduate, however, as I will do throughout this Article, it would be a very
substantial period of time before the burden of debt repayments of even only a $160,000
debt is reduced to a manageable size for those graduates with starting salaries in the neighborhood of $60,000/year.
79. See Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2, at 135. The average undergraduate student
loan debt for those undergraduates that did incur such debt is about $25,000. Id. Much of
this loan debt is, however, subsidized Stafford loans that currently carry only a 3.4% interest rate, much lower than the interest rates charged on federal loans to law students and
other graduate students. See Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, supra note 57.
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pay for even $160,000 of law school costs are significantly impacted by the
IBR program under the PAYE rules, and by the PSLF program. Let me
first provide an overview of the main provisions of those programs, and
then in Part V, I will analyze in some detail their impact upon the affordability of law school.
A.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE IBR PROGRAM
AND THE PAYE RULES

Under the federal government's original IBR program, as it existed after its adoption in 200780 and prior to its 2010 amendment 8' and the
Obama Administration's subsequent PAYE rules changes in the program, 82 a graduate could elect to have their monthly loan payment obligations repaid over a twenty-five-year repayment term, with the required
repayments capped at an amount equal to 15% of the difference between
their monthly adjusted gross income83 and 150% of the poverty line
monthly income for a family of the same size as is being supported by the
graduate's income. 84 This cap provided for a very large reduction in the
borrower's monthly payment obligations compared to what they would
have been outside the IBR program, even under an extended twenty-fiveyear repayment schedule.8 5 These reduced payments, however, are for
80. See generally College Lost Deduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121
Stat. 784 (2007).
81. H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. § 2213 (2010).
82. See generally Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,088 (Nov. 1, 2012) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 674, 682, 586).
83. For many attorneys this will be significantly less than their gross income due to
contributions to retirement savings accounts and various other expenditures from one's
gross income that are not included in adjusted gross income. See Delisle & Holt, supra note
15, at 4, for more discussion of this point.
I will not address in this Article the adjusted gross income measurement issues presented
by a married borrower whose spouse also earns taxable income. For discussion of this
issue, see generally Schrag (2007), supra note 15, at 52-55.
84. Schrag (2007), supra note 15, at 35-36.
85. For example, consider a law school graduate who is single, obtains a $60,000 starting salary, and has a $250,000 debt at a 7.5% blended annual interest rate. That graduate
would then owe over $3,000/month in principal and interest payments if on a standard tenyear repayment schedule and over $1,860/month even if on an extended twenty-five-year
repayment schedule. See Repayment Calculator,supra note 65. Under the original IBR
program (prior to the PAYE rules), however, the graduate would only have to make
monthly repayments of 1/12 x 15% x ($60,000 - $16,335) = $546/month, only about onethird of the amount required to repay even only the $1,563/month interest owing on a 7.5%
annual interest, twenty-five-year term loan of that size, let alone repay any of the principal
sum. For an otherwise identical law school graduate with a family of three persons, their
IBR program repayment obligations would only be 1/12 x 15% x ($60,000 - $27,465) =
$407/month, only about one-quarter of the amount required to repay even the interest
owing on a 7.5% blended annual interest, 25-year term loan of that size, let alone repay
any of the principal sum.
For a comparable law school graduate with a $200,000 debt at a 7.5% annual interest
rate, the repayment obligations on a standard ten-year repayment schedule would be about
$2,400/month, and on an extended twenty-five-year repayment schedule would be about
$1,488/month. The annual interest alone owing on such a $200,000 loan would be $1,250/
month. For a comparable law school graduate with a $160,000 debt at a 7.5% annual interest rate, the repayment obligations on a ten-year repayment schedule would be about
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most law student borrowers not anywhere near large enough to cover
even the interest owing on the outstanding debt,8 6 leading to negative
amortization and continued growth in the size of that debt over time due
to accrued unpaid interest.87 The remaining unpaid debt obligation, however, will then be forgiven after twenty-five years,88 although with the
very important proviso that the forgiven debt obligation will be regarded
as taxable income that is subject to ordinary income tax liability at the
taxpayer's applicable marginal rate at the time of debt forgiveness. 89
There are, however, some provisions of the IBR program that substantially curtail the growth in the outstanding debt that would otherwise occur from this negative amortization payment schedule, and that
consequently will substantially reduce the borrower's income tax liability
after twenty-five years. First of all, the federal government pays the unpaid portion of the interest owed for the first three years after repayment
commences, so that unpaid interest will accrue for at most only twentytwo years. 90 Second, for the remaining years after the first three years in
which the borrower makes payments under the IBR program, whether
the borrower continues in the program for the remainder of the twentyfive-year period or instead leaves the program early if their income increases to the point where their making the IBR program required payments is no longer advantageous to them, the unpaid interest will accrue
but will not be capitalized into the outstanding loan principal, so that
there will be no compound interest effect but only the accrual of unpaid
simple interest on the original amount owing at the time of the borrower's initial repayment obligation.9 ' These favorable unpaid interest
accrual provisions together obviously made the original IBR program's
debt forgiveness provision even more attractive to prospective borrowers
than it would otherwise be.
Under the PAYE rules adopted to implement the 2010 legislative
changes in the IBR program, effective in 2012 and thereafter for most

$1,920/month, and on a twenty-five-year repayment schedule would be about $1,190/
month. The annual interest alone owing on such a $160,000 loan would be $1,000/month.
However, the monthly repayment obligations for each of these persons with smaller outstanding loan balances under the original IBR program would be exactly the same as noted
above for the $250,000 borrower, despite the much lower outstanding loan amounts, since
the size of the IBR loan repayment obligations are determined only by the adjusted gross
income of the borrower and not by the amount borrowed or the interest rate on the loan.
See Schrag (2007), supra note 15, at 35-36. It is crucial that one understands this feature of
the IBR program.
86. See Income-Based Repayment Planfor the Direct Loan and FFEL Programs,FED.
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/income-based-repayment.pdf
(last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
87. Schrag (2007), supra note 15, at 50.
88. Id. at 37-38.
89. Id. at 55-56.
90. Id. at 35.
91. Id.
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borrowers, 92 the monthly payment obligations are now capped at only
10% of the difference between the graduate's monthly adjusted gross income and 150% of the poverty level income. 9 3 The required payments
are thus now only 2/3 as large as were required under the original IBR
program prior to the PAYE rules. For virtually all borrowers, these required payments will now be far less than even the interest owing on their
loans. 94 In addition, the remaining debt obligations will now be forgiven
after only twenty years rather than twenty-five years, although the forgiven debt will still be regarded as taxable income at the time of forgiveness. 95 The PAYE rules do not alter the IBR provisions under which the
government will pay the unpaid interest for the first three years after the
borrower's payment obligation commences, and under which the unpaid
interest after that date will accrue but will not be capitalized into the
outstanding loan principal. 96
There is one interesting and arguably economically inefficient impact
of the IBR program in terms of the incentives created for borrowers, an
impact that is made more significant by the PAYE rules. The amount that
the borrower must repay each month under the IBR program, as I have
noted above, depends only on the difference between the borrower's adjusted gross income and 150% of the poverty level income and is usually
not sufficient to cover even the interest owed on the loans, let alone repay any of the loan principal.9 7 The amount of the monthly payment obligation is therefore completely independent of how much money the
92. See Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and
William D. Ford Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,088, 66,117 (Nov. 1, 2012) (to be codified
at C.F.R. pts. 674, 682, 685).
93. Id. at 66100. For example, a law school graduate who is single, has a median
$60,000/year starting salary, a $250,000 debt at a 7.5% annual interest rate, and who would
therefore owe over $3,000/month if on a ten-year repayment schedule-and over $1,860/
month even if on an extended twenty-five-year repayment schedule-would, under the
new PAYE rules, only have to make monthly repayments of 1/12 x 10% x ($60,000 $16,335) = $364/month. For an otherwise identical law school graduate with a family of
three, their IBR program repayment obligations would only be 1/12 x 10% x ($60,000 $27,465) = $271/month. Monthly payments this small, less than one-quarter of the $1,563
monthly interest accruing on a $250,000, twenty-five-year term loan with a 7.5% interest
rate, will lead, as I will later discuss, to rapid growth of the outstanding balance of that loan
over the twenty-year IBR repayment period to a sum approaching $500,000. This would
occur even under the "no capitalization of unpaid interest" IBR program provision and
even if the capped monthly payments were to gradually increase as the graduate's income
grew over time.
94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
95. See Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and
William D. Ford Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66,137. Under the closely related PSLF
program, law graduates who take certain qualifying public service legal positions will have
their unpaid loan balances forgiven after only ten years and, moreover, without that forgiven debt being regarded as taxable income. See TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw ScHooLs,
supra note 1, at 122. This program is clearly the best deal in town, so to speak, for people
with some interest in and ability to obtain public service legal work, and its generosity has
led to very intense competition among graduates for the relatively few qualifying positions.
Id.
96. See Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and
William D. Ford Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66,137.
97. See id.
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person has borrowed and how much they owe in interest payments, except for the tax obligations imposed after twenty years in connection with
the final debt forgiveness. These provisions therefore create a powerful
incentive for borrowers to borrow as much money as they can qualify
for, 98 whether or not they actually need the money for their legal
education.
The only consequence under the IBR program for borrowers who engage in borrowing beyond their immediate law school financial needs is
that they will then have to pay some additional income taxes when that
extra borrowing (and the accrued unpaid interest thereon) is forgiven
twenty years later. 99 One can easily and with relatively little financial risk
"game" these provisions by initially setting aside a sufficient portion of
this extra borrowing, or periodically setting aside sufficient sums from
one's later earnings, into a conservatively invested escrow reserve account to later pay these deferred taxes, and then correctly and cheerfully
regard the rest of the extra borrowed funds as being "free money" from
the taxpayers that will never have to be repaid. 100 The IBR program does
not merely provide for a deferral of taxes, such as is allowed for qualifying retirement contributions or capital gains appreciation.10 1 The extra
borrowing, beyond the proportion that needs to be set aside either initially or over time to pay the eventual debt forgiveness tax bill, is truly
free money from the government with no repayment obligation ever!
Let me try to make this striking point even clearer with a simple illustrative calculation. Consider an IBR enrollee who owes $250,000 at the
time their loan repayments must commence six months after graduation.
For virtually any salary the borrower might receive in their initial legal or
other position the IBR repayments will not be sufficient to cover the interest owing on the loan, and there will be to that extent negative amortization and growth in the outstanding debt over probably all of the final
seventeen years of the twenty-year loan repayment term.102 If that person
has taken out an additional $1,000 loan beyond this $250,000 sum, so that
at the time their repayments commence they would owe an additional
$1,000 (plus a little accrued interest on this $1,000 loan), that additional
98. The IBR program rules, however, only allow borrowing for "authorized educational expenses" determined by the law school that the borrower attends, so the amount
that can be borrowed is limited by the particular law school's estimate of the combined
amount of law school tuition and fees and related expenses and living costs. Borrower's
Rights and ResponsibilitiesStatement, STUDENT AssISTANCE FoUND., http://files.safmt.org/
forms/brr.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
99. See Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and
William D. Ford Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66,100.
100. See Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 9-10 n.39.
101. Tax Deferred, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxdeferred.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
102. See Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and
William D. Ford Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66,137. For example, even if a single enrollee obtains a $160,000/year starting salary, their initial IBR monthly loan repayments of
(($160,000 - $27,465) x .10)/12 = $1,104/month, are far short of the $1,563/month interest
accruing on a $250,000, twenty-five-year term loan at a 7.5% blended annual interest rate.
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$1,000 debt will then also accrue unpaid simple interest at the 7.9% Grad
PLUS loan rate for the final seventeen years of the loan term, leading to
additional debt at the time of debt forgiveness of $3,642.103 At a 33%
combined federal and state income tax rate on that forgiven debt,104 the
IBR enrollee would then owe additional taxes of $1,202 on this additional
debt. Assuming that the enrollee has available the opportunity to earn a
4.1% after-tax annual rate of return on invested funds over the twentyyear loan period,10 5 it would only be necessary for that person to initially
invest $538 of the additional $1,000 of borrowed funds in an escrow account over that twenty-year loan term to build up the $1,202 of funds
necessary to discharge that additional tax liability when it comes due.1 06
The remaining $462 of the initial $1,000 loan, which is a full 46.2% of that
additional borrowing, 0 7 is essentially free money entailing no repayment
obligation.
Given this feature of the IBR program that, to a large extent (although
not completely, as shown above, because of the debt forgiveness tax obligation), severs the normal linkage between the amount borrowed and the
size of one's repayment obligations, the conventional advice that is given
to student borrowers to be prudent and conservative with regard to the
amount of their student loan borrowing is almost completely inapposite.
Those students planning to enroll in the IBR program that are capable of
sensibly managing their long-term finances should probably borrow as
much in federal student loans as they possibly can under their school's
"authorized educational expenses" IBR loan limits, regardless of their financial circumstances. They should do so even if they have the wherewithal to pay for some or all of their law school expenses out of their own
or family funds, or are prepared to live especially frugally as law students,
and should then invest the appropriate proportion of that portion of their
loans that is not needed for educational purposes in a- conservatively invested escrow account dedicated to later paying the debt forgiveness
taxes on this extra borrowing.
This feature of the IBR program also creates a perverse incentive for
law schools to estimate the amount of "authorized educational expenses"
that a typical student would need to spend to attend their program as
high as they can possibly justify, so as to allow their students to borrow as
much as possible on these very favorable terms. 0 8 A high estimate of
these expenses will provide those schools with a competitive advantage in
recruiting students over other otherwise comparable schools that may estimate these expenses more conservatively. 109 I would hope that the U.S.
103.
104.
105.
figure.
106.

Tax Deferred, supra note 101. $1,000 x (1.079A17) = $3,642.
See infra note 147.
See supra note 59 for discussion of the justification for using this rate of return
(1.041)^20 = 2.234, and $1,202/2.234 = $538.05.

107. $462/$1,000 = 0.462 = 46.2%.

108. Delisle & Holt, supra note 15, at 12.
109. See Schrag (2007), supra note 15, at 41.
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Department of Education is alert to this possibility and periodically reviews the authorized educational expenses claimed by the law schools
and used for IBR loan limits purposes for their accuracy.
B.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM

Closely related to the IBR program is another program that was created by the same legislation that created the IBR program, the PSLF program.11 0 That program provides that if a graduate"' takes a qualifying
full-time, public service legal position, beyond the fact that the required
monthly loan repayments (also calculated on IBR/PAYE program terms)
will likely be very low given the generally rather modest salaries paid for
most qualifying public service positions, the remaining unpaid principal
and accrued interest balance owing is forgiven after only ten years rather
than twenty years as for IBR program borrowers who qualify for PAYE
rules treatment.11 2 In addition, this forgiven debt, unlike the debt for IBR
program borrowers, is not regarded as taxable income when forgiven." 3
Such loan terms are obviously extremely advantageous and have resulted
in very intense competition among graduates for the relatively small
number of qualifying public service positions.114
A law student who has some interest in and, more importantly, a wellgrounded confidence in their ability to later obtain one of these desirable
qualifying public service positions should once again probably take out as
much as possible in government student loans, regardless of whether they
have an immediate need for those funds. Moreover, unlike an IBR enrollee, they will not then need to set aside any of these borrowed funds or
any of their later earnings to cover later debt forgiveness tax liabilities.115
The PSLF program is therefore arguably the best deal in town for those
recent law graduates who are able to obtain qualifying positions, at least
for those persons who regard the additional satisfaction they will obtain
from doing such public interest legal work in comparison to the lesser
110. See id. at 27.
111. The PSLF program also applies to non-lawyers who take qualifying public service
positions. See id.
112. See id. at 41.
113. See Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 10.
114. See, e.g., CAMPOs (2012), supra note 1, at 49-50:
"[Plublic interest jobs [that would qualify under the PSLF program], which are already
extremely competitive, are becoming even more difficult to acquire, as lawyers in such jobs
who carry large debt loads become increasingly unwilling to leave them, so that they can
take advantage of PSLF's favorable terms."
See also TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW ScHOOLS, supra note 1, at 122:

"Competition for these [PSLF] positions is keen-it is the final hope of a reasonable escape from debt for the multitude of heavily indebted graduates who do not secure corporate law jobs."
Tamanaha also makes the point that a student seeking a PSLF-qualifying job would likely
have to take a substantial risk by first turning down opportunities that usually present
themselves, if at all, during the fall of the second year to take an attractive position with a
large law firm because the public service jobs usually cannot be obtained until the second
semester of the third year or even after graduation. Id. at 183.
115. See Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 10.
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satisfactions they feel that they will obtain from private legal practice as
roughly sufficient to offset the extra after-tax income they might be able
to earn in private practice.
As noted above in connection with the IBR program, the treatment of
debt forgiven under the PSLF program gives law schools an incentive to
estimate their "authorized educational expenses" to be as large as possible so as to further advantage those of their students who may considering enrolling in this program after graduation. The incentive under the
PSLF program is even stronger than the incentive under the IBR program given the much larger benefits associated with the PSLF program's
completely untaxed debt forgiveness,1 16 suggesting even more strongly a
need for periodic federal review of these educational expenses estimates
for their accuracy.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE AFFORDABILITY OF LAW SCHOOL
Having briefly discussed the main features of the IBR and PSLF programs, I will now analyze the question of the affordability of law school,
both under unsubsidized federal student loan terms and under the IBR
and PSLF programs. I will conduct this analysis by separately taking several different approaches and comparing the conclusions I reach.
First, I would like to consider, for a law graduate taking a full-time,
entry-level legal position paying the current $60,000/year median salary,
what percentage of his or her income over time would be required to
repay their law school loans under varying assumptions regarding the
amount of their debt, whether or not they enroll in the IBR or PSLF
programs, and if they do so enroll, then taking into account their family
size circumstances. This "debt servicing burden" analysis will closely
track the "Sarah" hypotheticals extensively explored by Brian Tamanaha
and Phillip Schrag." 7
Second, I will also conduct what I will describe as a "salary premium"
analysis. This analysis is intended to identify how large of a salary premium a law graduate would have to earn each year, over and above what
a comparable person who had only an undergraduate degree would be
able to earn, during their loan repayment period to justify various levels
of law school debt. I will do this first under unsubsidized debt repayment
terms and then under the IBR and PSLF programs. Finally, I will conduct
a "present value" analysis that will attempt to identify the present value
of the costs of law school given various levels of law school debt under
both unsubsidized loan repayment terms and under IBR and PSLF program repayment terms, as well as attempt to ascertain the size of the governmental subsidies these programs provide.
116. See Merritt (2013), supra note 17, at 10. Under the PSLF program, all of the additional borrowing can be regarded as "free money," rather than only 46.2% of that additional borrowing as under the IBR program, see supra note 107.
117. See TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLs, supra note 1, at 111-112, 119-125;
Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 8-17.
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I warn the reader in advance that these calculations are conducted in
some mathematical detail, perhaps excessive detail considering the many
unavoidable and sometimes debatable underlying assumptions that I
have made. However, the conclusions reached are relatively robust with
regard to many of those underlying assumptions. All of these alternative
analyses will point to roughly the same strong conclusions regarding the
current affordability of law school. First, even under standard ten-year
federal loan repayment terms, and certainly under extended twenty-fiveyear loan repayment terms, law school is still cost-justified for almost all
students attending the elite law schools because of the attractive employment opportunities those students will generally have upon graduation.
However, attending law school under unsubsidized loan repayment terms
no longer makes financial sense for most prospective applicants to nonelite law schools. But I will show that under the generous IBR program
terms, and certainly under the extremely favorable PSLF program terms,
law school is also at least a borderline financially viable undertaking for
many law students attending upper- or mid-tier, non-elite law schools,
specifically those better students who are likely to graduate in the upper
half or so of their classes and will therefore have good prospects for obtaining $60,000/year or more starting salaries.11 8 As a result of the IBR
program, those schools are likely to be able to still enroll enough students
to survive and to continue to offer Harvard-style education, although
they are likely to have to significantly downsize and therefore engage in
at least some modest restructuring over time to reduce costs and hold
down tuition levels.
Finally, however, even under the generous IBR or PSLF program
terms law school is now clearly an uneconomic proposition for anyone
except the very best students attending one or another of the many
lower-tier law schools, given the extremely poor employment opportunities that graduates of those schools now face. Even with those programs
available, the majority of the lower-tier law schools will probably not be
able to continue to enroll sufficient numbers of students at high enough
tuition levels to cover the costs of providing Harvard-style legal education. Except for those few lower tier schools that are fortunate enough to
be able to draw upon substantial endowment earnings or upon large state
subsidies to cover their losses, these schools will probably have to drastically downsize and either undergo drastic restructuring of their programs
to sharply reduce their costs and tuition levels, or else close their
operations.
A.

THE "DEBT SERVICING BURDEN" APPROACH

Both Brian Tamanaha and Phillip Schrag have considered at some
length the loan repayment obligations of a hypothetical law student, Sarah, who graduates and then takes a full-time entry-level legal position
118. See supra note 18.
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paying the class of 2010 median starting salary of $63,000/year. 119 Here, I
will carry out the same sort of mathematical analysis as they undertook
for each of the three different substantial law school loan amounts that I
am here considering, and in each instance do the calculations for two different family situations, either single or supporting a family of three persons, but instead using the updated and slightly lower class of 2011
$60,000/year median starting salary. I will then carry out a comparable
analysis regarding the PSLF program.
1. Sarah under the IBR program
First of all, if Sarah borrows the full $250,000 cost of a private legal
education through unsubsidized federal student loans, repayable over an
extended twenty-five-year term at a blended annual interest rate of 7.5%,
her principal and interest payments would then be over $1,860/month, an
obviously unaffordable 37.2% of her modest $5,000/month before-tax salary. Under the IBR program and the new PAYE rules, however, if she
were a single graduate supporting only herself, then her initial monthly
loan payment obligations would be only 1/12 x 10% x ($60,000 - $16,335)
= $364/month, 120 and if she supports a family of three persons her initial
monthly loan repayments would be only 1/12 x 10% x ($60,000 - $27,435)
= $2718/month. 12 1
The rate at which Sarah's required loan repayments will increase over
time depends on the rate at which her adjusted gross income will increase
over time and the rate at which the definition of the poverty income level
increases. 122 One can, of course, only speculate regarding how rapidly the
salaries of typical young lawyers and the poverty-level income are likely
to increase over the next twenty years; that will obviously depend upon
the average rate of overall price inflation over that period as well as upon
other factors. Any calculations and projections will have to be based
upon some assumptions in these regards.
I will therefore assume (hopefully reasonably) for this hypothetical and
for all of my many other illustrative hypotheticals that Sarah will receive
5% average annual raises over the next twenty years after commencing
her loan repayments under the IBR program, while the average annual
rate of inflation over that time period will be 3%/year. Thus, Sarah will be
receiving approximately 2%/year average annual increases in her "real,"
inflation-adjusted income over that time period. 12 3 I will also assume that
119. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLs, supra note 1, at 111-112, 119-125; Schrag

(2013), supra note 15, at 8-17.
120. The poverty-level income for a single person is now set at $16,335/year. See U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., FY 2011/2012 HHS Poverty Guidelines, LIHEAP
CLEARINGHOUSE,

http://www.liheap.ncat.org/profiles/povertytables/FY2012/popstate.htm

(last updated Feb. 26, 2013).
121. The poverty level income for a person supporting a family of three persons is now
set at $27,795/year. Id.
122. See Schrag (2007), supra note 15, at 36.
123. Different analysts of law school affordability and the net benefits of legal education make different assumptions about future relative salary trends and price-level move-
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the specification of the poverty-level income will also increase by an average of 3%/year over that same extended time period to accurately reflect
annual price inflation of this magnitude. Under these assumptions, Sarah's required monthly payments under the IBR program would then
gradually increase by about 5.7%/yearl 24 from the initial $364/month to
about $635/month by the tenth year, 125 and to about $1,103/month by the
twentieth year, if she remains single throughout that time period, 126 by
about 6.6%/yearl 27 from the initial $271/month to about $512/month by
the tenth year,128 and to about $968/month by the twentieth year, if she
supports a family of three persons over that time period.129 As I noted
earlier, her monthly payment obligations depend only upon her adjusted
gross income and the poverty level income and are no larger for her having $250,000 in outstanding loan debt upon commencing repayments
under the IBR program than if her debt at that time had been far
smaller.130
Under the IBR program, after twenty years Sarah's remaining debt
would be forgiven, and the forgiven debt would be regarded as taxable
income at that time.131 That tax bill will obviously be rather large. To
precisely calculate just how large, one would need to first determine how
large her forgivable debt would be after twenty years and then determine
ments. Herwig Schlunk, for example, assumed that both lawyer and non-lawyer salaries
would grow at 3.5%/year over the relevant time periods, but did not allow for any possible
overall price inflation during the relevant time periods. Schlunk, supra note 43, at 14. See
also Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, SSRN
(Apr. 13, 2013), http://ssrn.comlabstract=2250585 (criticizing Schlunk's assumptions). I
here similarly assume equal rates of growth in real income for lawyers and non-lawyers,
but at a significantly lower 2%/year rate for each group, and I assume a 3%/year overall
inflation rate. In sharp contrast, Simkovic & McIntyre assume that the differential between
lawyer and non-lawyer salaries will grow significantly in relative as well as in absolute
terms, as well as assuming, as I do, an average 3%/year inflation rate. Id. I am not so
optimistic about growth in future lawyer salaries over the course of their careers, relative
to growth in non-lawyer salaries, as are Simkovic & McIntyre.
124. (($60,000 x 1.05) - ($16,335 x 1.03))/($60,000 - $16,335) = 1.057, a 5.7% annual
increase.
125. $364 x (1.057)A1O = $635.45.
126. $364 x (1.057)A20 = $1,103.06.
127. (($60,000 x 1.05) - ($27,465 x 1.03))/($60,000 - $27,465) = 1.0657, a 6.57% annual
increase.
128. $271 x (1.0657)^10 = $512.06.
129. $271 x (1.0657)A20 = $967.54.
130. As long as the IBR program loan repayments are less than what the combined
principal and interest payments would be on an unsubsidized twenty-five-year term loan
then the IBR program would be advantageous for a borrower. For a single borrower with a
$60,000 annual salary who would be required to initially repay 1/12 x 10% x ($60,000 $16,335) = $364/month, the IBR program would initially be advantageous even if the person had borrowed only about $43,600 in Stafford loans at the applicable 6.8% annual interest rate. See supra note 46. Any borrowing beyond this $43,600 level would not affect the
size of the monthly IBR payments due, but only the size of the eventual tax liability for the
forgiven debt. Similarly, for a borrower supporting a family of three persons with a $60,000
annual salary who would be required to initially repay 1/12 x 10% x ($60,000 - $27,435) =
$271/month the IBR program would initially be advantageous even if the person had only
borrowed about $35,000 in Stafford loans.
131. Jonathan M. Layman, Forgiven but not Forgotten: Taxation of Forgiven Student
Loans Under the Income-Based-Repayment Play, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 131, 147 (2011).
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what tax rate would apply to that forgiven-debt income. Let me first calculate the size of Sarah's unpaid debt after twenty years, under various
simplifying assumptions, and then I will turn to the much more difficult
question of determining the applicable tax rate.
I will first assume that Sarah is single; that she owes $250,000 in loan
debt at the time she commences her loan repayments under the IBR program; that she takes a position upon graduation paying the median
$60,000/year starting salary; and that, as assumed above in connection
with determining her monthly IBR repayments, her salary then grows at
an average of 5%/year over the next twenty years while the poverty level
income is raised an average of 3%/year. Under these assumptions, her
monthly loan repayments would start at $364/month and also grow steadily at about 5.7%/year. She would therefore have to make payments averaging roughly $634/month-the tenth-year payment obligations-over
the entirety of that twenty-year time period.132
The monthly interest payment alone due on a $250,000 loan at a 7.5%
annual interest rate is approximately $1,563.133 With Sarah's monthly
payments averaging only $634/month over the twenty years her unpaid
interest will average $929/month.134 Under the IBR program, the government will forgive this unpaid interest for the first three years after her
repayments commence, and then there will accrue as part of her growing
debt the $929/month on average of unpaid interest over the next seventeen years,13 5 for a total unpaid debt at the time of debt forgiveness of
about a rather substantial $439,516136 If Sarah had instead been supporting a family of three persons over this time, under these same assumptions her monthly IBR payments over the twenty-year time period would
instead have started at $271/month and averaged only about $512/month
over that period, leading to accruing unpaid interest of an average of
about $1,051/month,137 and to a larger total unpaid debt at the time of
debt forgiveness of about $464,404.138
If Sarah was single and had instead owed only $200,000 upon her enrollment in the IBR program, under these same assumptions her unpaid
interest would accrue at a rate averaging $616/month,139 leading to an
unpaid debt at the time of debt forgiveness of $325,664,140 and if she instead supported a family of three persons, then her unpaid interest would
132. 364 x (1.057^10) = $633.65.
133. $250,000 x (0.075/12) = $1,563.
134. $1,563/month - $635/month = $929/month.

135. If your student loan debt is high relative to your income, you may qualify for the
Income-Based Repayment Plan (IBR), FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-

loans/understand/plans/income-based (last visited Dec. 16, 2013). But this unpaid interest
will not be capitalized into principal, avoiding the compound interest effect. Id.
136. $250,000 + ($929 x 12 x 17) = $439,516.
137. $1,563/month - $512/month = $1,051/month.
138. $250,000 + (($1,051) x 12 x 17) = $464,404.
139. ($200,000 x (.075/12)) - $635 = $616/month.
140. $200,000 + ($616 x 12 x 17) = $325,664.
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accrue at a rate averaging $738/month,141 leading to an unpaid debt at the
time of debt forgiveness of $350,552.142 Finally, if Sarah was single and
had instead owed only $160,000 upon her enrollment in the IBR program,
under these same assumptions her unpaid interest would accrue at a rate
averaging $366/month, 143 leading to an unpaid debt at the time of debt
forgiveness of $234,664,144 and if she instead supported a family of three
persons then her unpaid interest would accrue at a rate averaging $488!
month, 145 leading to an unpaid debt at the time of debt forgiveness of
$259,552.146

These are all rather substantial amounts of taxable income, and the
resulting tax burdens will be large. Before I turn to estimating Sarah's tax
rate on that income so that her tax liability can be determined, let me first
briefly note the considerable difficulties that IBR enrollees will have in
predicting with any confidence exactly how large a debt forgiveness tax
bill they are likely to face in twenty years.
To determine the amount of debt forgiveness taxes individuals will
owe, they will first have to estimate how large their unpaid debt will be at
the time of forgiveness, which as discussed above will require them to
estimate how rapidly their adjusted gross income will grow over the next
twenty years as well as how rapidly the poverty income level will increase
over that time, which will in turn require them to estimate the amount of
price inflation that will take place over the next twenty years. After estimating the size of their debt burden at the time of debt forgiveness, the
IBR enrollees will then have to determine what marginal tax rate will be
applied to that debt forgiveness income. This will depend, first of all, on
how much other income they will have in that twentieth year. 147 It will
also depend upon what the structure of federal income tax brackets will
look like in twenty years after any intervening changes that may have
been made in the relevant tax rates, and upon how much adjustment
upwards of the various tax bracket cut-offs has taken place over that period to offset the impacts of inflation of the general price level over that
time. 148 There will also generally be a significant state income tax imposed on local state residents on this debt forgiveness income, at least for
141. ($200,000 x (.075/12)) - $512 = $738/month.
142. $200,000 + ($738 x 12 x 17) = $350,552.
143. ($160,000 x (.075/12)) - $635 = $366/month.
144. $160,000 + ($366 x 12 x 17) = $234,664.
145. ($160,000 x (.075/12)) - $512/month = $488/month.
146. $160,000 + ($547 x 12 x 17) = $259,552.
147. If, for example, a person has a large enough income from other sources to put
them into the top 39.6% marginal tax bracket, then the entire forgiven debt will be taxed at
this 39.6% rate. If, however, the person's other income is less than this, then each portion
of the forgiven debt will be taxed at the marginal tax rate applicable to that particular
"slice" of the debt forgiveness income, with the overall tax rate on that debt forgiveness
income then being a weighted average of the different applicable marginal tax rates. See
Rev. Proc. 2011-52, 2011-45 I.R.B. 701, at § 3.
148. MARTIN J. MCMAHON & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF INDIVIDUALS

§ 2.01

(2d ed. 2013). Tax bracket cut-offs are often either systematically or

on an ad hoc basis adjusted upwards to prevent "bracket creep" from price level inflation
that does not reflect real income gains. Id.
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the majority of states that have a state income tax regime, so those individuals will also have to project in what state they will be residing in
twenty years and what the applicable marginal tax rates will be for that
state at that time.149 These are all difficult calculations.
Let me return to the more manageable circumstances of our hypothetical Sarah, with her $60,000/year starting salary that is assumed to grow at
an average annual rate of 5%/year over the twenty years after commencing IBR repayments and with both the poverty-level income and the
overall price level projected to increase by an average of 3%/year. Under
these assumptions her salary in year twenty will be approximately
$159,198.15o I will further assume that she will pay taxes under the tax
rate structure applicable to a single person1 51 and that the various marginal tax rates will be unchanged from current rates except for the fact that
each of the tax-bracket cutoffs will be raised by 80.6% to reflect the cumulative effect of 3%/year average annual price inflation over those

twenty years. 15 2
I have calculated earlier that under these assumptions if Sarah is single
and owes $250,000 at the time her loan repayments commence, she will
have a debt of $439,516 after twenty years.' 5 3 She will therefore owe federal income taxes of $136,453 on this amount, 154 a 31% federal tax.' 5 5 If
she instead supports a family of three persons, her debt after twenty years
will be $469,404,156 and she will owe federal income taxes of $148,666 on
this amount,'5 7 a 31.2% federal tax.' 5 8 If Sarah is single and only owes
$200,000 at the time her loan repayments commence, she will have a debt
of $325,664 after twenty years. 159 She will therefore owe federal income
149. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION TT 1.02, 20.02 (3d ed. 2013).
150. $60,000 x (1.05)A20 = $159,198.
151. That set of tax brackets now imposes a 25% marginal tax on income between
$36,250 and $87,850, 28% on income between $87,850 and $183,250, 33% on income between $187,250 and $398,350, 35% on income between $398,350 and $400,000, and 39.6%
on income over $400,000. Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, § 1(c). I will assume for
these illustrative calculations that there will not be any additional tax liability imposed on
the debt forgiveness income by the Alternative Minimum Tax rules.
152. (1.03)^20 = 1.806, an 80.6% increase, leading to the following new projected structure of tax rates in twenty years for a single person: a 25% marginal tax rate imposed on
income between $65,468 and $158,657, 28% on income between $158,657 and $330,950,
33% on income between $330,950 and $719,420, 35% on income between $719,420 and
$722,400, and 39.6% on income over $722,400. I will again assume for these illustrative
calculations that there will not be any additional tax liability imposed on the debt forgiveness income by the Alternative Minimum Tax rules, which will likely be indexed as well to
reflect inflation.
153. See supra note 136.
154. (($330,950 - $159,198) x .28) + (($439,516 - $171,752) x .33) = $133,453.
155. $136,453/$439,516 = 0.31046, a 31.0% tax rate.
156. See supra note 138.
157. (($330,950 - $159,198) x .28) + (($469,404 - $171,752) x .33) = $144,666. If Sarah is
filing using married filing separately tax status, her tax rate would be slightly higher, and if
she is filing using married filing jointly tax status her tax rate would be slightly lower. See
Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444. I will ignore these filing status complications for
these tax rate hypotheticals.
158. $148,666/$464,404 = 0.3115, a 31.2% tax rate.
159. See supra note 140.
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taxes of $98,882 on this amount, 160 a 30.4% federal tax. 16 1 If she instead
supports a family of three persons, her debt after twenty years will be
$350,552,162 and she will owe federal income taxes of $107,095 on this
amount,163 a 30.6% federal tax. 164 Finally, if Sarah is single and only owes
$160,000 at the time her loan repayments commence, she will have a debt
of $234,664 after twenty years.165 She will therefore owe federal income
taxes of $68,852 on this amount,166 a 29.3% federal tax.167 If she instead
supports a family of three persons, her debt after twenty years will be
$259,552,168 and she will owe federal income taxes of $77,065 on this
amount,169 a 29.7% federal tax.170 Since all of the above applicable tax
rates bunch closely between 29.3% and 31.2%, I will assume for ease of
exposition for these hypotheticals that Sarah will pay in all instances
about a 30% federal tax rate on her debt forgiveness income.
Determining the appropriate state income tax rate to apply to this hypothetical income is more difficult since there are large variations among
the states as to the applicable upper tax brackets' marginal tax rates.' 7 '
For the purpose of these illustrative hypotheticals, I will assume that Sarah will be subject to a 3.33% marginal state tax rate, giving rise to an
overall one-third (33.33%) combined federal and state income tax on her
debt forgiveness income.
This 33.33% figure is a useful round number for planning purposes. If
Sarah owes $250,000 when commencing her repayments, for example,
this will lead to a state income tax bill of $14,636172 when her debt is
forgiven under the IBR program, if she is single, for an approximate total
federal and state income tax liability at that time of $146,491.173 She will
160. (($330,950 - $159,198) x .28) + (($362,588 - $171,752) x .33) = $98,882.
161. $98,882/$325,664 = 0.3036, a 30.4% tax rate.
162. See supra note 142.
163. (($330,950 - $159,198) x .28) + (($350,552 - $171,752) x .33) = $107,095. If Sarah is
filing using married filing separately tax status, her tax rate would be slightly higher, and if
she is filing using married filing jointly tax status, her tax rate would be slightly lower. See
Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444. I will ignore these filing status complications for
these tax rate hypotheticals.
164. $107,095/$350,552 = 0.3055, a 30.6% tax rate.
165. See supra note 144.
166. (($330,950 - $159,198) x .28) + (($234,664 - $171,752) x .33) = $68,852.
167. $68,852/$234,664 = 0.2934, a 29.3% tax rate.
168. See supra note 146.
169. (($330,950 - $159,198) x .28) + (($271,588 - $171,752) x .33) = $81,036. If Sarah is
filing using married filing separately tax status, her tax rate would be slightly higher, and if
she is filing using married filing jointly tax status, her tax rate would be slightly lower. See
Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444. I will ignore these filing status complications for
these tax rate hypotheticals.
170. $77,065/$259,552 = 0.2969, a 29.7% tax rate.
171. For example, while some states (such as Texas) have no state income tax at all,
other states (such as New York or California) have relatively high marginal state income
tax rates for upper-income taxpayers. See Individual State Income Tax Rates 2000-2011,
2013, TAx POL'Y CENTER (Nov. 7, 2013, 10:47 PM), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=406.
172. $439,516 x.0333 = $14,636. See supra note 136.
173. $439,516 x 0.3333 = $146,491. See supra note 136.
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owe a state income tax bill of $15,465174 if she supports three persons, for
an approximate total federal and state income tax liability of $154,801.175
If Sarah instead owes $200,000 when commencing repayments, this will
lead to a state income tax bill of $10,845176 if she is single, for an approximate total federal and state income tax liability of $108,544,'17 and to a
state income tax bill of $11,673 if she supports three persons,'17 for an
approximate total federal and state income tax liability of $116,734.179 If
Sarah instead owes $160,000 when commencing repayments, this will lead
to a state income tax bill of $7,81418o if she is single, for an approximate
total federal and state income tax liability of $78,214,181 and a state income tax bill of $8,643182 if she supports three persons, for an approximate total federal and state income tax liability of $86,431.183
It is certainly possible that the IBR provisions may be amended at
some point to eliminate the taxation of forgiven debt under the program,
so as to parallel the current debt forgiveness provisions of the PSLF program. 184 Some knowledgeable commentators have called for legislation
to this effect.' 8 5 Moreover, then-Senator Hillary Clinton unsuccessfully
introduced legislation in 2007 that would have accomplished this end, 1 8 6
and now the Obama Administration has included such a provision in its
proposed fiscal year 2014 budget.187 There is, however, no assurance that
such legislation will be adopted given the currently partisan and
gridlocked Congressional legislative process and given the great political
sensitivity of tax law changes.1 88 Our Sarah would be wise to assume for
now that these tax obligations will remain in force and to provide for
them well in advance by either setting aside and conservatively investing
some significant portion of her initial loans or by making regular monthly
payments over her first twenty years of employment into a conservatively
invested escrow account. 89 Please be patient while I engage in some fur174. $464,404 x.0333 = $15,465. See supra note 138.
175. $464,404 x 0.3333 = $154,801. See supra note 138.
176. $325,664 x.0333 = $10,845. See supra note 140.
177. $325,664 x 0.3333 = $108,544. See supra note 140.
178. $350,552 x .0333 = $11,673. See supra note 142.
179. $350,552 x 0.3333 = $116,734. See supra note 142.
180. $234,664 x .0333 = $7,814. See supra note 144.
181. $234,664 x 0.3333 = $78,214. See supra note 144.
182. $259,552 x .0333 = $8,643. See supra note 146.
183. $259,552 x 0.3333 = $86,431. See supra note 146.
184. See Deslisle & Holt, supra note 15, at 7.
185. See id. at 15.
186. Student Borrower Bill of Rights Act of 2007, S. 511, 110th Cong. § 6(b).
187. Ann Carrns, Budget Would Eliminate Taxes on Forgiven Student Debt, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2013, 1:52 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/budget-would-eliminate-taxes-on-forgiven-student-debt.
188. See Josh Mitchell, Cutting Down Student Debt, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424127887324059704578471223436096876 (last updated May 20,
2013, 10:12 AM).
189. One criticism that might be made of the IBR program is that it is based upon the
implicit assumption that those high-debt law students and other graduate student borrowers who will have these large debt-forgiveness tax liabilities after twenty years will have the
foresight and self-discipline necessary to make over the years the regular escrow deposits
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ther illustrative calculations of the size of these amounts.
Let me initially assume that Sarah needs the entire law school loan
amount for her legal education, and regularly contributes to the escrow
account out of her monthly earnings after graduation. Let me also conservatively, but realistically, assume that she will be able to earn only a
modest 5%/year average before-tax return on her investment portfolio,
which is here assumed, for simplicity, to consist only of a conventional
diversified portfolio of common stocks or stock mutual funds with 2%/
year of this return on the portfolio assumed to be dividends and the remaining 3%/year consisting of capital appreciation. There will be a 20%
income tax imposed each year on these dividends, 190 with the after-tax
portion of the dividends then assumed to be reinvested in the portfolio,
and no capital gains taxes will be imposed on the capital appreciation
until the assets are later sold. 19 1 This will lead to a 3% + 1.6% = 4.6%
average annual after-tax rate of return on the portfolio prior to its liquidation. After twenty years, the portfolio will be liquidated to pay the debt
necessary to build up a fund of perhaps as much as $100,000 and$200,000 as needed to pay
these taxes. Given the extent to which persons often fail to make comparable provisions
for their retirement, this may be an assumption that is not justified. See Edward Siedle, The
Greatest Retirement Crisis In American History, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsiedle/2013/03/20/the-greatest-retirement-crisis-in-americanhistory/. There may prove to be a substantial number of law-student borrowers who find
themselves in rather serious financial difficulties with the IRS when these discharge of
indebtedness taxes come due. Other law students who might benefit from the IBR program might choose to not enroll because of (perhaps wise) concerns they have that they
may lack sufficient self-discipline to provide for this eventual tax obligation.
It is also possible that by the time an IBR enrollee's debt is forgiven the law will have
been amended to exempt the forgiven debt from tax liability, as it is now for the discharged
debt under the PSLF program. See Delisle & Holt, supra note 15, at 7. There will surely be
a number of financially distressed IBR enrollees in twenty years who will lobby strenuously for such a change, and some analysts currently support such a move. See, e.g., id. at
15. However, I suspect that the political reaction to a proposed tax-law amendment that
called for foregoing substantial amounts of tax revenues, with the benefits to be apportioned to mid-career attorneys and other professionals in $100,000-$200,000 amounts,
would likely be unsympathetic. Current IBR enrollees surely should not count on there
being such a favorable change in the law and should make provision for eventually paying
those taxes. They perhaps should even take into account the possibility that the topbracket marginal tax rates applicable to such large amounts of taxable income may be
increased over the next twenty years, and they may want to set aside extra escrow deposits
to address that eventuality.
Let me also note here in passing a little-noticed aspect of the IBR program. Federal
student loan debts are generally not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Katheryn E. Hancock, A
Certainty of Hopelessness: Debt, Depression, and the Dischargeof Student Loans Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 33 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 151, 151 (2009). Once the remaining unpaid
balance of the loan debt is forgiven under the IBR program after twenty years, the borrower now has a tax liability obligation on this discharged debt. In other words. the debt is
now technically a tax debt rather than a student loan debt. See Student Loan Debt, supra
note 135. As a result that debt may now be discharged in bankruptcy, although the bankruptcy provisions regarding the discharge of tax debt are also onerous. See Paul H. Waldman, Bankruptcy Discharge of Tax Debts: Navigating the Minefield, 23 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 1, 1-2 (2004).
190. See A Taxpayer's Guide to 2013, FIDELITY (Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.fidelity
.com/viewpoints/personal-finance/taxpayers-guide.
191. See Tax Topics-Topic 409 Capital Gains and Losses, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
taxtopics/tc409.html (last updated Apr. 1, 2013).
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forgiveness taxes. Long-term capital gains taxes at the 20% rate will now
be paid on the portion of the sale proceeds that reflect stock appreciation,
leading to about an overall 4.1% average annual after-all taxes rate of
return for the portfolio over the 20-year period, 192 and the remainder of
the proceeds can then be used to pay the debt-forgiveness tax liability.
Under these simplifying assumptions, for Sarah to be able to pay the
debt-forgiveness federal and state tax bills when they come due twenty
years after her IBR repayments commence, assuming for the moment
that she wants to make equal-sized payments each month into the escrow
account over the twenty years, Sarah would need to make 240 monthly
payments of the following sizes noted in the table below to the account,
the amounts depending on the amount of loan debt she initially owes
when she commences the repayments, and also depending upon whether
she is single or instead supports a family of three persons: 193
Required Monthly Equal-Sized Tax Liability Escrow Deposits
If supporting three
persons

Amount initially owed

If single

$250,000

$486/monthl 94

$514/month'

$200,000

$360/monthl 96

$387/month' 97

95

192. When the escrow account is liquidated most of the proceeds will be either a return
of initial deposits or of reinvested after-tax dividends. Only about 25% of the value of the
account after twenty years will be long-term capital gains that are subject to a 20% tax rate.
See id. This will reduce the amount of net proceeds by about .20 x .25 = 5%. This capital
gains tax will therefore lead to an average annual after-all taxes rate of return on the
portfolio over that period of about 4.1%. This is down from the 4.6% average annual aftertax rate of return over that period after each year's taxes on the dividends have been paid,
but before payment of the final capital gains taxes.
193. The figures in this table are based upon the assumption that Sarah has financed all
of her law school costs, including the forgone after-tax income, through borrowing. To the
extent that she has financed some of those costs through use of her own funds, or through
spending less on annual living expenses than her assumed $30,000/year foregone income,
her final debt obligation that is forgiven and the corresponding required monthly escrow
deposits to pay the taxes on this forgiven debt will be reduced in the same proportion. So,
for example, if her full costs of law school were $200,000, but she was able to reduce her
debt upon commencing IBR repayments by 15% to $170,000 through reducing her law
school living expenses to $20,000 each year, she would only have to make monthly escrow
payments 15% lower than those set forth in the table for an initial $200,000 loan debt.
194. A stream of 240 monthly payments of $486 each, invested at a 4.1% annual aftertax interest rate, compounded annually, will grow to a sum of $146,491 at the end of twenty
years.
195. A stream of 240 monthly payments of $514 each, invested at a 4.1% annual aftertax interest rate, compounded annually, will grow to a sum of $154,801 at the end of twenty
years.
196. A stream of 240 monthly payments of $360 each, invested at a 4.1% annual aftertax interest rate, compounded annually, will grow to a sum of $108,544 at the end of twenty
years.
197. A stream of 240 monthly payments of $387 each, invested at a 4.1% annual aftertax interest rate, compounded annually, will grow to a sum of $116,734 at the end of twenty
years.
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$160,000

1

$260/month1 98

$287/month

Given that Sarah's income is assumed to grow at an average of 5%/
year over the twenty-year period, it would probably make more sense for
Sarah to make a stream of deposits in her tax liability escrow account that
grew 5%/year over time, rather than equal-sized payments, so as to
lighten her burden during her early years of lower income. For a $250,000
initial debt, if she is single, her escrow payments could then start at only
$298/month, growing over the twenty years to $792/month, and would
still be sufficient at a 4.1% average annual rate of return to build up the
fund to meet the eventual tax liability. If she is supporting three persons
the corresponding initial escrow payment would be $315/month, growing
over the twenty years to $838/month. For a $200,000 initial debt, if she is
single her escrow payments could then start at only $221/month, growing
over the years to $588/month, and if she supports three persons they
could start at start at $238/month, growing over the years to $632/month.
Finally, for a $160,000 initial debt, if she is single, Sarah's escrow payments could then start at only $160/month, growing over the years to
$424/month, and if she supports three persons they could start at $176/
month, growing over the years to $468/month.
Pulling all of these various calculations together, if Sarah borrows
$250,000 to finance her legal education and remains single then the total
cost to her under the IBR program, considering both the required
monthly loan repayments and the necessary growing contributions to the
escrow account for covering the eventual debt-forgiveness tax bill, would
initially be about $364 + $298 = $662/month, only about 13.2% of her
initial $5,000 monthly income, and under the assumptions of 5% average
annual salary growth and 3% annual increases in the poverty level income this would gradually rise over the next twenty years, along with her
income, to about $1,109 + $792 = $1,901/month. If she instead supports a
family of three persons then under the IBR program the total initial cost
to her would be about $271 + $315 = $586/month initially, only about
11.7% of her income, gradually rising, along with her income, to about
$967 + $838 = $1,805/month in year twenty.
If she instead borrows only $200,000 and remains single, then the total
cost to her under the IBR program, considering the eventual debt forgiveness tax bill, would initially be about $364 + $221 = $585/month,
about 11.7% of her income, and gradually rise over the next 20 years,
along with her income, to about $1,109 + $588 = $1,697/month. If she
instead supports a family of three, then under the IBR program the total
cost to her would be about $271 + $238 = $509/month initially, about
198. A stream of 240 monthly payments of $260 each, invested at a 4.1% annual aftertax interest rate, compounded annually, will grow to a sum of $78,214 at the end of twenty
years.
199. A stream of 240 monthly payments of $287 each, invested at a 4.1% annual aftertax interest rate, compounded annually, will grow to a sum of $86,431 at the end of twenty
years.
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10.1% of her income, gradually rising over the next 20 years, along with
her income, to about $967 + $632 = $1,599/month.
Finally, if Sarah instead borrows only $160,000 and remains single, then
the total cost to her under the IBR program, considering the eventual
debt forgiveness tax bill, would initially be about $364 + $160 = $524/
month, about 10.5% of her income, and gradually rise over the next
twenty years, along with her income, to about $1,109 + $424 = $1,523/
month. If she instead supports a family of three, then under the IBR program the total cost to her would be about $271 + $176 = $447/month
initially, only about 8.9% of her income, gradually rising over the next
twenty years, along with her income, to about $967 + $468 = $1,435/
month.
I have surely obscured my central points with all of these detailed hypothetical calculations, but my conclusions are relatively clear and robust.
Let me here attempt to succinctly summarize the major results and implications of these mathematical machinations. If a graduate who owes
$250,000 in law school debt takes an entry-level, full-time legal position
paying the current median $60,000/year starting salary-a salary of
$5,000/month before taxes-that graduate under the IBR program will
initially have to make combined debt repayment and tax liability escrow
payments of approximately $624/month, 200 approximately 12.5% of their
income. However, only between $271/month and $364/month of that sum,
depending on her family status, will be mandatory loan repayments only between 5.4% and 7.3% of the borrower's income-and the remainder will be in discretionary (but highly advisable) tax-liability escrow deposits. A $200,000 debt level will instead require that graduate to make
initial monthly debt-repayment and tax-liability escrow payments of approximately $547 month,2 01 approximately 10.9% of their income. Again,
only between $271/month and $364/month of that sum, depending on her
family status, will be mandatory loan repayments- again between 5.4%
and 7.3% of the borrower's income-and the remainder will be in discretionary tax-liability escrow deposits. A $160,000 debt level will instead
require that graduate to make initial monthly debt-repayment and taxliability escrow payments of approximately $486/month, 202 approximately
9.7% of their income. Once again, the required loan repayments will only
be between $271/month and $364/month, depending on her family status-only 5.4% to 7.3% of the borrower's income-and the remainder
will be discretionary tax-liability escrow deposits.
200. This $624/month is the
ments and tax escrow deposits
three members.
201. This $547/month is the
ments and tax escrow deposits
three members.
202. This $486/month is the
ments and tax escrow deposits
three members.

average of the required $662 and $586 initial monthly payfor single borrowers and borrowers supporting a family of
average of the required $585 and $509 initial monthly payfor single borrowers and borrowers supporting a family of
average of the required $524 and $447 initial monthly payfor single borrowers and borrowers supporting a family of
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Debt repayment burdens of these sizes, ranging from 9.7% to 12.5% of
her before-tax income, 20 3 are surely manageable on Sarah's salary, particularly since the tax-liability escrow deposit portion of the monthly burden
is not mandatory and can be deferred if necessary to deal with financial
exigencies. Of course, if a student also has substantial undergraduate student loans to repay, 20 4 then even the mandatory loan repayments under
the IBR program could be difficult to afford on a median $60,000/year
entry-level salary, 205 and the additional tax-liability escrow deposit obligations could possibly make law school unaffordable. But thanks to the
IBR program, a law student who is not burdened by unduly large undergraduate debts, and, who due to the stature of their law school or to their
strong performance in law school, or both, realistically expects to earn at
least the current median starting salary of $60,000/year or more upon
graduation, can afford to borrow $160,000 and perhaps even as much as
$200,000 or $250,000 to pay for law school if they are willing to devote a
relatively modest 9.7% to 12.5% of their income to debt repayments and
tax-escrow deposits, 20 6 and if they have the financial self-discipline to regularly make the necessary escrow account deposits over the next twenty
years.207
The analysis above suggests that the high costs of law school may be
justified for those prospective students who reasonably expect to do well
enough, given the relative stature of the law school they attend, to be able
to obtain a full-time legal position paying at or above the $60,000/year
median starting salary. However, as I have noted earlier, only about 55%
of law graduates are now able to obtain such full-time legal positions,
and, of course, half of those positions will pay less than the median starting salary, sometimes significantly less, so I am here referring to less than
one-third of law students. 208 And even students with well-grounded ex203. Let me briefly note that a law graduate whose adjusted gross income is low enough
to qualify may deduct up to $2,500/year of student loan interest, saving them approximately $625-$800/year, amounting a savings of about 1% to 1.33% of a $60,000/year income. See supra note 66.
204. The average undergraduate who graduates with outstanding student loans now
owes over $25,000 in federal student loans. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLs, supra
note 1, at 110.
205. On the other hand, to the extent that the graduate has financed the cost of law
school with his own or family funds then the debt repayment burden would be less than
this, although the overall economic cost including foregone income would be largely unaffected. See supra note 55.
206. But see supra note 203 discussing some minor tax benefits that would further reduce this burden. One should keep in mind that these debt-burden percentage calculations
are all based on the assumption of certainty as to a graduate's ability to obtain a full-time
legal position with a $60,000/year starting salary. However, given that there is no certainty
in life a typical risk-averse and relatively undiversified new law graduate would likely regard a monthly debt burden with an expected percentage-of-income value in these ranges
as being more burdensome, perhaps substantially so, than were they certain with regard to
their future income stream.
207. These large amounts of debt would surely render it difficult for graduates to keep
up with their tax escrow payments, at least for the first few years after graduation.
208. But see Barros,supra note 2, who argues that the approximately 55% rate at which
class of 2011 graduates obtained full-time legal employment by nine months after gradua-
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pectations of excelling in law school sometimes do not perform nearly as
well as they had hoped. 2 09 Given these grim facts, as Brian Tamanaha
makes clear in FAILING LAw SCHOOLS, and Paul Campos makes clearer
than clear, if that is possible, in Don't Go to Law School (Unless), there is
therefore a significant financial risk now involved in attending law school,
even for students attending well-regarded non-elite schools and even
given the IBR program. 2 10 Even for the stronger students at non-elite
schools, the risk of a poor employment outcome is now sufficiently great
that a typical risk-averse and relatively undiversified law school applicant
should discount their expected income stream by an appropriate discount
factor to reflect this risk.
This risk of unemployment is relatively small (although non-negligible
in this difficult employment market) for students attending one of the
elite law schools. But for those students who attend an upper- or mid-tier,
non-elite law school and who may not graduate in at least the upper half
of their class, or who do not interview very well with potential employers,
or both, and for those students who attend a lower-tier law school and
who may not graduate in the top 10% or at least in the top quarter of
their class, nor have influential hiring connections at a local law firm, the
risk of a very long period of financial difficulty after graduation is substantial and should be reflected in discounting their expected income
streams.
Let me revisit our Sarah one last time to illustrate this sobering point.
Let me assume that she attended an upper- or mid-tier, non-elite private
law school with a substantial 33% scholarship, and therefore graduated
with $200,000 in debt at the time that she commenced repayments under
the IBR program.2 11 Assume also that Sarah is single, graduated in the
lower half of her class academically, and is only able to obtain a full-time
legal position with a small law firm paying a modest salary of $45,000/year
($3,750/month) or is unable to obtain full-time legal employment at all
and therefore has to settle for a paralegal (or retail store assistant manager, schoolteacher, etc.) position paying the same $45,000/year, the typical salary now paid to a person starting out on their career with only an
undergraduate degree. 212
Assuming that Sarah keeps this job and obtains average annual raises
of 5%/year over the next twenty years, and that the poverty income level
increases by an average of 3%/year over that time, Sarah's monthly IBR
tion understates the proportion of graduates who will eventually obtain legal positions with
a comparable career salary track.
209. See CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 46-51.
210. See id.; TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw ScHooLs, supra note 1, at 119-125. Given this

uncertainty a typical risk-averse and relatively very undiversified new law graduate should
discount their expected income stream by an additional discount factor that reflects the
riskiness that it embodies and their personal risk premium for bearing such a risk, thereby
raising, perhaps significantly, the threshold starting salary needed to justify their incurring
any particular level of educational debt.
211. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 45.
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payments will start at $239/month213 and gradually increase to $728/
month over the twenty years, averaging about $484/month. Her unpaid
interest will therefore average about $1,079/month, 214 and her unpaid
debt at the end of the twenty years will be about $470,116,215 leading to a
combined federal and state income tax liability on her forgiven debt of
about $156,705,216 requiring her to set aside monthly tax-liability escrow
deposits of about an average of $525/month217 over the twenty-year loan
term. If she structures her escrow deposits as discussed earlier to grow by
5% year along with her income, as before, her total combined monthly
loan repayments and escrow deposits will start at $239 + $322 = $551/
month, about 14.7% of her $3,750 monthly income, and gradually grow
with her income over the twenty years to about $728 + $856 = $1,584/
month, averaging about $484/month + $525/month = $1,009/month.
So Sarah will now have to set aside about 14.7% of her modest $3,750/
month income for a full twenty years, and under these salary assumptions
she will not have gained any offsetting financial benefits at all from attending law school. In fact, her starting salary of $45,000/year is likely to
be about $5,000/year less than the comparable salary of a person who had
taken a typical $45,000/year undergraduate degree-based position starting
three years earlier, an 11.1% salary differential218 that is likely to persist
over the years. The after-tax portion of that lost $5,000/year of income, on
a monthly basis, would start at about $279/month, 219 growing to about
$737/month after twenty years and averaging about $452/month over that
time period. That is approximately another 7.4% of her salary. So the
total impact upon Sarah of attending law school at a cost of $200,000, and
then obtaining a $45,000/year legal position, or a $45,000/year non-legal
position paying no more than a position she could have obtained on the
basis of her undergraduate degree alone, is a burden of about 22.1% of
her current salary, and about 20% of the slightly larger salary that she
would have earned over the years had she not attended law school, for
the next twenty years!
The bottom line for Sarah is that law school was a very risky gamble
that she unfortunately lost and that ended up costing her in one way or
another about one-fifth of her income for the next twenty years, even
under the generous IBR program provisions. Given what Paul Campos
describes as the "Special Snowflake Syndrome" 220 -the tendency of law
213. ($45,000 - $16,335) x .10 x 1/12 = $239.
214. $1,563/month - $484/month = $1,079/month.
215. $250,000 + ($1,079 x 12 x 17) = $470,116.
216. $470,116 x .0333 = $156,549. Sarah's tax rate may actually be slightly less than
33.3% because her income will be somewhat smaller after twenty years, having started at
$45,000/year, than if she had started at $60,000/year, thereby lowering slightly the tax rate
applicable to some of the discharged debt income. See supra notes 170, 171.
217. A stream of 240 monthly payments of $525 each, invested at a 4.1% annual aftertax interest rate, compounded annually, will grow to a sum of $156,705 at the end of twenty
years.
218. $50,000/$45,000 = 1.111, an 11.1% increase.
219. ($5,000 x .67)/12 = $279.
220. CAMPOs (2012), supra note 1, at 15-21.
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students and others who have had some early success in life to regard
themselves as being less likely to experience adverse events than the relevant statistical probabilities would indicate-there are, unfortunately,
likely to be quite a few law graduates in Sarah's position in the coming
years. A wise law student should correspondingly discount their expected
stream of earnings, perhaps quite significantly, to reflect this substantial
downside risk.
2.

Sarah under the PSLF program

Let me now consider the situation if our Sarah takes a qualifying public
service position which, under the PSLF program, allows for IBR program-level capped debt repayments as well as debt forgiveness after only
ten years, and without any tax liability being imposed on the forgiven
debt. Let me first assume that Sarah is single, borrows an amount somewhere between $160,000 and $250,000 to finance her legal education, and
then takes a qualifying public service position paying the median $60,000/
year starting salary. Let me also again assume that her salary will increase
by an average of 5%/year over the next ten years while the poverty level
income will be increased by an average of 3%/year. Her initial monthly
payments under the IBR program will, as discussed, above be only $364/
month, rising gradually by about 5.7%/year 221 to $635/month by the tenth
year. The government will pay the unpaid portion of her monthly $1,563
interest charges on her loans for the first three years after her IBR repayments commence, and for the next seven years her unpaid interest averaging about $853/month over that seven-year period 222 will accrue but
will not be capitalized. Her total unpaid debt after ten years will be
$321,652,223 which will then be forgiven without any tax liability being
imposed. Her required monthly repayments will only initially comprise
9.7% of her income, and will under these assumptions of 5% average
annual salary growth and 3% annual increases in the poverty level income remain at roughly that same percentage of her income level for the
ten-year period, an entirely feasible burden for her to bear.
The results for Sarah under the PSLF program will be very similar if
she supports a family of three persons. Her initial monthly payments
under the IBR program will as discussed above be only $271/month, rising gradually by about 6.6%/year 224 to $512/month by the tenth year. The
government will pay the unpaid portion of her monthly $1,563 interest
charges on her loans for the first three years after her IBR repayments
commence, and for the next seven years her unpaid interest averaging
about $1,140/month over that seven-year period 225 will accrue but will
221. See supra note 124.
222. Her average monthly payment over the final seven years of her ten-year payment
obligation will be about $710/month. $1,563/month - $710/month = $853/month.
223. $250,000 + ($853 x 12 x 7) = $250,000 + $71,652 = $321,652.
224. See supra note 127.
225. Her average monthly payment over the final seven years of her ten-year payment
obligation will be about $423. $1,563/month - $423/month = $1,140/month.
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not be capitalized. Her total unpaid debt after ten years will be
$345,760,226 which will then be forgiven without any tax liability being
imposed. Her required monthly repayments will only initially comprise
7.2% of her income, and will, under these assumptions, remain at roughly
that same percentage of her income level for the ten-year period, again
an entirely feasible burden for her to bear.
Let me once again emphasize that if Sarah will be taking a qualifying
public service position after graduation she should borrow as much in
federal government student loans as she possibly can, regardless of her
financial needs, since her required monthly payments will be exactly the
same amount no matter how much she borrows, and for qualifying public
service positions there is not even a deferred tax liability on debt forgiveness to be concerned about. Any such extra borrowing can be invested,
possibly in a ten-year annuity with the monthly annuity payments offset
against her already rather small monthly loan repayments. Again, if one
is inclined to a public service legal (or non-legal) career, and if one has
the opportunity to take a PSLF program-qualifying position, this very
generous program is indeed "the best deal in town."
However, this simple analysis of law school affordability under the
PSLF program is incomplete in an important regard. One also needs to
take into account the fact that many qualifying public service positions
pay less than the current median $60,000/year starting salary, sometimes
significantly less. For those law graduates who regard the perhaps substantial sacrifice in income that they will have to bear to take a public
service position as being fully justified by the extra satisfaction they will
obtain from doing that sort of work rather than engaging in private legal
practice or taking another non-qualifying position, the straightforward
analysis conducted above will apply. But one should also consider the
situation of a law graduate who accepts a qualifying public service position paying only, say, $45,000 annually, 227 but who would not have accepted such a position with such a low salary rather than a private legal
position paying the median $60,000/year starting salary if it were not for
the substantial PSLF program advantages.
For that graduate, the cost of law school is not merely the modest
monthly loan repayments that they will have to make for ten yearswhich under those $45,000/year salary assumption would only start at
$237/month for a single person, 22 8 about 6.4% of their income, gradually
climbing under these assumptions by about 5.7%/year to about $373/
month by the tenth year, averaging about $306/month over that period-

226. $250,000 + ($1,140 x 12 x 7) = $250,000 + $95,760 = $345,760.
227. $45,000 was the median annual starting salary for class of 2011 graduates taking
positions with public interest organizations. NALP (2011), supra note 2.
228. 1/12 x 10% x ($45,000 - $16,635) = $236.38.
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but also some portion 22 9 of the $10,000/year in after-tax income 230 that
the graduate has forgone each year for at least ten years of public service
practice by accepting the lower-paid position and keeping it (or holding
other qualifying positions) for a total of ten years. However, even if a
graduate was just barely willing to accept a $45,000/year public service
position rather than a $60,000/year non-qualifying position so as to avail
themselves of the PSLF program, and thus regarded virtually the entire
$10,000/year-$833/month-of forgone after-tax income as an additional
cost of the PSLF program, the program is still a pretty good deal. The net
cost to him initially would only be $239/month + $883/month = $1,122/
month, a fairly substantial 22.4% of the hypothetical $60,000/year alternative starting salary, but that would only be for ten years rather than
twenty years as under the IBR program, and only $239/month (gradually
climbing to $373/month by year ten) of this sum would be an out-ofpocket repayment obligation. This is an entirely feasible way to finance a
$250,000 (or more) legal education leading to a public service career for
at least ten years before other career options can possibly be pursued.
3.

The Effects of Inflation on the Debt-Servicing Burden

For long-term credit relationships, the size of the real burden of payments to the debtor and the corresponding size of the real benefits to the
creditor are influenced by the extent to which there is inflation in the
general level of prices over the term of the loan. Sometimes the payment
obligations under such relationships are linked in some manner to a price
index in an attempt to maintain the real value of these burdens and benefits over time, but more often they are not so indexed, and sometimes
they are partially but not fully indexed in a manner that can create a
complicated relationship between price level changes and the real benefits or burdens.
I would like to briefly compare the effects of inflation on the real burdens to student borrowers and the real benefits to the federal government
of unsubsidized student loans and also of loans made under the IBR or
PSLF programs. Since this is already a relatively long and complicated
Article, in the interest of economy I will do so only for one possible loan
arrangement-a law student borrower who is and will remain single and
who takes out $250,000 in student loans-but the conclusions I will reach
229. The proper measure here of the annual lost income cost to a graduate taking a
qualifying public service position is the after-tax portion of the difference between the
starting salary for the public service position and the lowest salary that the graduate would
have accepted to take the public service position were there no special loan repayment
terms for public service positions that differed from the normal IBR terms. For example, if
the graduate who took the $45,000 starting salary public service position would have taken
that position only for a minimum starting salary of at least $54,000/year if there were no
special loan repayment terms for such a position, then taking that public service position
would impose an additional after-tax cost on that person of ($54,000 - $45,000) x 2/3 =
$6,000/year for the duration of their public service career, probably growing over time as
the salary difference between the two career tracks widened.
230. ($60,000 - $45,000) x 2/3 = $10,000.
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would equally apply to loans of other amounts or to loans made to borrowers supporting other family members as well as themselves.
Let me first consider the effects of inflation on an unsubsidized
$250,000 federal student loan made at a 7.5% blended annual interest
rate and with a twenty-five-year repayment term. This loan would obligate the borrower to repay approximately $1,860/month over its twentyfive-year term.2 31 Any long-term loan made at a fixed interest rate constitutes a mutual gamble, with the borrower gambling that there will be future price inflation at a rate in excess of what the parties expected and
provided for in the loan repayment terms at the time that the loan was
entered into, excess inflation that will gradually reduce the real burden of
their fixed payment obligations, while the lender is similarly gambling
that the rate of inflation will be less than their initial mutual expectations
embodied in the contract terms.
In my prior calculations, I have consistently assumed a 3% annual inflation rate. Over a twenty-five-year loan term, this would reduce the real
value of the loan repayments on a $250,000, 7.5% annual interest rate
loan, measured in dollars of the purchasing power they have at the time
the loan was entered into, from the initial $1,860/month down to $888/
month,2 32 averaging in size about $1,285/month over the loan term. 2 3 3 If,
however, the rate of price inflation over that twenty-five-year period actually averaged only 0%, then the real burden of that debt to the borrower and benefit to the government would remain at $1,860/month
throughout the loan term, significantly greater than $1,285/month. On the
other hand, if price inflation averaged a higher 6%/year over that twentyyear time period, then the real burden and benefit of those $1,860/month
repayments would then only average $898/month over the loan term. 2 3 4
Long-term student loans taken out at a fixed interest rate are therefore
relatively risky to both the borrowers and the lender with regard to future
rates of inflation.
The effects of inflation on the burdens and benefits of IBR program
loans are far more complex and interesting. One portion of the loan obligations-the monthly repayment obligations over the twenty-year loan
term-are approximately (but not exactly) indexed to inflation rates, as a
practical matter, while the debt-forgiveness tax liability portion of the
IBR repayment obligation is not so indexed. The assessment here of the
effects of unanticipated inflation is therefore made substantially more
complicated than for a fixed interest rate loan, since the monthly repayment obligations and the tax-liability escrow deposit requirements under
the IBR program are very differently affected by inflation.
Let me consider how different rates of price inflation over the twentyyear loan term would affect the real burdens and benefits of a hypotheti231.
232.
233.
234.

See supra note 93.
(1.03)^25 = 2.094. $1,860/month/(2.094) = $888/month.
(1.03)^12.5 = 1.447. $1,860/monthl(1.447) = $1,285/month.
(1.06)^12.5 = 2.072. $1,860/month/(2.072) = $898/month.
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cal IBR loan. Let me assume again that a $250,000 loan is taken out by
Sarah, who then obtains upon graduation a full-time legal position paying
$60,000/year. Under the prior assumptions of subsequent 5%/year average annual salary growth and 3%/year average increases in the price level
and in the poverty income level, and tax liability escrow deposits structured to grow by 5%/year in size over the loan term, as discussed above,
Sarah would have initial combined debt-repayment and tax-liability escrow-account obligations of $364/month + $298/month = $662/month,
with this monthly amount then increasing at about 5%/year 235 along with
her assumed annual salary increases of that amount, remaining at approximately $13.2% of her monthly income over the twenty-year loan term.
Her eventual debt-forgiveness tax liability will be $146,491,236 which her
tax liability escrow account, assuming again a 4.1% annual after-tax rate
of return, 237 would then accumulate to by the end of the loan term.
Consider now the situation that would result if there were no price
inflation at all over that twenty-year term. This would likely be reflected
in her salary increasing by an average of only 2%/year, rather than 5%/
year,238 in the poverty-level income remaining unchanged over time, in
her escrow account now only yielding a 1.6% average annual after-tax
rate of return on the dividend payments, and with no capital appreciation. 239 Her loan repayments would again start at $364/month, but would
now increase by only approximately 2%/year. 240 The monthly repayments portion of her IBR obligation is essentially indexed to inflation,
since both increases in her adjusted gross income and the poverty-level
income will likely roughly reflect the actual rate of inflation over time.
These monthly loan repayments would, under a 2%/year salary increase, only average $444/month over the entire twenty-year loan
term, 24 1 leading to unpaid interest on her loan accruing at the higher rate
of $1,119/month 242 for the final seventeen years, to a total debt obligation
after twenty years of a now-larger $478,226,243 and to a combined state
and federal income tax liability on that forgiven debt of about
$159,409.244 This is a modestly larger tax obligation than the $146,491 that
235. Her debt repayment obligations would actually increase by a slightly larger 5.7%/
year, see supra note 124, but I will overlook this slight complication in this illustrative
analysis.
236. See supra note 194.
237. See supra note 55.
238. The 5%/year salary increase assumption incorporates an expected 3% annual inflation rate.
239. The lack of price inflation would presumably mean that the 3%/year annual appreciation of the stock values would not take place, leaving only the 2%/year x .80 = 1.6%/
year annual after-tax dividend yield.
240. (($60,000 x 1.02) - ($16,335))/($60,000 - $16,335) = 1.0275, a 2.75% annual increase. Her debt repayment obligations would therefore actually increase by a slightly
larger 2.75%/year rather than 2%/year, but I will overlook this slight complication in this
illustrative analysis.
241. (1.02)^10 = 1.219, a 21.9% increase. $364/month x 1.219 = $444/month.
242. $1,563/month - $444/month = $1,119/month.
243. ($250,000) + ($1,119 x 12 x 17) = $478,226.
244. $478,236 x .333 = $159,409.
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she would owe under the 3%/year inflation assumption, 245 and, much
more importantly, the escrow account would now grow at a much slower
1.6%/year average annual after-tax rate over the loan term rather than at
a 4.1% average annual after-tax rate. The monthly escrow deposits that
would have to be made to cover this eventual tax liability would consequently have to be significantly increased to be sufficient to meet this tax
liability obligation.
On the other hand, let me instead assume for a moment that inflation
proceeds at a higher 6% annual rate over the twenty-year term of an IBR
loan, that the annual salary increases that Sarah receives correspondingly
increase to an average of 8%/year, that the poverty-level income now
increases by 6%/year, and that the escrow account now grows at an approximate annual rate of 6.5%/year. 246 Sarah's monthly loan repayments
will again start at $364/month, but will now increase rapidly by about 8%/
year, 247 averaging about $786/month over the loan term. 24 8 Her unpaid
interest will therefore only accrue at a lower average rate of $777/
month, 249 leading to a final debt obligation of about $408,508250 and a
federal and state income tax liability of only about $136,033.251 This is a
somewhat smaller tax obligation than the $146,437 she would have owed
under the 3% annual inflation assumptionS252 and, much more importantly, with the escrow account now growing at a rapid 6.5% average annual after-tax rate rather than a 4.1% average annual after-tax rate, the
size of the necessary monthly escrow payments would be substantially
reduced.
Finally, let me consider the circumstances of a $250,000 loan to Sarah
made under the PSLF program. The analysis here is much simpler; the
real burden of the loan to Sarah and benefit to the government lender
would be essentially unaffected by the rate of inflation. The monthly loan
payments would be essentially indexed to inflation, as they are under the
IBR program, but under the PSLF program there is no tax liability owing
at the end of the loan term to complicate things. This reveals yet another
advantage of the PSLF program to borrowers: the repayment obligations
are essentially fully indexed to inflation so that they do not have to bear
245. See supra note 194.
246. The account would presumably grow by 1.6% + 6% = 7.6%/year, with a 20% capital gains tax due after twenty years on, now, a very substantial portion of the account,
given the rate of inflation, reducing the overall after-all-taxes rate of return on the account
to something in the 6.5%/year-to-7%/year annual range. I will assume a 6.5% annual rate
of return here for my subsequent calculations.
247. (($60,000 x 1.08) - ($16,335 x 1.06))/($60,000 - $16,335) = 1.0875, an 8.75% annual
increase. Her debt repayment obligations would therefore actually increase by a slightly
larger 8.75%/year rather than 8%/year, but I will overlook this slight complication in this
illustrative analysis. See supra note 240.
248. $364/month x (1.08)A10 = $786/month.
249. $1,563/month - $786/month = $777/month.

250. ($250,000 + ($777 x 12 x 17)) = $408,508.
251. $408,508 x 0.333= $136,033.
252. See supra note 194.
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inflation risk in the same manner that they do under unsubsidized loans,
or even under IBR loans.
In summary, the government lender and the student borrower are each
taking a substantial risk with regard to future price inflation differing
from their expectations in an adverse manner when they enter into a
long-term, unsubsidized, fixed-rate student loan contract. Under the IBR
program, however, the size of the monthly loan repayments are essentially indexed to inflation, removing this risk for both parties with regard
to those repayments. However, the final debt-forgiveness tax-liability obligation under the IBR program is not indexed to inflation, and, moreover, the different rates at which unpaid interest will accrue under
different assumptions about inflation and the different rates of return
likely to be earned on the escrow accounts dedicated to paying that tax
obligation work together to magnify the impact of variations in the inflation rate on the size of the borrower's practically necessary escrow deposits. The government bears no inflation risk here, except for that risk that
stems from the fact that the real value of the final tax payment will depend upon the rate of inflation over the loan term, but the borrower who
must accumulate enough in their escrow account to pay that tax liability,
regardless of the rate of return they earn on their investments, bears a
very substantial inflation risk under the IBR program terms. The PSLF
program, in contrast, essentially indexes repayment obligations to inflation, making them stable in real terms and removing inflation risk for
both borrowers and the lender.
B.

A

"SALARY PREMIUM" APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE FINANCIAL
VIABILITY OF LEGAL EDUCATION

The several Sarah hypotheticals discussed above are illuminating, but
there is another approach one can take in considering the financial viability of legal education under current conditions that provides some additional insights and that reaches comparable conclusions, an approach that
I will label the "salary premium" approach: How large of a salary premium over the starting salary that a typical prospective law school applicant with only an undergraduate degree could immediately obtain would
the entry-level salary for a full-time legal position have to be to justify
that applicant incurring the substantial costs of law school?2 53
1. The Required Salary Premium under Unsubsidized Loan Terms
Let me first conduct this analysis for unsubsidized federal student
loans, without regard to the IBR and PSLF program options. If one as253. The subsequent calculations in Part V.B.1. are all based upon the simplifying assumption that these salaries are certain to be received and are not merely the expected
value of a distribution of possibilities. A typical risk-averse and relatively undiversified
law-school applicant should of course demand a somewhat larger expected salary premium
to cover their loan repayments to reflect the extent of riskiness inherent in an uncertain
expected salary premium and their personal attitudes with regard to this risk.
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sumes that a graduate who borrows $250,000 for law school at a blended
7.5% annual interest rate on unsubsidized twenty-five-year repayment
terms subsequently has a twenty-five-year legal career, then that person
would have to earn approximately an extra $22,321/year after taxes over
and above what he would have earned in a position that he could have
obtained and kept without a law degree over that twenty-five-year period
to pay off those loans. 2 5 4 Assuming again a combined 33% overall marginal tax rate for all taxes that would be imposed on this person's income, 255 this would mean that additional income averaging $33,482/year
over that period would be required to be able to make those loan
repayments. 256
Let me further assume that a typical prospective law student who does
not attend law school could earn an average starting salary of approximately $45,000/year, 257 rising gradually by a total of about 11.1% over the
next three years of employment to about $50,000/year. 258 This would
mean that a starting salary for a law graduate of approximately $83,482/
year would be required to justify the costs of law school, 259 assuming that
the typical absolute salary differential between law graduates obtaining
full-time legal positions and persons with only an undergraduate degree
remains constant over their careers. Only those students who attend elite
law schools and outstanding or very well-connected students at non-elite
schools should plan on being able to obtain such well-paid positions. The
comparable required starting salary to justify a $200,000 law school loan
debt under this constant salary differential assumption would be approximately $76,785/year, 260 and to justify even a $160,000 loan debt would be
approximately $71,428.261 All of these required salaries are well above
the current $60,000/year median starting salary.
Viewed in this rather simplistic fashion, the current median starting salary therefore does not financially justify most prospective law students
who are considering attending non-elite schools investing in a legal education, even at the lower $160,000 cost level, absent the substantial loan
repayment subsidies provide by the IBR or PSLF programs. 262 This is a
254. Repayment of a $250,000 loan at a 7.5% annual interest rate over a twenty-fiveyear term would require annual loan repayments of approximately $22,321/year.
255. See supra note 46.
256. $22,321 x 1.5 = $33,482.
257. See supra note 45.
258. $50,000/$45,000 = 1.111, an 11.1% increase.
259. $50,000 + ($22,321 x 1.5) = $83,482.
260. $50,000 + (($22,321 x .80) x 1.5) = $76,785. According to the NALP statistics for
the class of 2011, at most 34% of the graduates who reported their salaries had starting
salaries over $75,000. See NALP (2011), supra note 2. Given the non-response bias in the
NALP surveys, which is recognized to overstate the percentage of graduates earning higher
incomes, id., and given that only about 55% of class of 2011 graduates had obtained fulltime legal positions nine months after graduation, see supra note 4, probably no more than
at most about 20% of graduates obtained full-time legal positions paying over $75,000/
year.
261. $50,000 + (($22,321 x .64) x 1.5) = $71,428.
262. If, however, a graduate has a legal career that lasts longer than twenty-five years,
this would narrow somewhat, although not drastically, the annual salary premium required
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point repeatedly emphasized by Brian Tamanaha in FAILING LAW
SCH-OOLS.2 6 3 However, this pessimistic conclusion is, as I have noted,
based upon the assumption that the initial annual salary differential will
persist between the two career tracks being compared over the twentyfive-year period, but will not widen further. This assumption, however,
appears to me to be somewhat implausible. One would expect the differential between a full-time legal position paying the median entry-level
salary and a typical non-legal position paying the median undergraduate
degree-based salary to widen over the years as both salaries increase, certainly in absolute terms if not also in proportional terms. To the extent
that a typical law graduate's salary differential over the typical non-legal
alternative salary increases over the years, this would narrow the initial
starting salary differential needed to justify attending law school, perhaps
significantly so.
For example, let me assume for the sake of illustration that both the
average legal starting salary and the average undergraduate degree-based
salary (after three years of employment) will then each increase by an
average of 5%/year over the relevant twenty-five-year period, so that the
salary differential between the positions will gradually widen in absolute
terms (although not in proportional terms, remaining at a 5% differential). 2 6 4 Under this assumption, the initial salary differential will also grow
to justify incurring the costs of law school, particularly for a career extending over thirtyfive or forty years or even longer. On the other hand, many law graduates, for one reason
or another, practice law for much less than twenty five years.
263. See TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLs, supra note 1, at 158.
264. Schlunk, supra note 43, similarly assumes that lawyer and non-lawyer salaries will
grow at equal percentage rates so that the salary differential will gradually widen in absolute terms, but will remain constant in percentage terms. Id. at 317-18. However, in a
recent paper that has attracted a great deal of attention, Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre have projected that the average salary differential between lawyers and otherwise
comparable non-lawyers without post-graduate degrees will increase significantly during
their careers in both absolute and relative terms, which leads Simkovic and McIntyre to
reach conclusions regarding the proportion of law graduates for whom the costs of law
school will likely be justified by its benefits that are far more optimistic than the conclusions that I reach in this Article. See generally Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 123.
The work of Simkovic & McIntyre certainly makes clear that any attempt to value a law
degree is highly sensitive to the assumptions being made as to how typical lawyer salaries
and the salaries of typical non-lawyers of comparable academic and other abilities and
without professional degrees will trend relative to one another over the course of their
careers. See id. at 17-18. These assumptions involve thirty- to forty-year projections covering a period of likely significant continuing change and turmoil in the legal profession,
during which past salary relationships may not continue to hold, and any projections that
assume that these trends will continue are consequently rather speculative. Id. Even if their
projections regarding a widening proportional gap between relative typical lawyer and
non-lawyer earnings over the period of a career prove to be more accurate than my simplifying assumption of a growing absolute but constant relative salary differential, however,
the usefulness of Simkovic and McIntyre's overall conclusions regarding the positive net
present value of legal education for most prospective law students is undercut by their
conceded failure to draw any distinctions between the employment prospects of the graduates of different law schools in different reputational tiers. Id. at 49-50. This omission is a
serious and perhaps crippling shortcoming of their study. See TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW
SCHOOLs, supra note 1, at 141. The employment opportunities available to a typical graduate of Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, or another elite law school as compared to,
for example, the opportunities available to a graduate of Florida Coastal, Thomas Cooley,
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by an average of 5%/year, compounded annually, and the salary gap will
therefore have increased by a total of approximately 239% by year
twenty-five. 265 Under this alternative assumption, the initial full-time
starting salary needed to justify borrowing $250,000 to finance a legal education would only need to exceed the alternative $50,000/year undergraduate degree-based starting salary by only about $15,254/year, 266
implying a total required starting salary of about $65,254/year. 267 To justify $200,000 in loans the required initial starting salary under these assumptions would be only about $62,203/year, 268 and to justify $160,000 in
loans the required initial starting salary would be only about $59,762/
269
year.
Under these more encouraging and, in my opinion, more realistic assumptions regarding comparative legal and non-legal salaries over the
course of a twenty-five-year legal career, Brian Tamanaha's pessimistic
conclusion that the costs of attending law school cannot be justified for a
law student who expects to earn the class of 2010 median starting salary
of $63,000/year for a full-time entry-level legal position is somewhat overstated. 270 That $63,000/year salary under these salary growth assumptions
would not appear to justify incurring $250,000 or even $200,000 of law
school debt on unsubsidized repayment terms, but might just barely justify a $160,000 debt. 271 His conclusion is somewhat more accurate with
regard to the class of 2011's slightly lower $60,000/year median starting
salary, although it is still a very close call whether students who can reasonably expect to obtain the median or better starting salary upon graduation may be justified in investing in an unsubsidized $160,000 legal
education. 272
or of most other lower-tier law schools are obviously so radically different that it is not
very meaningful to try to ascertain the net present value of a generic "law degree" that
aggregates such radically disparate school-related average career outcomes. See id. Their
conclusion that law school will prove to be cost-justified for most law students, even if it
proves to be accurate, is not necessarily inconsistent with my more disaggregated and far
more pessimistic conclusions as to whether law school is cost-justified for many lowerranking graduates of upper- or mid-tier, non-elite law schools, and for most graduates of
lower-tier law schools. See Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 123, at 50.
265. (1.05)^25 = 3.3864, approximately a 239% increase. See supra text accompanying
note 264.
266. $33,482 /((1 + 3.39)/2) = $15,254. See supra notes 256, 265.
267. $50,000 + $33,482 /((1 + 3.39)/2) = $50,000 + $15,254 = $65,254. See supra notes
256, 265.
268. $50,000 + $26,786/((1 + 3.39)/2) = $50,000 + $12,203 $62,203. See supra notes 256,
265.
269. $50,000 + $21,428/((1 + 3.39)/2) = $50,000 + $9,762 = $59,762. See supra notes 256,
265.
270. See TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLs, supra note 1, at 119.
271. See id.
272. See id. Let me once again make clear that these calculations are done under the
simplifying assumption that these starting salaries will be received with certainty. Given,
however, that there is uncertainty as to the salary that a typical risk-averse and relatively
undiversified law school applicant will obtain upon graduation, a higher starting salary may
be required to compensate for the risk premium that such a person would apply to an
uncertain future income stream.

2014]

Income-Based Repayment Program

109

Finally, if one assumes that the salary differential between full-time
lawyers and persons with only undergraduate degrees will widen over
time, not merely in absolute terms but also in relative percentage terms,
as do Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre in their recent influential
(though controversial) article, 273 then to that extent a lower starting salary will justify incurring the costs of legal education.
2.

The Required Salary Premium under the IBR and PSLF Options

Given the IBR provisions, to justify the costs of law school the incremental after-tax income attributable to the law degree will now only have
to be enough to cover the more modest combined IBR repayment obligations and debt-forgiveness tax-liability escrow deposit requirements. The
IBR program is revealed to be somewhat of a game-changer here as to
the affordability of law school, although it does not change the calculations quite as dramatically as one might expect.
Let me attempt to demonstrate this point. Consider a student who incurs $250,000 of law-school debt, enrolls in the IBR program, and remains single. Assume also that this student obtains a full-time legal
position upon graduation, that his or her income will again increase
thereafter by an average of 5%/year, as will the alternative non-legal salary, and that the poverty-level income and the general price level will
increase by an average of 3%/year. For this student, as I have calculated
above for the various Sarah hypotheticals, the combined monthly loan
repayment and escrow deposit obligations (again making escrow deposits
that grow 5%/year in size along with the graduate's income) would start
at only about $364/month + $298/month = $662/month, growing over the
twenty-year term along with her income to $1,109 + $792 = $1,901/
month. 274 This would initially require additional annual after-tax income
of $662 x 12 = $7,944, and if one again assumes a 33% overall marginal
tax rate this would require additional taxable income over the assumed
alternative non-legal salary of $50,000/year of only approximately
$11,916/year. 275 In other words, the $250,000 debt obligation could be justified by an initial starting salary of only $61,916/year. 27 6 A $200,000 debt
obligation for a comparable student could be justified by only a $60,530
starting salary,277 and a $160,000 debt obligation could be justified by
only a $59,432 starting salary. 2 78
273. Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 123, at 17.
274. See supra Part V.A.1.
275. $7,944 x 1.5 = $11,916.
276. $50,000 + $11,916 = $61,916.

277. The initial combined debt-repayment and escrow-deposit obligation would be
$364/month + $221/month = $585/month, growing over the next twenty years to $1,109/
month + $588/month = $1,697/month. See supra Part V.A.1. Therefore she would need a
before-tax salary premium of $585 x 12 x 1.5 = $10,530/year to justify this $200,000 cost, a
total salary of $60,530/year.
278. The initial combined debt-repayment and escrow-deposit obligation would be
$364/month + $160/month = $524/month, growing over the next 20 years to $1,109/month +
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This last set of calculations reveal that, under the IBR program, law
school appears to remain at least a borderline financially viable proposition for many prospective law students, surely for those who are able to
attend elite law schools, as well as for those who attend an upper- or midtier, non-elite law school and do relatively well academically, so that the
prospects for obtaining a $60,000/year or better starting salary upon graduation are then relatively good, even under the assumption that the salary
differential between lawyers and persons with only undergraduate degrees will remain constant in relative percentage terms.279 But as discussed above with regard to the Sarah hypotheticals, a student should not
attend an upper- or mid-tier, non-elite law school unless they have a solid
basis for expecting to do well enough academically to graduate at least in
the upper half of their class, and should definitely not attend a lower-tier
law school unless they have reasonable expectations of graduating in the
top 10% or at least in the top quarter of their class or have the necessary
local connections to obtain an attractive position upon graduation even if
they do not do exceptionally well in their classes. 280
For a graduate taking a qualifying public service position, the forgiveness of the remaining debt without tax liability after only ten years under
the PSLF program substantially reduces the required salary premium to
justify the costs of law school. 2 81 A single law graduate who had borrowed somewhere between $160,000 and $250,000 would only have to
make monthly payments starting at $364/month, and averaging about
$401/month over the ten-year repayment term, assuming, once again, 5%
average annual salary increases and 3% annual increases in the povertylevel income. 282 He would therefore only need to earn an average of
$7,218/year 283 in before-tax income over and above the assumed $50,000/
year undergraduate degree-based employment alternative, a total starting
salary of only $50,000/year + $7,218/year = $57,218/year and this (growing
at an assumed average rate of 5%/year) for only ten years, to justify the
costs of law school. 284
Most qualifying public service positions available to new law graduates,
however, currently pay less than $57,218/year, 285 so that the costs of a
legal education usually could not be justified solely on the basis of the
salary premium earned over only ten years. However, most law graduates
who complete ten years of public service practice will then go on to con$424/month = $1,523/month. Therefore she would need a before-tax salary premium of
$524 x 12 x 1.5 = $9,432/year to justify this $160,000 cost, a total salary of $59,432/year.
279. See supra note 22.
280. See supra Part V.A.1.
281. See TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 122.
282. $364/month x (1.05/1.03)A5 = $401/month.
283. $401/month x 12 x 1.5 = $7,218/year.
284. If a person's legal career is longer than ten years, a very likely possibility for most
graduates, then a correspondingly smaller salary premium over the $50,000/year undergraduate degree-based hypothetical alternative salary would be required to justify the costs
of law school under the PSLF program. See supra note 262.
285. $45,000 was the median annual starting salary for class of 2011 graduates taking
positions with public interest organizations. NALP (2011), supra note 2.
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tinue to practice in public service or in the private sector for a number of
additional years, often at a substantial salary premium over the undergraduate degree-based alternative and will eventually more than make up
for any education costs not recovered during the first years of practice.286
Once again the PSLF program is revealed to be a very good deal, certainly for anyone with an interest in a public service legal practice and
with the ability to obtain such a position. 287
C. A

"PRESENT VALUE" APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE FINANCIAL
VIABILITY OF LEGAL EDUCATION

A third approach to assessing the financial viability of legal education,
one closely related to the previous "salary premium" approach and leading to similar conclusions, would be to first calculate the "present value"
of the cost of legal education, and then use that figure to determine what
annual salary premium over and above the typical salary that would be
obtainable with only an undergraduate degree would justify incurring
those costs in the context of a given loan repayment period.28 8 This ap286. See generally TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 122.
287. Although it should be kept in mind that such qualifying public service legal positions are becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, see id., and that most such positions pay
less than $57,218/year starting salaries, see NALP (2011), supra note 2. If a law graduate
accepted a position paying a smaller annual salary premium than $7,218 over the $50,000/
year undergraduate degree-based hypothetical alternative salary, or perhaps paid even less
than $50,000/year, then a period of employment longer than ten years would be required to
recapture the law school costs incurred under the PSLF program. See supra Part V.A.2.
288. 1 will not in this Article attempt the far more complex calculations of the net present value of legal education. Such calculations would require estimating not only the present value of the cost burden of attending law school but also the present value of the
benefits of a legal education. To determine the present value of those benefits, one would
first have to project the after-tax salary trend for a typical law graduate over the course of a
thirty- to forty-year legal career. As this Article makes clear, such projections to be meaningful would have to be made separately for graduates of different law schools in different
reputational tiers, given the very different employment prospects those different graduates
would face, and perhaps also disaggregated by other salary-relevant factors such as race,
gender, undergraduate school and major, law school location, etc. See, e.g., TAMANAHA,
FAILING LAw SCHOOLs, supra note 1, at 141. Then those projected expected salaries for
graduates of different law schools would have to be discounted to a present value by a
discount factor that reflects not only a real discount rate for future income receipts as well
as projected inflation rates over that extended period, but which also includes a risk premium that reflects both the rather extreme variability of possible salaries around their
expected value and the attitude of relatively undiversified law graduates towards such salary uncertainty risk.
The appropriate discount rate to use for such present value of expected income calculations is not clear. Herwig Schlunk attempted to value the net benefits of a legal education
and used an 8% to 20% range of annual discount rates for these calculations, focusing most
of his attention on use of a 12% discount rate. See Schlunk, supra note 43, at 316-19. These
are extremely high discount rates that radically reduce the present value of projected future salaries to reflect what Schlunk regards as the extreme riskiness of law-graduate salary
outcomes for relatively undiversified graduates. See id. at 322. In their more recent attempt
to calculate the present value of expected income streams Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre have utilized a much lower 6% discount rate-reflecting the sum of a 3% real discount rate and a 3% expected annual inflation rate-but one that does not include any risk
premium at all to reflect the uncertainty of salary outcomes for a typical law school graduate, even though most law graduates are surely at least moderately risk-averse and relatively undiversified. Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 123, at 39. In my opinion, some
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proach will also provide some insights regarding the cost to the taxpayers
of the federal subsidies provided by the IBR and PSLF programs. 289
The present value of the cost of repaying the loan debt undertaken to
pay for law school would be the sum of the discounted present values of
each of the required loan repayments, with the appropriate discount rate
to apply, in my opinion, being the average annual after-tax rate of return
one could expect to obtain on one's own conservatively invested capital. 290 The current blended 7.5% annual rate for government loans to law
students is very high relative to the current interest rate environment and
is well above the annual after-tax rate of return one could realistically
hope to obtain on conservative investments. 29 1 A more realistic figure for
the average annual rate of return, before taxes, that one could hope to
achieve without undue risk over a twenty- to thirty-year period on a conventional, conservatively invested common stock or mutual fund portfolio might be in the neighborhood of about 5%,292 leading to an average
annual after-tax return of about 4.1%.293 1 will use this latter interest rate
for present value discounting purposes.
For an unsubsidized $250,000, 7.5% annual interest rate, twenty-fiveyear term loan, a loan requiring monthly principal and interest payments
of about $1,860/month, the present value of those repayment obligations
additional discount factor is called for to reflect the riskiness of the expected income
stream facing relatively undiversified graduates-the discount rate used by Simkovic &
McIntyre is therefore too low-but the large implicit risk premium applied by Schlunk in
his calculations may be too high. See id.; Schlunk, supra note 43, at 322. Since I do not in
this Article attempt to estimate the net present value of a legal education, I will not advance any recommendation as to the appropriate discount rate for one to use in such
calculations.
289. See, e.g., Simkovik & McIntyre, supra note 123, at 44-45.
290. Id. One could argue that each individual student borrower's personal rate of time
preference would be a more appropriate discount rate to use to discount their loan-repayment obligations, but this figure would obviously be difficult to determine and would vary
between individuals. It is conventional to instead use as a more generic discounting factor
some measure of the after-tax rate of return on invested capital for discounting such future
cash flows.
291. To obtain a 7.5% after-tax annual return a person at a 33% marginal tax rate
would have to earn a 7.5% x 1.5 = 11.25% annual rate of return, obviously an unrealistically high rate of return for relatively conservative investments in today's financial
markets.
292. This 5% figure is based on an assumed investment portfolio of relatively conservative common stocks or stock mutual funds, paying an average dividend yield of 2%/year,
and having average capital appreciation of 3%/year.
293. The 2%/year average dividend yield is assumed to be taxed at the current 20%
dividend tax rate, leading to a 1.6%/year after-tax dividend yield. See supra note 239. The
3%/year average capital appreciation, if it is liquidated after one year and the 20% longterm capital gains tax is then paid, would leave a 2.4% after-tax capital gain, leading to a
total average gain of 4%/year. If, however, the capital gains on this investment are allowed
to accrue for twenty years without realization, this will lead to an average annual after-tax
return on the portfolio of 4.6% over the twenty years, with the capital gains portion of the
portfolio, at that time being about 25% of its total value, then taxed at a 20% rate when
these gains are eventually realized. This deferred capital gains tax will serve to reduce the
amount of portfolio proceeds by about .20 x .25 = 5%, which will serve to reduce the
average annual after-all-taxes rate of return on the portfolio over the twenty years down
from 4.6% to about 4.1%. This 4.1% after-all taxes rate of return will therefore be the
discount rate that I will apply in this present value analysis.
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when calculated using this 4.1% discount rate is about $344,844.294 For a
$200,000 loan, the comparable monthly principal and interest payments
would be $1,488/month, and the discounted present value of those obligations at a 4.1% annual discount rate is about $275,875,295 and for a
$160,000 loan the comparable monthly principal and interest payments is
$1,190/month, and the discounted present value of those obligations at a
4.1% annual discount rate is about $220,626.296 Law school paid for by
money borrowed at a 7.5% annual interest rate that far exceeds currently
available after-tax rates of return on relatively conservative investments
is very expensive if the loans are not subsidized!
For loans repaid under the IBR program, in contrast, the present value
of a $250,000, 7.5% annual interest-rate loan, including the present value
of the future debt-forgiveness tax liability, is much lower. 2 9 7 Consider an
IBR program borrower of that amount as I have discussed above in the
Sarah hypotheticals, given the assumed 5% average annual salary increases and assumed 3% average annual increase in the poverty-level income. 298 That person, if single, would have to make monthly payments
starting at $364/month and averaging about $634/month over the twentyyear repayment period and then would owe federal and state income
taxes of $146,491 on the discharged debt after the twenty years. 299 The
present value of these combined monthly repayment and tax-liability obligations, calculated at a 4.1% annual discount rate, is only about
$168,398.300 For a $200,000 loan, the comparable present-value figure
would be $151,347,3o1 and for a $160,000 loan the comparable figure
would be $137,772.302 For a borrower supporting three persons, the corresponding present-value amounts would be $152,234,303 $135,170,304 and
294. The present value of a stream of 300 monthly principal and interest payments of
$1,860/month, discounted at a 4.1% annual rate, is approximately $344,844.
295. The present value of a stream of 300 monthly principal and interest payments of
$1,488/month, discounted at a 4.1% annual rate, is approximately $275,875.
296. The present value of a stream of 300 monthly principal and interest payments of
$1,190/month, discounted at a 4.1% annual rate, is approximately $220,626.
297. See supra Part V.A.1.
298. See id.
299. See supra note 194.
300. This is the present value of a stream of twenty annual debt repayments of $635 x
12 = $7,620 plus a single tax liability sum in twenty years of $146,491, all discounted at a
4.1% annual rate. See supra notes 125, 194.
301. This is the present value of a stream of twenty annual debt repayments of $635 x
12 = $7,620, plus a single tax liability sum in twenty years of $108,544, all discounted at a
4.1% annual rate. See supra notes 125, 196.
302. This is the present value of a stream of twenty annual debt repayments of $635 x
12 = 7,620, plus a single tax liability sum in twenty years of $78,214, all discounted at a
4.1% annual rate. See supra notes 125, 198.
303. This is the present value of a stream of twenty annual debt repayments of $512 x
12 = $6,144 plus a single tax liability sum in twenty years of $154,801, all discounted at a
4.1% annual rate. See supra notes 125, 195.
304. This is the present value of a stream of twenty annual debt repayments of $512 x
12 = $6,144 plus a single tax liability sum in twenty years of $116,734, all discounted at a
4.1% annual rate. See supra notes 125, 197.
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$121,604305 respectively.
If one calculates the average annual salary premium over the typical
undergraduate degree-based salary that one would have to earn over a
twenty-year legal career that would have the same present value as the
present value of the costs of law school as calculated above under the
IBR program, using the same 4.1% annual discount rate, one reaches the
following rather encouraging conclusions. To justify a single borrower
taking out $250,000 in law school loans under the assumption of a 5%/
year average annual growth in the differential between the two salaries,
only a starting salary of about $61,377/year would be needed. 306 For a
$200,000 loan debt, the comparable required starting salary is only
$59,102.307 And for a $160,000 loan debt, the comparable required starting salary is only $57,276.308
This "present value" approach once again strongly suggests that a student who realistically expects to obtain a full-time starting salary of
$60,000/year or better can afford to pay for law school through use of the
IBR program, even if this requires incurring $200,000 or perhaps even as
much as $250,000 of loan debt. 309 The IBR program terms are generous
indeed. But they do not appear to be generous enough to justify those
students who risk performing below average academically at an upper-or
mid-tier non-elite law school, or who may do anything short of top quarter work at a lower-tier school, to incur the high costs of law school given
their bleak employment prospects.31 0
Let me also briefly consider the circumstances of a single graduate who
borrows $250,000 to pay for law school, and then takes a qualifying public
service position initially paying $60,000/year. That person will initially
have to pay $364/month under the PSLF program, and with their income
assumed to increase an average of 5%/year while the poverty-level income increases 3%/year, their payments will gradually rise by about
5.7%/year to about $635/month by year ten, averaging about $500/month
305. This is the present value of a stream of twenty annual debt repayments of $512 x
12 = $6,144 plus a single tax liability sum in twenty years of $86,431, all discounted at a
4.1% annual rate. See supra notes 125, 199.
306. $50,000 + ($18,532)/(1.05)A10 = $61,377. If one assumes, however, as do Simkovic
& McIntyre, supra note 123, that the average salary differential between lawyers and otherwise comparable non-lawyers without other professional degrees will grow larger during
their careers in relative as well as absolute terms, then to that extent a lower starting salary
will justify law school loans of that amount. Id. at 17.
307. $50,000 + ($18,532 x .80)/(1.05)A10 = $59,102. If one assumes, however, as do
Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 123, that the average salary differential between lawyers
and otherwise comparable non-lawyers without other professional degrees will grow larger
during their careers in relative as well as absolute terms, then to that extent a lower starting salary will justify law school loans of that amount. Id. at 17.
308. $50,000 + ($18.532 x .64)/(1.05)A10 = $57,281. If one assumes, however, as do
Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 123, that the average salary differential between lawyers
and otherwise comparable non-lawyers without other professional degrees will grow larger
during their careers in relative as well as absolute terms, then to that extent a lower starting salary will justify law school loans of that amount. Id. at 17.
309. See note 307 and accompanying text.
310. See Merritt (2013), supra note 17, at 13.
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over that ten-year period.3 11 The remaining debt obligation will then be
forgiven without tax liability. 312 The present value of these loan repayment obligations over the ten years, again calculated using this 4.1% annual discount rate, is only about $48,420.313 The comparable present
value figure for a person supporting a family of three persons on this
salary is only $31,182.314
If that person instead takes a qualifying public service position paying
only $45,000/year, a more likely starting salary, with the same 5%/year
average salary growth assumptions, they will have to initially make payments of $236/month, gradually increasing by the tenth year to $497!
month, and averaging about $306/month.31 5 The present value of these
loan repayment obligations, calculated at a 4.1% annual discount rate, is
only about $29,633.316 The comparable present value figure for a person
supporting a family of three persons on this salary is only $19,368.317 The
costs of law school under the generous PSLF debt repayment terms are
quite modest indeed.
The present value approach to analyzing law school affordability also
sheds some light on another interesting and important question: how
large a government subsidy is being provided to all of the IBR or PSLF
law graduate enrollees by the favorable monthly-repayment and debt-forgiveness terms? While this question can be answered reasonably accurately for a particular individual enrollee for which one has quite a bit of
information, it is a very difficult question to answer in general terms because of the uncertainty as to what proportion of IBR or PSLF law graduate enrollees would still be willing to borrow on unsubsidized federal
student loan terms to finance their education if the IBR and PSLF programs were not available, as opposed to forgoing law school or other
graduate training altogether.31 8
Let me initially assume, for the purpose of a hypothetical loan-to-loan
comparison, that a law graduate with a $250,000 loan debt obtains a fulltime legal position with a $60,000/year starting salary. That salary then
grows at an average of 5%/year while the poverty-level income and the
price level each increase by 3%/year, and the borrower enrolls in the IBR
program. Let me also assume for now (perhaps somewhat unrealistically)
that such a graduate would have borrowed that exact same amount from
the federal government at a 7.5% blended annual interest rate on a
311. See supra Part V.A.2.
312. See Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 10.
313. This is the present value of a stream of ten annual payments averaging
$6,000 each, discounted at a 4.1% annual discount rate.
314. This is the present value of a stream of ten annual payments averaging
$3,864 each, discounted at a 4.1% annual discount rate.
315. See supra note 228.
316. This is the present value of a stream of 10 annual payments averaging
$3,672 each, discounted at a 4.1% annual discount rate.
317. This is the present value of a stream of 10 annual payments averaging
$2,400 each, discounted at a 4.1% annual discount rate.
318. See infra Part VII for a discussion of this question.

$500 x 12 =
$322 x 12

=

$306 x 12 =
$200 x 12 =
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twenty-five-year repayment schedule if the IBR program was unavailable. Let me assume also that the federal government can obtain the funds
to finance this $250,000 loan by selling as necessary ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds, or perhaps a mixture of ten-year and shorter maturity, loweryielding bonds, at an overall 2% average annual interest rate.
Under this 2% annual cost of capital assumption, the present value to
the federal government of a $250,000, twenty-five-year term loan yielding
a 7.5% annual interest rate is about a rather substantial $185,445.319 The
present value of the loan under IBR repayment and debt-forgiveness
terms, however, falls to negative $33,253,320 reflecting the fact that the
very low monthly loan repayments and the final debt forgiveness federal
tax payment are not together sufficient to even cover the government's
costs of funding the loan, even when this funding is done through selling a
mixture of U.S. Treasury bonds at a low 2% average annual interest rate.
When the government provides $250,000 of student loans under IBR
program terms, rather than under unsubsidized twenty-five-year repayment terms, it therefore costs the government-combining the foregone
revenues on $250,000 of unsubsidized 7.5% annual interest rate loans not
made, with the subsidies provided by the IBR loan-approximately a total of $185,445 + $33,253 = $218,698 in present value terms. In other
words, the cost to the government of making $250,000 in loans under the
IBR program, if the available alternative is making those same loans on
unsubsidized 7.5% annual interest rate terms, is approximately 87.5% of
the face amount of those loans! 321 If, however, the particular IBR enrollee would not have been willing to take out that $250,000 loan on unsubsidized terms, so that no profitable unsubsidized loan to that graduate
was therefore precluded by enrolling that graduate in the IBR program,
319. The benefit to the government would be the present value of the stream of net
receipts on the 7.5%/year loan after paying the assumed 2%/year interest cost of the government borrowing those funds to make the loan in the capital market. The twenty-five
annual loan repayments on the 7.5%/year, $250,000 loan would each be approximately
$22,331, and the annual repayments needed to fully amortize the 2%/year bond funding
costs for $250,000 over the same twenty-five-year term would each be about $12,821, leading to net receipts to the government of about $22,331 - $12,821 = $9,510/year. If one then
discounts that stream of twenty-five net receipts of $9,510/year at 2%/year, reflecting the
government's resulting savings in borrowing costs due to those earnings, the present value
of that loan to the federal government is about $185,445. This rough estimate does not
incorporate any deductions for administrative costs or for losses due to loan defaults.
320. That borrower, if single, would have to make monthly repayments starting at $364/
month and averaging about $635/month ($7,620/year) over the twenty-year repayment period of this $250,000 loan, and then would owe federal income taxes of $136,386 on the
discharged debt after the twenty years, assuming a 30% applicable tax rate. The annual
payments necessary for the government to amortize a $250,000, 2% annual interest rate
bond issue over a twenty-year period would be about $15,244. The government would thus
suffer net losses of $7,620 - $15,244 = $7,624/year before receiving the $136,386 tax payment in year twenty. If one then discounts that stream of twenty net losses of $7,624/year,
and the $136,386 tax payment, at 2%/year, the present value of that loan to the federal
government is about $91,781 - $125,034 = -$33,253. The government is thus providing a
subsidy to the borrower having a present value cost to the government of $33,253. This
rough estimate does not incorporate any deductions for administrative costs or for losses
due to loan defaults.
321. $218,698/$250,000 = 87.5%.
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then there is no foregone income and the subsidy cost to the government
of extending IBR program terms to that enrollee is only $33,253, a mere
13.3% of the loan's face amount. 322
Let me briefly also consider the government subsidy aspects of a
$250,000 student loan made to a person who upon graduation obtains a
public service position with a starting salary of $45,000/year, increasing by
an average of 5%/year for ten years, and who enrolls in the PSLF program. The results here are rather striking. That person, if single, will again
initially owe repayments of only $236/month, with the repayments averaging $306/month ($3,672/year) over the ten-year repayment period. 323
The annual payments needed for the government to amortize a $250,000,
ten-year bond debt at a 2% annual interest rate is approximately $27,778/
year, much larger than these small annual loan repayments received
under PSLF program terms. 324 The present value of that loan to the government, with those large net annual subsidies again discounted at a 2%
annual interest rate, is a very substantial negative $216,952.325
When the government provides $250,000 of student loans under PSLF
program terms, rather than under unsubsidized twenty-five-year repayment terms, it therefore costs the government, in combined foregone revenues on $250,000 at 7.5% interest rate loans and in PSLF loan subsidies,
approximately a total of $186,732 + $216,952 = $403,684 in present value
terms. 326 In other words, the cost to the government of making loans
under the PSLF program, again if the available alternative is making
those same loans on unsubsidized 7.5% annual interest rate terms, is approximately 161% of the face amount of those loans! 3 2 7 If, however, the
particular PSLF program enrollee would not have been willing to take
out that $250,000 loan on unsubsidized terms, so that no profitable unsubsidized loan to that graduate was therefore precluded by the availability
to him of the PSLF program, then the subsidy cost to the government of
extending PSLF program terms to that enrollee is still a substantial
$216,952, a full 86.8% of the loan's face amount.328
The IBR and PSLF programs thus each provide very substantial benefits from the point of view of the enrollees, particularly for graduates who
take qualifying public service positions. As noted above, viewed from the
perspective of a borrower, $250,000 in unsubsidized federal loans taken
out at the current relatively high 7.5% blended annual interest rate creates a repayment obligation which has a present value of $344,844 when
the loan repayment and tax liability obligations are discounted at a 4.1%
interest rate that more realistically reflects the graduate's after-tax return
322.
323.
324.
325.
culated
326.
327.
328.

$33,253/$250,000 = 13.3%.
See supra notes 228, 229.
See id.
The present value of a stream of ten net annual subsidy payments of $24,106, calas $$3,672/year - $27,778/year, discounted at a 2% annual rate, is about $216,952.
See supra note 325.
$403,684/$250,000 = 161.0%.
$216,952/$250,000 = 86.8%.
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possibilities. Under the generous IBR program repayment terms the present value of that debt obligation is reduced to $168,398, a very substantial reduction of over 50%.329 But under the terms applicable under the
PSLF program for qualifying public service positions, the present value of
that same $250,000 debt obligation for a single person is reduced from
$344,844 to only between about $31,764 and $48,420, depending upon the
public service position's salary within the $45,000/year-$60,000/year annual range, and to only about between $19,368 and $31,182 for a person
supporting a family of three persons, over a 90% cost reduction! Who
says that we do not sufficiently encourage public service?3 30
In addition, when these same loans are looked at from the point of
view of the government, as noted above, the subsidies provided to borrowers by the IBR program are fairly modest for those enrollees who
would not have been willing to borrow on unsubsidized federal student
loan terms, but are quite substantial with regard to those borrowers who
would have been willing to borrow on unsubsidized terms if that were
their only option. The subsidies provided by the more generous PSLF
program are quite substantial in either case.
D.

SUMMARY

The existing literature on the law school financial crisis does not adequately recognize the very substantial impact that the IBR program
under the new PAYE rules and the closely-related PSLF program have on
the financial aspects of the decision whether to attend law school. Responding to some criticisms in this regard, 331 Brian Tamanaha has since
conceded that his seminal work FAILING LAw SCHOOLS, which has clearly
become the definitive point of departure for all later assessments of the
financial problems of legal education, did not adequately take into account the impact of the original (pre-PAYE rules) IBR loan-repayment
option on student-debt repayment burdens and also did not adequately
take into account the far more generous terms now offered under the
IBR program under the PAYE rules. 3 3 2 The voluminous writings by Paul
Campos on these questions also fail to adequately assess the significance
of the IBR program for those students who will do well enough academically to obtain attractive legal positions upon graduation. 333
The extensive hypothetical calculations that I have carried out, first in
the context of the "debt servicing burden" approach and then under the
329. See id.; see also supra note 300.
330. In fairness, let me note that the PSLF program presents value figures that reflect
only loan repayment costs and do not include any allowance for the additional after-tax
foregone income costs borne by a graduate who accepts a public service position at a lower
salary than he or she would have received had the PSLF program not existed.
331. See Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 11-19.
332. "Schrag makes a convincing case [about the advantages of the IBR program under
the PAYE rules]... his argument is sound." Brian Tamanaha, The Problems with IBR,
NAT'L JURIST, Jan. 2013, at 14.
333. See Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 17 n.66.
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"salary premium" and "present value" approaches, respectively, demonstrate that the IBR program as implemented under the PAYE rules has a
substantial impact upon the financial viability of Harvard-style legal education. Many prospective law students, particularly those who are considering attending elite law schools or upper- or mid-tier, non-elite law
schools, may find that even in the current depressed employment market,
the costs of even a private $250,000 legal education are justified, especially if they have realistic plans to pursue a public service career for at
least ten years. However, even with the generous IBR provisions law
school is not cost-justified for the large majority of students who are considering attending one or another of the many lower-tier law schools, or
for the students who are considering attending upper- or mid-tier, nonelite law schools but who would bear a substantial risk of graduating in
the lower half or so of their class if they do so. Those students would not
have sufficiently promising prospects for obtaining either full-time legal
positions paying at least the current $60,000/year median starting salary
or public service positions that would qualify for the PSLF program that
would justify incurring the costs of law school.
VI.

WILL PROSPECTIVE LAW STUDENTS UTILIZE THE IBR
PROGRAM ON A LARGE SCALE?

While the IBR and PSLF programs each appear to be generous enough
to justify many (although not most) prospective law students undertaking
an expensive Harvard-style legal education, it is not clear how many students will be willing to pursue one of these debt repayment options. Relatively few law graduates have enrolled in the IBR program to date. 33 4
Law graduate enrollment may, however, now substantially increase given
how much more generous the IBR program has become after the adoption of the PAYE rules,335 but then again it may not.
Let me first of all discuss some of the reasons why law graduates may
not choose to enroll in the IBR program on a large scale over the next
few years. I will then briefly discuss a possible simple reform of the program that would encourage increased enrollments, but which also reveals
334. See Rachael Zahorsky, Loan Moans: Why Don't Law Grads Use Loan Repayment
Programs?, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2013, at 32.
335. While a recent study by Barclays projects that half of all student borrowers will be
eligible for the IBR program under the PAYE rules and that the government has underestimated the cost of the IBR program over the next ten years by $235 billion, the U.S. Department of Education estimates that only 6% of student borrowers will actually enroll.
Jason Delisle, Barclays Student Loan Report: New Income Based Repayment Enrollment to
Balloon, $235 Billion Hidden Cost, NEw AM. FOUND. (Dec. 13, 2012), http://edmoney.new
america.net/blogposts/2012/barclays-studentloanreport..new income based -repayment
enrollment_to_ballooncost_75. The Delisle post does not break out the Barclays or Department of Education enrollment eligibility or enrollment projections separately for law
students. See id. Brian Tamanaha projects that "it is likely that many thousands of recent
law graduates" will enroll in IBR over the coming years. Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2, at
137-38.
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some of the difficulties involved in achieving this objective in light of the
tensions and trade-offs that are inherent in the IBR and PSLF programs.
A.

FACTORS THAT MAY LIMIT IBR PROGRAM ENROLLMENT
BY LAw GRADUATES

There are quite a number of possible reasons why the currently low
rate of IBR program enrollment by law graduates may persist even
though the program terms have become far more generous under the
PAYE rules. First of all, the problem may simply be that many law students and recent law graduates are not aware of the details of the IBR
and PSLF programs and their large financial advantages. 336 They may not
be being provided with clear information regarding the contours of what
are rather complex programs that require considerable financial acumen
to fully understand and evaluate. 337 If not, this would limit the extent to
which the programs are utilized even if much broader use is justified by
their generous provisions. 338 It may also be the case that law students,
being primarily young and academic over-achievers, tend to be an overoptimistic group who generally assume without much investigation and
reflection that they will be able to obtain high-paying legal positions after
graduation and therefore will have no need to avail themselves of subsidized loan repayment programs, and consequently do not pay much attention to IBR or PSLF program brochures or other information. 339
One would think that law schools would find it to be in their interest, as
well as in the interest of their students, to effectively publicize how difficult it will be for many graduates to repay their large law school debts on
unsubsidized terms and to advertise the advantages of the IBR and PSLF
programs and encourage and facilitate their students' enrollment in those
programs. Some law schools are apparently rather aggressively promoting
these programs. 340 However, it is not really possible to make the details
of these programs clear to prospective or current law students without at
the same time communicating the unpalatable message that legal education no longer makes economic sense for many students at even the better non-elite schools, nor for the large majority of students at the lowertier schools, absent a large taxpayer subsidy, a message that many law
336. "[L]ack of easy access to distilled details is the greatest barrier for many indebted
grads. 'People just don't realize the federal government has options available to them' .....
At many law schools, financial aid offices are . .. short-staffed and overwhelmed . .. counselors . . . [lack] . . . adequate knowledge about the changing laws regarding repayment

options." Zahorsky, supra note 334, at 32. "Unfortunately, many [IBR] borrowers simply
don't receive counseling they need to understand the choices that are available to them or
what they need to do to take advantage of them." Stephen Burd et al., Rebalancing Resources and Incentives in Federal Student Aid," NEw AM. FOUND. (Jan. 29, 2013), http://ed
money.newamerica.net/publications/policy/rebalancing-resources-andincentivesinfeder
al student aid.
337. See Zahorsky, supra note 224, at 302.
338. See id.
339. Paul Campos is certainly of this view. CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 15-21 (discussing "Special Snowflake Syndrome").
340. Id. at 50.
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schools may be understandably reluctant to endorse. 341 In addition, many
law school financial aid officers may be relatively unaware of (or in denial
of) 3 4 2 the need for and the advantages and details of these programs.
Second, even those relatively few prospective law students who fully
understand these loan repayment programs may still be reluctant to rely
upon them for one reason or another. There are a considerable number
of uncertainties to ponder. First, many prospective students considering
attending non-elite schools may be unsure whether they will do well
enough academically to be able obtain a position with a median or better
starting salary that would justify incurring such large loan debts. Such
concerns are quite legitimate given the relatively large proportion of law
graduates who are unable to obtain full-time legal positions at the median
or better starting salary, even if they have graduated from upper- or midtier non-elite law schools, 3 4 3 and given the uncertainty that most prospective law students face (or at least should face) as to whether their academic success at the undergraduate level will translate to success in law
school. 3 44 Other prospective students may be uncomfortable with the
debt forgiveness tax liability aspects of the IBR program given how difficult it will be for an enrollee to precisely determine how large their unpaid debt obligations after twenty years are likely to be and how difficult
it will be to determine the precise tax rate that will be applied to that
forgiven debt at the time of discharge. 3 4 5 Students may also be uncomfortable given the substantial risk they face that their escrow deposits
may have to be increased to be sufficient to meet the eventual tax liability
obligation if inflation rates and the rate of return they can expect on their
escrow account are substantially lower than they originally expected. 3 4 6
Some persons may see the balance of advantages of enrolling in the
IBR or PSLF programs but be of the opinion that one should fully repay
his or her debts and therefore will be unwilling to enter into arrangements that would shift much of their debt repayment burden onto taxpayers. 3 4 7 Some other persons may fear the consequences for their credit
ratings and later access to mortgage financing or other important loans of
having such a large debt burden that continually grows through negative
341. As Paul Campos has noted in his inimitable style, "[I]t's politically tricky to advertise that your operation's budget is based on the assumption that taxpayers will pick up the
tab for the large percentage of the loans your graduates take out that won't be repaid.
That's the kind of thing you probably want to keep on the down low to the extent possible." Paul Campos, Will IBR bail out law schools?, INSIDE THE LAw SCHOOL SCAM (December 23, 2012), http://insidethe law school scam.blogspot.com.
342. "Second, it's important not to underestimate how much denial still grips legal
academia. Telling law professors that they're peddling worthless degrees that generate
enormous debts that won't be repaid naturally injures their amour-propre,so they tend not
to believe it, statistics be damned." Id.
343. See Tamanaha, Problems With Income Based Repayment, supra note 15.
344. See CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 15-21.
345. See supra notes 123-147 and accompanying text.

346. See supra notes 147, 148.
347. See TAMANAHA, FAILING

LAw SCHOOLS,

supra note 1, at 178-79.
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amortization, 348 perhaps thinking back to the severe difficulties that the
recent financial crisis imposed on many persons who had taken out negative amortization home mortgages. Other prospective students may fear,
perhaps with good reason, that they may lack the financial self-discipline
to make (without being legally compelled to do so) the regular and substantial escrow deposits over twenty years that will be necessary to eventually have a fund sufficient to pay a potentially large debt forgiveness tax
liability. Or they may even fear that the top-bracket marginal tax rate
that will likely be applicable to most or all of their forgiven debt may be
significantly increased over the next twenty years, perhaps rendering
their escrow account financial provisions inadequate to meet their tax
obligations.
Some prospective law school applicants, particularly those who are already inclined to "think like lawyers" and anticipate and provide for possible adverse contingencies, may question whether a person who enrolls
in the IBR program can rely upon the important debt forgiveness provision still being in force in twenty yearS3 4 9 when they seek to discharge
their remaining unpaid debt that, as I have shown, may be well over
$400,000 by that time. This question of the reliability of the IBR and
PSLF program promises is often overlooked by analysts of those programs. Even Phillip Schrag, who far more than any other writer shows a
detailed understanding of the operation of the IBR program under the
PAYE rules, does not adequately address this question.3 50 Does a borrower who has enrolled in the IBR program face some risk that this debt
forgiveness provision might be made less generous-or even abrogated
entirely-by subsequent Congressional or Presidential action prior to
their debt discharge date? In other words, is the current debt-forgiveness
provision a fixed, unalterable contractual obligation of the federal government, at least with regard to those persons who have already enrolled
in the IBR program, or is that debt forgiveness potentially subject to
change with regard to those borrowers by a Congress or Administration
that is seeking to increase federal revenues?
In his DON'T Go To LAw SCHOOL (UNLESS) book, Paul Campos states
that the IBR program "doesn't create any contractual rights, and could
be changed or eliminated at any time." 351 He has also made statements
elsewhere along the same lines. 3 5 2 Campos is apparently of the view that
348. Id. at 121-122; CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 49. But see Schrag (2012), supra
note 15, at 16-19 (rejecting the validity of such credit concerns).
349. They may also question whether a person can rely on the fact that the PSLF program debt-forgiveness provisions will still be in force in ten years if the graduate is employed in a qualifying public service position. See CAMPOs (2012), supra note 1, at 51.
350. See generally Schrag (2013), supra note 15.
351. CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 49.
352. "Potential applicants are skeptical about whether IBR/PAYE is really going to
work as advertised. Perhaps it will be cut back or eliminated altogether over the years, as
the political process para-glides over an ongoing series of fiscal cliffs." Campos, Will IBR
bail out law schools?, supra note 341. "[T]he IBR program creates no contractual rights for
those who take advantage of it: as a legal matter the program could be eliminated at any
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an IBR enrollee faces the risk that the debt-forgiveness provision applicable to their loan could be legislatively changed even after their enrollment in the program, potentially subjecting them to having to fully repay
the perhaps over $400,000 of outstanding debt that may have built up
after many years of accruing unpaid interest. 3 5 3 Moreover, if Campos is
correct, then the total debt that an IBR program enrollee might have to
repay in a lump sum after twenty years could even be significantly larger
than that sum if the government not only eliminates the debt forgiveness
provision but also eliminates the provisions requiring it to pay the unpaid
accrued interest for the first three years after the repayment obligations
come due, or the provision preventing the capitalization of accrued interest after that three-year period, or both, which the government could presumably also do if it is not contractually committed to those initial loan
repayment terms. 354
If enrollment in the IBR program actually poses a risk of such a financial catastrophe for the enrollees then many prospective law students
would wisely choose not to pursue that option. However, Schrag, in his
2013 article, flatly disagrees with Campos on this point and rather summarily claims in a footnote that the current IBR program debt forgiveness provision is not subject to change with regard to those borrowers
who have already enrolled in the program and thus have relied upon it.35 5
Schrag cites in support of this claim the text of the Master Promissory
Notes for the IBR program and some explanatory materials relating to
those Notes that are all available on a U.S. Department of Education
website. 356 However, review of those materials reveals they are far from
being models of clarity, and, standing alone, they may not be sufficient to
support Schrag's claim and allay any possible borrower concerns in this

time, leaving those dependent upon it with enormous amounts of non-dischargeable debt."
Campos, The Crisis, supra note 2, at 208.
353. See id. (citing to the Master Promissory Notes, MPN without Data Labels, U.S.
DEPT. OF EDUCATION, http://www.direct.ed/gov/mpn.html (last visited April 10, 2014)).
354. See CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 49.
355. "[T]he income-based repayment plan is in fact built into the master promissory
note that a borrower signs and its terms thereby become federal contractual obligations."
Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 18 n.66.
356. Id.
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regard. 357 But if one also looks at the PAYE rules themselves,35 8 or at
some other, more current Department of Education advisory materials
that are available online and that reflect the impact of the PAYE rules,
one finds much clearer support for Schrag's position that the current generous IBR program terms regarding debt forgiveness after twenty years,
and the federal government's payment of accrued unpaid interest for
three years after the IBR repayments are first due, and the subsequent
non-capitalization of unpaid accrued interest after the first three years of
repayment, will all be regarded by the federal government (and, if necessary, also by the courts) as binding contractual commitments, at least for
those graduates who have enrolled in the IBR program prior to any subsequent legislation or administrative measures that would change those
terms. 359 My conclusion is that Schrag is correct here, and that an IBR or
PSLF enrollee need not have any real concern as to whether the government will honor its commitment to forgive the remaining debt obligation
after twenty years (or ten years under the PSLF program) if the enrollee
has complied with all of the program requirements. 360
Finally, a prospective law school applicant may be concerned that they
are vulnerable to adverse modifications of the IBR or PSLF programs
that might occur during the several years after they begin to incur substantial law school debts but prior to their enrollment in the program.
This appears to me to be a legitimate concern. 361 Moreover, this risk of
357. For example, the "Borrower's Rights and Responsibilities Statement"' for the Federal Direct Stafford/Ford Loan program, and for the Federal Direct PLUS Loan program,
cited by Schrag, id., in each case declare that after the expiration of twenty-five years the
unpaid debt under the IBR program "may qualify for cancellation," while the comparable
phrasing there used for the earlier and quite different and rarely used Income Contingent
Repayment program is that the unpaid debt after twenty-five years "will be forgiven." See
id. This different choice of language for the IBR program as compared to the Income
Contingent Repayment program-the use of the term discretionary term "may" rather
than the mandatory term "will"-suggests that the debt-forgiveness feature of the IBR
program may possibly be regarded by the government as discretionary rather than as a
mandatory contractual commitment. See id. In addition, neither the Master Promissory
Notes nor the appended explanatory materials to either Note state with any clarity that
unpaid accrued interest will not be capitalized after the first three years of loan repayment
under the IBR program. See id. These Master Promissory Note materials now available on
the Dept. of Education website, supra note 356, are also somewhat dated in that they make
no reference to any of the changes made by the PAYE rules, such as adoption of a shorter
twenty-year loan repayment term. See id.
358. Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,088 (Nov. 1, 2012) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pts. 674, 682, 685).
359. See, e.g., Pay as You Earn, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repayloans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn (last visited May 13, 2013) ("[I]nterest that accrues
but is not covered by your loan payments will not be capitalized ... any remaining balance
will be forgiven after 20 years of qualifying repayment.")
360. See id. As I have noted above, however, a borrower should not assume that the tax
rate applicable to the forgiven debt will necessarily remain unchanged over the years.
361. This is a legitimate concern because it appears unlikely that the incurring of lawschool debts by a law student, even if those debts were undertaken in the expectation of
later being able to enroll in the IBR or PSLF programs under their current debt-forgiveness terms, would be regarded by courts as creating a promissory estoppel-based vested
contractual right to enroll in one of those specific programs on those terms in the face of
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program changes prior to enrollment is not one that a student can avoid
by enrolling in one or the other of these programs at the time that their
loan debts are first incurred, or very shortly thereafter, since a student is
not entitled to enroll in a loan repayment plan until sometime after their
graduation (or withdrawal from enrollment) when their loans have been
consolidated and the grace period on their loans has expired or been
waived. 362
It appears clear that the large majority of law graduates should
promptly enroll in either the IBR or PSLF programs to repay their student loan debts. Except for those relatively few graduates of one of the
elite law schools, or those law graduates who already have or are confident that they will be able to obtain a legal position paying substantially
more than .the current $60,000/year median starting salary, graduates
should promptly enroll in the IBR program36 3 or in the PSLF program.
Unless one has a high probability of being able to obtain one of the relatively small number of large firm entry-level associate positions that pay
six-figure starting salaries upwards of $160,000/year, or one of the scarce
and coveted PSLF program-qualifying public service positions, the risk of
having to repay out of a relatively low salary upwards of $160,000 to
$250,000 in unsubsidized 7.5% blended annual interest rate government
loans, loans that generally cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, is just too
great.
Law graduates should therefore utilize the IBR or PSLF programs. But
should a person attend a non-elite law school at all, even with the availability of the IBR and PSLF repayment options? That is the more difficult
question. As I have demonstrated above in some detail, under the IBR
attempts by the federal government to modify or terminate those programs prior to that
student's formal enrollment. Courts might well regard such a borrower's expectation that
the preferential terms of federal loan repayment programs would not be modified during
the several years that may pass after they take out their first law school loans but before
their formal enrollment in one or the other of those repayment programs as not being
foreseeable and reasonable reliance that would justify imposing on the federal government
under an estoppel theory the cost of hundreds of millions or perhaps even billions of dollars of foregone tax revenues. A law student taking out student loans is, in my opinion,
exposed to some risk of adverse modification or even termination of the IBR program, the
PSLF program, or both prior to their formal enrollment in one of those programs.
362. The grace period on student loans does not begin to run until the student drops
below half-time enrollment or consolidates their loans. Consolidation of loans is now not
allowed for students still enrolled, so that no law student can now elect a repayment plan
until after graduation. The most that a law graduate can do to accelerate their IBR or
PSLF enrollment is to consolidate their loans immediately after graduation, a process that
takes approximately sixty days, and then waive their grace period, allowing them to enroll
in the IBR or PSLF program approximately sixty days after graduation, several months
sooner than is generally done. Heather Jarvis, personal email to the author (July 1, 2013)
(on file with the author). The usual advice given to graduates is to promptly consider their
repayment options "within a couple of months after graduating," Heather Jarvis, Student
Loan Timeline for GraduatingStudents, 41 STUDENT LAw. 7, (2013), thereby limiting their
exposure to adverse changes in the terms of the loan repayment programs to as short a
time period as possible.
363. This is, of course, assuming that they have the financial self-discipline to regularly
set aside sufficient funds so as to be able to pay the eventual large debt-forgiveness tax
liability.
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program the costs of attending a non-elite law school appear to be justified, just barely, if one is going to be one of the graduates of those schools
who are able to obtain full-time legal positions paying at least $60,000/
year. 364 And under the PSLF program the costs of law school appear to
be justified for anyone inclined to and, more importantly, able to obtain a
qualifying public service position. But, as I have also shown, there are
quite a number of legitimate risks involved in going the IBR route. One
major risk is of course the risk of failing to accurately predict just how
well one will actually perform academically in law school, something that
is very difficult for most people to predict with any certainty, and the
other major risk is the several financial uncertainties discussed above that
are associated with repayment of the eventual IBR debt forgiveness tax
liability. These concerns together should perhaps caution prospective students against enrolling in law school and incurring the large debts involved, even under IBR or PSLF program repayment terms, unless they
are quite certain that they will do well enough academically to have excellent employment opportunities available upon graduation. One might
well conservatively advise such persons not to attend a non-elite law
school unless they reasonably expect to be able to graduate with at least
top-quarter rank at an upper- or mid-tier non-elite law school, or with at
least top-10% rank at a lower tier school, thereby giving themselves a
little margin for error in their academic performance predictions.
Whether prospective law students who cannot gain admission into an
elite law school will also see it this way in the coming years, and then
judiciously choose either to attend a non-elite law school under the IBR
or PSLF program only if they are strong enough students, and if not to
instead seek a different career, is yet unclear.
B.

A

POSSIBLE REFORM OF THE IBR PROGRAM TO MAKE IT
ATTRACTIVE TO POTENTIAL ENROLLEES

MORE

In Part VII of this Article I will briefly consider the several arguments
that can be offered in support of the continued availability of the IBR
program for law students, as well as the several counter-arguments that
can be made for the substantial curtailment or even abolition of the program with regard to those students. For the remainder of this Part VI,
however, I will simply take it as a given that the IBR program as it applies to law and other graduate students is a worthy program that should
and will be continued, and I will briefly consider the complications that
would be introduced by one possible alteration of the program intended
to make it more attractive to potential enrollees. There are, of course,
other possible modifications to the IBR program that are different from
the one that I will here consider. However, I will present a simple and
straightforward modification of the IBR program that appears on its face
to address the more obvious difficulties that it presents that may be dis364. See supra Part V.
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couraging enrollment, which upon closer inspection reveals some of the
trade-offs and unintended consequences that one would encounter in attempting to deal with those difficulties.
The IBR program could, of course, be made more attractive to potential enrollees simply by reducing the monthly payment obligations associated with a given income, by shortening the period during which such
repayments need be made, or by reducing or even eliminating the final
debt-forgiveness tax burden. However, any such changes would obviously
increase the cost of the IBR subsidy to the federal government, raising an
additional concern. I will therefore limit my discussion here to a proposed
change in the IBR program meant to encourage greater enrollments and
that would be revenue-neutral in that it would not increase the aggregate
subsidy provided by the program to the enrollees.
As I have discussed above, one set of legitimate and related concerns
that might be preventing some persons from enrolling in the IBR program is the combination of the uncertain size of their final debt-forgiveness tax liability, the uncertain size of the periodic escrow deposits that
they would need to make to provide for that tax liability, and their lack of
confidence in their ability to force themselves to make those substantial
escrow deposits on a regular basis over many years absent any legal requirement that they do so. These related problems could all be eliminated
by adoption of the following three amendments to the IBR program.
First, the rules could be changed so that a law student would be able to
"lock in" their IBR enrollment on current program terms at the time they
took their initial law school loan. Second, the final debt forgiveness at the
end of the repayment term could be exempted from federal tax liability.
Third, there could be a corresponding revenue-neutral increase in the
percentage of the difference between enrollees' adjusted gross income
and the appropriate poverty-level income that enrollees would be obligated to repay. This would be an increase from the current 10% figure
under the PAYE rules to whatever higher percentage of the difference is
necessary to exactly offset in present value terms the cost of subsidizing
the additional enrollees who would be likely to enroll in the program
given the new tax exemption, the higher repayment percentage imposed,
and the government's eventual loss of debt-forgiveness tax liability payments from the IBR program's enrollees. 365
At first glance, this proposed new arrangement is appealing. Under
these provisions the IBR enrollees would have monthly repayment obligations that were essentially linked to their income and the inflation rate,
therefore removing the above-discussed inflation risk that enrollees now
365. The monthly repayments would need to be increased enough so that the extra
repayments required of enrollees would have an aggregate present value, when discounted
at the federal government's cost of capital, equal to the combined present value of the of
the new subsidies provided to additional enrollees and the lost tax revenues due to the
exemption of debt forgiveness from tax liability. This might have to be a fairly substantial
increase, perhaps to a percentage rate significantly larger than the pre-PAYE rules level of
15%.
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must bear with regard to the sufficiency of their tax liability escrow accounts, as well as removing any risk that the applicable marginal tax rates
or IBR provisions could be changed over time in a manner that is adverse
to their interests. It would also legally commit borrowers to make sufficient payments on a regular basis to fully meet their repayment obligations, avoiding the possibility of their falling into arrears for lack of
sufficient self-discipline in making the now-discretionary tax liability escrow deposits. The government, in turn, would receive enough in extra
monthly repayments over current IBR loan repayments to offset both the
subsidies to additional IBR enrollees and the future loss of debt-forgiveness tax revenues so that the changes would be revenue-neutral.
A little closer scrutiny, however, reveals some difficulties that this particular proposal to encourage IBR enrollment would present. First of all,
the new arrangement would create additional cross-subsidies from highincome borrowers to low-income borrowers beyond those inherent in the
current IBR provisions. Let me explain this point. For any across-theboard increase in the percentage of IBR enrollees' adjusted gross incomes in excess of the applicable poverty level income from 10% to a
higher percentage, the burden of the increase in monthly repayments
would be proportionally larger for high-income enrollees than for lowincome enrollees that had the same amount of outstanding debt. However, under the current IBR provisions high-income enrollees will have
lower amounts of outstanding debt at the time of debt forgiveness than
will low-income enrollees who have borrowed the same initial amount,
since because of their higher monthly loan repayments those high-income
enrollees will have accrued less unpaid interest, so they will therefore
benefit less from the exemption of debt forgiveness from tax liability than
will low-income borrowers whose debt has increased by a larger amount
during the loan term. In other words, while increasing the percentage of
their income that IBR enrollees would be required to pay could be made
essentially revenue-neutral for the federal government, given the appropriate increase in that percentage, it would not be neutral as to enrollees
in that it would reallocate the distribution of the IBR subsidies more towards low-income borrowers and away from high-income borrowers. This
proposal would therefore go beyond simply encouraging persons to make
greater use of the IBR provisions and would change the distribution of
the program's benefits across different classes of enrollees, thereby raising additional and controversial policy issues. 366
A second difficulty with this proposed change in the IBR rules is that
the complete exemption of debt forgiveness from tax liability would exacerbate the perverse incentive that the IBR program now creates for borrowing as much as possible even if the funds are not necessary to pay for
366. Although given that the IBR program currently provides substantially larger subsidies to low-income borrowers than to high-income borrowers, the slight reallocation of the
program's subsidies to further favor low-income borrowers that this proposed reform
would provide is perhaps not that significant.
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the expenses of law school.36 7 As discussed above, approximately half of
the student loans that an IBR enrollee might now incur beyond their financial needs during law school are essentially "free money," 3 68 as are
100% of the comparable loans for PSLF program enrollees who need not
provide for future debt-forgiveness tax liability. This proposal would increase the incentive of IBR enrollees to borrow as much as they possibly
can, regardless of their financial needs, and would consequently place law
schools under even greater pressure to exaggerate their "authorized educational expenses" so as to facilitate student borrowing, requiring closer
governmental oversight of these figures to counteract.
Brief consideration of this simple IBR program reform proposal that I
have set forth above reveals that the program embodies a basic set of
tensions that are difficult to resolve through only relatively minor adjustments. First of all, for the IBR program to adequately address the law
school affordability problem for most law graduates that is presented by
the high $160,000 to $250,000 cost of a Harvard-style legal education, the
required monthly loan repayments payments will have to be set so low
that there will necessarily be negative amortization of the loans and, consequently, a large unpaid loan debt remaining at the end of the loan term.
If that debt is not then forgiven, or even if it is partially forgiven through
being treated as taxable income, this then imposes a large and uncertain
liability on IBR enrollees that will be difficult for them to provide for,
thus discouraging enrollment in the program and costing the government
money to provide this total or partial debt forgiveness. But, on the other
hand, if this debt is wholly forgiven this will create new cross-subsidies
across different classes of enrollees, as well as creating, as previously discussed, a perverse incentive for prospective enrollees to borrow as much
as they can, even if it is more than is needed for them to cover law school
costs. It is not apparent to me how the IBR program might be selectively
modified within its current general contours to simultaneously address all
of these concerns.
VII.

THE FUTURE OF THE IBR PROGRAM

The IBR program under the PAYE rules may enable many upper- or
mid-tier non-elite law schools to avoid having to make immediate and
drastic changes to their cost structures and tuition charges if their students in the coming few years prove to be willing to continue to enroll at
current tuition levels and incur large loan debtS3 6 9 in reliance on the IBR
or PSLF program options. But will the IBR program remain as generous
367. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
369. Estimates of the current amount of federal student loans taken out each year by
law students are in the neighborhood of $4 billion/year. Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2, at
142 ("[A]lmost $4 billion dollars each year .... ); Campos, The Crisis, supra note 2, at
204-05 ("[A]pproximately $4.375 billion per year of relatively high-interest federal debt
that law students borrow to attend law school."). William Henderson and Rachel Zahorsky
estimate that between $36 billion and $72 billion will be borrowed by law students from the

130

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

for law students as it has now become under the PAYE rules? Or is there
a real possibility that the IBR program, the PSLF program, or both will
be significantly curtailed or even eliminated, at least for law student
borrowers?
The political risk here is considerable, in my opinion. The continuation
of the IBR and PSLF programs for law students in their current form is
far from certain for several reasons. First of all, given the controversial
nature of persistently large federal government deficits, 370 any federal
program that is perceived as significantly increasing those deficits by providing substantial benefits to a discrete group of individuals will remain
under continued critical Congressional scrutiny.37 ' This will be the case
even for those federal programs that seek worthy objectives and that
have had at least partial success in achieving those objectives, such as the
IBR and PSLF programs. 372 If the IBR and PSLF program enrollments
do grow rapidly in the coming few years, as some predict,373 the programs
will assuredly come under especially close Congressional review. 374
The IBR and PLSF programs are generally regarded as subsidy programs that cost the federal government money and that therefore have to
be justified in light of these costs. 37 5 But just how substantial are those
subsidies with regard to the subset of law student and other graduate student enrollees? This is actually quite a difficult question to answer since it
requires a hypothetical counterfactual comparison, and it is a question
that certainly merits a much more detailed empirical inquiry than I am
able to here carry out.
Let me briefly outline this conundrum. Graduate student loans at current federal student loan interest rates are clearly profitable to the federal
government. The unsubsidized Stafford loans made to law students and
other graduate students carry a relatively high 6.8% annual interest rate,
and the Grad PLUS loans carry an even higher 7.9% annual interest rate
and also require a 4% one-time loan origination fee. Moreover, the federal government is currently able to finance its funding needs by selling
ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds paying in the neighborhood of only 2% to
federal government between 2010 and 2020. William D. Henderson & Rachael Zahorsky,
The Law School Bubble, ABA J. (Jan. 2012), at 35.
370. See Federal Budget Deficit, GALLOP, (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
147626/federal-budget-deficit.aspx.
371. See Matt Leichter, Income Based Repayment: Lifeline for Law Graduates,Certain
Loser for Government, Am. LAW., Oct. 11, 2012.
372. The often-stated primary objectives of the IBR and PSLF programs are to broaden
access to higher education and to encourage public service. See generally Schrag (2013),
supra note 15; Schrag (2007), supra note 15. They have surely been at least partially successful in achieving these objectives.
373. See Tamanaha (2013), supra note 2, at 137-38.
374. There is already at least one piece of legislation that has been introduced in the
House of Representatives, the Earnings Contingent Education Loans Act (introduced by
Thomas Petri, R-Wisconsin) that would both eliminate the debt forgiveness on IBR loans
and discontinue the PSLF program. Thomas E. Petri, How to Repair Income-Based Repayment of Student Loans, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., June 10, 2013, available at chronicle.com/
article/How-to-Repair-Income-Based/139697.
375. See Tamanaha, Problems With Income Based Repayment, supra note 15, at 10-11.
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3% annual interest rates and by selling shorter term U.S. Treasury bonds
paying even lower rates. Therefore, there is a very large spread between
federal graduate student loan interest rates and the government's cost of
capital that results in considerable profit to the government, even allowing for defaults on a significant proportion of those loans.3 76 To the
extent that these same loans are made instead under more generous IBR
or PSLF program terms, those profits will be reduced, since as I have
shown the monthly loan repayments will be sharply reduced. Moreover,
the IBR debt-forgiveness provision will also reduce the final repayment
burden of enrollees after twenty years by approximately 67% to only the
taxes due on the debt forgiveness,3 7 7 and the PLSF program will forgive
the unpaid loan debt entirely after ten years.37 8
If one simply compares the government's net revenues on unsubsidized
graduate student loans with the much smaller net revenues that would
result for the same volume of IBR program loans, PSLF program loans,
or both, as I did in Part V of this Article, those programs do indeed appear to be rather generous subsidy programs. For example, with the IBR
subsidy for a $250,000 loan to a single borrower being approximately
87.5% of the loan amount, as compared to making that same loan on
unsubsidized terms, and the PSLF subsidy on a comparable loan being
161% of the loan amount.3 7 9 But is this really the proper comparison to
make? Will law students and other graduate students in fact be willing to
take out anywhere near the same volume of government student loans on
unsubsidized terms in the coming years as they would if the IBR and
PSLF programs were available?
It may be the case that many persons who are willing to borrow to pay
for their graduate school education on the generous IBR or PSLF program terms would not be willing to do so under much more expensive
unsubsidized 7.5% blended annual interest rate terms. If a substantial
number of persons are willing to borrow on IBR or PSLF program terms
but are unwilling to borrow on unsubsidized 7.5% annual interest rate
terms, then the proper comparison for determining the size of the IBR
and PSLF program subsidies would be to compare the government's net
revenues on graduate student loans, with the IBR and PSLF programs in
force, with the government's hypothetical net revenues on the perhaps
significantly smaller volume of graduate student loans that would be
taken out on unsubsidized terms in the absence of those programs.3 80
If graduate and law student reluctance to borrow on unsubsidized 7.5%
annual interest rate terms is so pronounced that the choice that the federal government actually faces is between making a large volume of modestly subsidized graduate and law student loans on IBR or PSLF program
376.
loans."
377.
378.
379.
380.

"Owing to high interest rates, the government makes a significant profit on student
Tamanaha, Problems With Income Based Repayment, supra note 15, at 11 n.43.
See supra notes 150-171.
See CAMPOS (2012), supra note 1, at 49.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
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repayment terms, or making very few (though individually highly profitable) graduate student loans on unsubsidized terms, then the total subsidy
provided through the IBR and PSLF programs may actually be relatively
modest in size. 381 In all likelihood, the substantial curtailment or elimination of the IBR and PSLF programs for graduate students would significantly reduce but not eliminate altogether the volume of graduate
student loans. But without knowing how substantial this reduction in loan
volume would be, one cannot determine how large a subsidy to provide
for law students and other graduate students by the IBR and PSLF
programs.
If it can be shown convincingly that the subsidies provided by the IBR
and PSLF programs for graduate and law students are, in the aggregate,
actually quite modest in size because sufficiently many prospective students would be unwilling to take out those same student loans under unsubsidized repayment terms, then the deficit hawks will likely move on to
other matters, and the more likely political pressures that will be felt here
will be to maintain or even further liberalize the IBR program, such as
perhaps by eliminating the tax liability on forgiven debt as is now done
under the PSLF program 382 or by simply reducing the interest rates on
graduate student loans.
Let me assume for the sake of further discussion that the IBR and
PSLF programs are proven to be (or at least continue to be perceived by
political leaders to be) on balance a significant taxpayer subsidy of legal
education. There then would arise a legitimate question as to whether this
subsidy is really good social policy, all things considered, that should be
continued.
The major argument in favor of allowing law students to enroll in the
IBR program is of course that this facilitates access to legal education for
persons of modest means, and that without such a subsidized loan repayment program legal education and the many subsequent professional and
political opportunities available to lawyers would be largely restricted to
persons from privileged family backgrounds, given legal education's
$160,000 to $250,000 cost.383 The PSLF program can be justified on the
same basis, as well as on the basis that it facilitates the provision of important public services. A second argument that has been made in support of the IBR and PSLF programs is that their impacts in reducing the
costs of legal education will not only benefit law graduates but will also
indirectly contribute to the broader availability of affordable legal services for currently underserved low-income and middle-class clients. 384 A
third argument that can be made in support of these programs, one with
admittedly somewhat limited normative appeal but perhaps having some
381. I have calculated that the subsidy percentage for a $250,000 IBR loan to a single
borrower would be only 13.3% of that loan, see supra note 322 and accompanying text, and
only 86.8% on a comparable PSLF loan, see supra note 328 and accompanying text.
382. This change is proposed by Delisle & Holt, supra note 15, at 15.
383. See generally Schrag (2013), supra note 15.
384. Id. at 26-27.
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practical force, is a kind of "facts on the ground" argument: given how
highly dependent legal education at the many non-elite schools has already and will increasingly become on the flow of subsidized government
loans, it would just be too disruptive to too many law schools and law
faculty members to now suddenly withdraw that financial support.38
However, a number of relatively strong criticisms can also be made of
these programs. One such criticism focuses specifically upon the interests
of IBR enrollees who graduate from law schools or from other graduate
programs that as a practical matter also require students to incur large
loan debts. That criticism is that the very low initial payment cap imposed
by the PAYE rules for graduates taking low initial starting salaries may
induce short-sighted persons into borrowing heavily to finance educational programs that may lead to positions that pay well enough for graduates to meet these low IBR monthly loan repayment obligations, but not
paying enough for the borrowers to also set aside sufficient funds in escrow to eventually meet their large debt-forgiveness tax liability. 38 6 This
will be the probable unpleasant result for many if not most law students
who enroll in the IBR program to finance their legal education at a
lower-tier law school and also for many students at upper- or mid-tier
non-elite law schools who graduate with undistinguished records. Thus,
the IBR program can be criticized as a means by which the law schools
and the federal government each take advantage of these borrowers'
short-sightedness and financial inexperience.3 8 7
It is beyond argument that law students are disproportionately (although not exclusively) drawn from higher income socioeconomic groups
that are less in need of taxpayer assistance than are some other supplicants that are in far more dire financial circumstances, and that the law
schools who indirectly will receive most of the student loan funds as tuition payments3 88 are by and large relatively affluent institutions. The law
faculty members who will then receive as compensation much of this student debt-financed tuition revenue are obviously also a relatively affluent
group. The subsidies provided by the IBR and PSLF programs out of
general taxpayer funds thus appear to be somewhat regressive in nature.
In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has projected that the number
of new law graduates is likely to exceed the number of net legal positions
available over the next decade as a result of economic growth and retirements by approximately a two-to-one ratio, even under rather optimistic
assumptions that the economy will grow relatively rapidly in the coming
few years and will reach full employment by 2020.389 This projected im385. See Steven R. Smith, Financingthe Future of Legal Education: "Not What it Used
to Be", 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 579, 610.
386. See Smith, supra note 1, at 595.
387. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLs, supra note 1, at 119-125; CAMPOS (2012),
supra note 1, at 46-51.
388. "In most law schools, federal student loans to the law students near or exceed the
total revenue from tuition." Smith, supra note 1, at 592. "[F]ederal loans have become the
lifeblood of legal education." Id. at 610.
389. See supra note 30.
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balance calls into question the wisdom of subsidizing legal education at
the taxpayers' expense at this time, rather than to allow market supply390
and-demand forces to operate to eliminate this surplus. .
Both Brian Tamanaha and Paul Campos have been highly critical of
the IBR program.39 1 Each of their critiques focus primarily on what they
perceive to be the disadvantages of the IBR program for law graduate
enrollees rather than on the broader social interests that may be thwarted
by the use of the program by law graduates. 392 Jason Delisle and Alex
Holt, in their extensive analysis of the IBR program, 393 are also quite
critical, particularly of the liberalization of IBR's monthly repayment and
debt-forgiveness terms resulting from the changes made by the 2010 legislative amendments and the subsequent PAYE rules, but their criticisms
focus much more on these broader social concerns rather than on the
circumstances of the IBR enrollees. 394
Besides also noting the perverse incentives that I have discussed that
the IBR and PSLF programs' repayment terms create encouraging excessive borrowing, 395 Delisle and Holt emphasize that because of the way
the IBR program is structured it provides the bulk of its benefits to highincome, high-debt borrowers such as law students and other professional
students, while its subsidies are far less generous for undergraduates who
enroll in the IBR program with much lower debt levels and later obtain
lower post-graduate incomes. 39 6 They criticize this skewed distributional
feature of the program as being unfair, as well as making graduate students much less sensitive to tuition costs, thus facilitating further cost and
tuition increases by law and graduate schools.3 97 They recommend a
number of changes in the IBR program designed to remove these disparities in enrollee benefits and perverse incentives, including, among other
recommendations, a call for restoring the IBR program's pre-PAYE rules
payment cap (15% of adjusted gross income minus the poverty-level income) for borrowers whose adjusted gross income is more than 300% of
the federal poverty wage, 398 restoring the prior twenty-five-year repayment period before debt forgiveness takes place for persons whose loan
balances initially exceed $40,000,399 and eliminating the federal tax liabil390. "Here is a question law schools keep hoping doesn't get asked: if there's a massive
oversupply of lawyers in America, to the point where half of all new law graduates aren't
getting legal jobs at all, why is the federal government issuing billions of dollars of taxpayer
subsidies every year to produce twice as many new layers as the economy can absorb, at a
vastly higher price than they would be produced if those subsidies didn't exist?" CAMPOS
(2012), supra note 1, at 51.
391. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw ScHooLs, supra note 1, at 119-125; CAMPOS
(2012), supra note 1, at 48-51.
392. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw ScHooLs, supra note 1, at 119-125; CAMPOS
(2012), supra note 1, at 48-51.
393. See Delisle & Holt, supra note 15.
394. See id. at ii.
395. See id. at 12.
396. Id. at 11-13.
397. Id. at 12.
398. Id. at 13.
399. Id. at 13-14.
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ity on forgiven debt. 4 0 0
In sharp contrast, Phillip Schrag has mounted a spirited defense of the
IBR program, at least in its more restrictive pre-PAYE rule form, emphasizing its role in providing broader access to legal education. 4 0 1 He also
suggested, as noted earlier, that its impacts in reducing the costs of legal
education will not only benefit law graduates but may also contribute to
the broader availability of affordable legal services for currently underserved low-income and middle-class clients. 40 2 One aspect of his defense
is to attempt to refute Tamanaha's specific claims made in FAILING LAW
SCHOOLS that enrollment in the IBR program might be unwise for enrollees, 40 3 either because of the large size of the total interest payment obligations under the extended repayment terms of the program or because
of possible adverse credit rating implications. 404 Schrag is quite convincing in this refutation of Tamanaha's interest payment burden claims, in
my opinion, making many of the same points that I have made in this
Article, and he is also persuasive in his refutation of the credit rating
concerns. 405
The other aspect of Schrag's defense of the IBR program is his responses to criticisms that the program is an inappropriate public subsidy
to legal education 406 and to Delisle and Holt's more specific criticism that
the IBR program, at least since it has been liberalized by the PAYE rules,
is unfair in that it diverts taxpayer dollars to relatively wealthy graduate
students. 40 7 Schrag's response to those who criticize the IBR program as
an inefficient public subsidy of legal education is to point out that there
are many other subsidies provided for higher education, both in the U.S.
and elsewhere, and that the IBR subsidy is not excessive in comparison.408 Moreover, in his opinion, "American society is laced with subsidies and cross-subsidies; those to higher education are hardly
exceptional." 4 0 9 This "governments provide subsidies all the time"-type
defense is, however, somewhat problematic in that it is unresponsive to
critics who would argue that the existence of other inefficient subsidies in
400. Id. at 15. This last recommendation seems somewhat incongruous given their concerns that the IBR program disproportionately and unfairly benefits high debt borrowers,
since eliminating the tax on forgiven student-loan debt would appear to worsen those perceived inequities.
If the IBR program is amended to eliminate federal tax liability on forgiven debt, this
would presumably still leave IBR enrollees subject to state income tax liability on that
forgiven debt, unless the applicable state has also amended its tax laws to conform with the
federal law amendment or the federal law changes would be interpreted as preempting
state law in this area.
401. Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 9-21.
402. Id. at 27-28.
403.

TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 120-126.

404. Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 12-19.
405. Id. at 17-19.
406. Id. at 19-20 (responding to various critics that he cites and discusses in note 77 of
his article).
407. Id. at 20-21 (responding to Delisle & Holt, supra note 15).
408. Id. at 19-20.
409. Id. at 20.
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higher education and elsewhere does not alone justify yet another inefficient subsidy program, and that an affirmative defense of this particular
subsidy program is called for in light of its inefficiencies and costs.
Schrag's rather summary response to the Delisle and Holt's equitybased critique of the IBR program, and to their corresponding recommendations for changes, is to criticize their proposed criterion for determining who would qualify as a "wealthy" graduate student and therefore
would be limited to the less generous pre-PAYE rules IBR repayment
and debt-forgiveness terms. 4 1 0 In my opinion, however, while Schrag may
be correct that Delisle and Holt have set their proposed criterion of
300% of the poverty-level income for defining a wealthy borrower 41 ' a
little too low, he does not really attempt to address their well-articulated
distributional concerns about the program. Schrag does make the interesting point that the subsidies provided by the IBR program, being larger
for graduates with smaller incomes, other things being equal, are actually
considerably more progressive in their incidence than is the distribution
of "merit" scholarships now provided by law schools, which tend to be
focused for U.S. News and World Report annual ranking purposes upon
the applicants with the highest LSAT scores and undergraduate grades,
students who are also the most likely to end up taking well-compensated
positions with large law firms. 4 1 2
My conclusion here is that Schrag is correct in dismissing the various
concerns that are expressed by Tamanaha and Campos disparaging the
claimed benefits of the IBR program for law graduates, at least for those
graduates who will do well enough academically to be able to obtain fulltime legal positions paying at least the $60,000/year median starting salary. The IBR program, and especially the more generous PSLF program,
as I have demonstrated in perhaps excessive detail, is a very good deal for
those persons who enroll when compared to the unpalatable alternative
of having to repay unsubsidized federal student loans. Tamanaha and
Campos are, however, correct in arguing that the costs of law school are
not justified, even under IBR terms, for the large majority of graduates of
lower-tier law schools, and even for many graduates of upper- and midtier non-elite schools, since those students will be unable to obtain fulltime legal positions paying at least in the neighborhood of $60,000/year,
and that many prospective applicants will be unable for one reason or
another to accurately assess whether their academic and later employment prospects justify enrollment. 413
In addition, Schrag has not, in my opinion, adequately refuted the criticism that the IBR program is an inefficient subsidy, nor has he addressed
the distributional concerns raised by Delisle and Holt. Moreover, he has
410. Id.
411. Delisle & Holt, supra note 15, at 13.
412. Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 16 n.63.
413. See TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 120-25; CAMPOS (2012),
supra note 1, at 46-51.
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not even attempted to address the broader criticism looming in the background of these discussions that, even if the IBR program is an effective
subsidy program for facilitating broader access to legal education, given
the current extreme oversupply of young lawyers this program may not
be as effective a use of public funds as would be some other federal programs (or tax reductions).
I will not in this Article take a definitive position on this complicated
and controversial question of the overall social merits of the IBR and
PSLF programs since the narrower focus of my analysis here has been on
the implications of these programs in their current form for prospective
law students and for law schools. However, a discerning reader cannot
fail to have noticed that these programs raise a number of legitimate concerns that should be somehow addressed, and that as I have noted in Part
VI of this Article it will be difficult to amend these programs to adequately address these concerns in a revenue-neutral fashion without fundamentally changing their nature. Nor will I take a position regarding
how large are the subsidies that these programs have and will in the future provide to law students and law schools. Answering that question
would require a comprehensive empirical assessment of the willingness of
law students to continue to take out student loans in the future on unsubsidized terms, which to my knowledge has not been carried out by
anyone.
I am of the opinion, however, that if the IBR program enrollment rates
for law students do increase sharply in the coming few years, as appears
likely once the favorable impact of the PAYE rules on repayment obligations become more widely understood, and if this increase in law student
enrollment is perceived by political leaders (rightly or wrongly) as imposing a substantial and growing subsidy cost upon the federal government,
this increased cost along with the other concerns that have been raised
may result in the these programs being made less generous and/or less
available, at least for law-student borrowers, if not for other types of students as well,4 14 perhaps even being eliminated altogether for law students. As I have discussed, such a change would likely have immediate
and dramatic adverse consequences for non-elite legal education.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Harvard-style legal education now costs students on average between
$160,000 and $250,000 for their three years of study, the precise amount
for any particular student depending on the law school attended, the alternative employment opportunities foregone, the amount of scholarship
assistance provided, and the availability of summer employment. But the
414. Brian Tamanaha, for example, has called for limits on the availability of federal
student loans for law students, based on school-specific indicia of the relative success that
the school's graduates have had in the employment market and also for caps on the aggregate student-loan debt that would be allowed for the students of any single law school.
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 177-81.
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median starting salary for full-time entry-level legal positions has now
fallen to $60,000/year. Moreover, upwards of 45% of recent law graduates
are unable to obtain full-time legal employment at all. While most students at elite law schools can still justify incurring the high costs of a legal
education because of the attractive employment prospects they will have
upon graduation, even under unsubsidized federal graduate student loan
terms, the current limited job opportunities do not justify incurring those
costs on those unsubsidized repayment terms for many students at even
the upper-or mid-tier non-elite law schools, nor for the large majority of
students at lower-tier law schools. However, the existence of the IBR
program as implemented by the PAYE rules significantly changes the financial equation for prospective students considering attending one or
another of the non-elite schools.
I have in this article conducted several different analyses of the impact
of the IBR program and of the related and even more generous PSLF
program. My analyses were necessarily based upon certain underlying assumptions about future salary and overall price level trends, specifically
that both lawyer starting salaries and non-lawyer fourth-year salaries
would then increase by 5%/year in nominal terms over the relevant time
periods, and that the rate of price inflation and corresponding rate of
increase in the poverty level income would be 3%/year over those time
periods. My overall conclusion, based on these assumptions, is that the
IBR program provisions are sufficiently generous so that Harvard-style
legal education remains a financially viable proposition for many prospective law students. This is so not only for those persons who are considering attending one of the elite law schools, but also for many persons
considering attending non-elite law schools, at least for those students
who are reasonably confident that they will be able to graduate in the top
quarter or at the very least the upper half of their classes at one of the
approximately forty upper- or mid-tier non-elite law schools,41 5 and also
for those students who are confident they will be able to earn top-10% or
at least top-quarter of their class grades at one or another of the 150+
lower-tier law schools. For most other law students, however, who in the
current depressed employment market have only modest chances of ob415. The prospects for students who graduate only in the middle of their classes at
upper- or mid-tier non-elite law schools may improve in the coming years even absent job
market improvement. I have estimated that approximately 42% of the graduates at upperor mid-tier law schools will probably now be able to obtain full-time legal positions paying
at least the median $60,000/year salary. If law school enrollments decline significantly at
these schools in the coming few years, as seems likely, a student will not have to do quite as
well academically, as compared to his class peers, to have a reasonable possibility of obtaining such a position.
For example, consider such a school that now graduates 225 students each year, and
usually places about 42% of those students-ninety-five graduates-in such positions. If
that school now reduces over time the size of its graduating class by 20% to 180 students,
now about 95/180 = 52.7% of its graduates should be able to obtain those $60,000/year
positions. The risk for a prospective applicant that would be associated with only average
or slightly above-average law school academic performance will now be significantly
reduced.
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taining a full-time entry-level legal position paying even the modest median starting salary of $60,000/year, and only a very slim chance of
obtaining a PSLF-qualifying public service legal position, attending law
school is no longer economically justified even with these heavily subsidized loan repayment options.
The continuation of Harvard-style legal education at many upper- and
mid-tier non-elite law schools will depend to a large extent upon the willingness of students at those schools to continue to borrow the large sums
needed to pay for this expensive education and then enroll in the IBR or
PSLF programs to reduce the repayment burden of those debts. My analysis has lead me to conclude that many (but not all) prospective law students considering attending upper- or mid-tier non-elite law schools
should go ahead and matriculate and then after their graduation enroll in
the IBR program, even given the financial risks involved, specifically
those students with reasonable expectations of graduating in the top
quarter or at the very least the top half of their class. Those students
should take out the needed student loans and then enroll in the IBR program as soon as possible to contractually lock in these favorable repayment and loan forgiveness terms. Whether prospective students will do so
on a large scale in the coming years, however, is for the several reasons
that I have discussed somewhat uncertain, and it is not clear how the
impediments to greater enrollment can be easily addressed through relatively minor amendments given the tensions and trade-offs inherent in
those programs. Moreover, even with the IBR and PSLF program options available, except for exceptionally able or unusually well-connected
students, the employment prospects upon graduation for a person attending any of the more than 150 lower-tier law schools simply do not justify
incurring the costs involved. There is consequently likely to be a sharp
decline in the enrollments at such law schools as these facts become more
widely understood, which will probably lead to many of them closing
their operations.
Finally, one should not assume that the current IBR and PSLF programs will necessarily continue to be available to law graduates indefinitely in their current form. The regressive taxpayer subsidies of
uncertain aggregate size that these programs provide 416 to law students
and indirectly to law professors, persons that are drawn disproportionately from the upper-income socioeconomic groups in society, makes
these programs an attractive target for political leaders looking for opportunities to reduce federal deficits. This is particularly likely now that
there is widely understood to be a pronounced oversupply of new lawyers
relative to their employment opportunities. There certainly are several
arguments that can be made that these programs should be continued

416. These subsidies are uncertain in amount, as I have discussed in Part V of this
Article, since it is unclear the extent to which IBR or PSLF enrollees would be willing to
borrow on unsubsidized federal loan terms.
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with regard to law students, 4 1 7 including an under-appreciated argument
that the subsidies that they provide to law students and other graduate
students are actually relatively modest,4 1 8 but the ultimate fate of these
programs is uncertain. They may well be restricted in the coming years in
their generosity or availability for law students and other graduate
students.
The elite law schools will be fine in any case, of course, but the deans of
other law schools and other legal education leaders may only have a relatively short period of time to take proactive steps that will significantly
reduce law school costs and tuitions for the upper-and mid-tier non-elite
schools so as to keep legal education financially viable at those schools.
This will probably be at a significantly reduced scale of operations and
tuition levels, especially if the IBR program is substantially curtailed or
even eliminated for law students. And, in my opinion, the curtailment of
the availability of the IBR program for law students would be the death
knell for many if not most of the lower-tier law schools.

417. See, e.g., Schrag (2013), supra note 15, at 9-21.
418. See supra text accompanying note 333.

